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THE CONTRACTING/PRODUCING AMBIGUITY AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE
MEANS/ENDS DISTINCTION IN EMPLOYMENT

Julia Tomassetti*
The principal source of instability in the employment/non-employment
distinction is neither imprecision in the legal tests nor the disjuncture between
static legal categories and the changing organization of work away from
industrialforms since the 1970s. Rather, it is the contradictionbetween equality
and servitude embedded within the employment contract. The employment
contract in the United States is a product of the nineteenth century incorporation
of master-servant status relations into contracts for labor services. The legal
rendering of master-servantauthority as a "contract" collapses a fundamental
distinction on which contemporary decision makers rely to chfferentiate
employment from other work relationships-thedistinction between whether the
alleged employer has a right to control the "means and manner" of the work,
the process, as opposed to only a right to control the "ends" of the work, the
product. It creates an ambiguity in employment between contracting(regarding
the ends) and production (the means), or between contractualformation and
performance.
One manifestation of the collapse of the means/ends distinction due to the
contradiction between servitude and equality in employment is judicial discord
over the phenomenon of upfront contractual specification (UCS). In several
legal disputes over whether certain work relationships are "employment"
relationships, the written contract governing the work includes detailed and
somewhat comprehensive rules. The alleged employer claims that the
contractual rules describe the "results" and not the "work." It may even
suggest that the rules are probative of non-employment because they limit its
authority. The workers claim that the contractual rules are an exercise of
control over their work, thus demonstrating an employment relationship. The
contracting/producingambiguityposes intractableinterpretativeproblems when
evaluating claims of control over the work relationship based on UCS.
The contracting/producing ambiguity is constant and permanent. The
distinction between employment and non-employment depends on the
institutionalizationof employment as a social practice. Legal decision makers
help to stabilize the distinction by constructing institutionalmarkers that signify
employment or non-employment, such as the bureaucraticand temporal markers
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of industrial work. This Article proposes that decision makers often construct
and interpose the written contract, andpractice of signing it, as an institutional
referent that signifies non-employment by purporting to separate contracting
from producing andto defend a sphere of independence in production.
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INTRODUCTION

Accounts for the notorious inconsistency in legal decisions over who is, and
who is not, in an employment relationship tend to emphasize imprecision in the
legal tests for employment or a disjuncture between relatively static legal
categories and emergent post-industrial forms of work.' This article will argue
that contradiction within the employment contract is the principal source of legal
instability in the employment/non-employment distinction. Judges and treatise
writers created what we know as the "employment contract"-working for
another under the other's direction and control-in the nineteenth century by
incorporating master-servant status authority into contracts for labor services.2
The constituent concepts of the legal definition of employment-equality in
contracting and servitude in production-are contradictory. This tension has
always been there, and it tends to become salient in the form of concrete
interpretative problems for legal decision makers in the face of institutional
instability or disruption.
This Article examines one doctrinal consequence of the servitude-equality
contradiction-the collapsed ends/means or product/process distinction.

1.
See, e.g., Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can't Tell an Employee When It Sees
One and How It Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 298-301, 338 (2001)
(arguing that tests for determining employment status are ambiguous and lead to uncertainty);
Katherine V.W. Stone, Legal Protectionsfor Atypical Employees: Employment Law for Workers
Without Workplaces andEmployees with Employers, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 251, 281-282
(2006) (arguing that work relationships today blur distinctions between employees and other
categories of workers). See generally KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS (2004)
(arguing that contemporary employment practices no longer fit a regime of employment and labor
law based on industrial models of work).
2.
See generally CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 268-78 (1993) (citations omitted) (describing the "new employment relation"
that emerged during the nineteenth century).
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Whether the alleged employer has a right to control the "manner and means" of
the work (the process), as opposed to only the "ends" or "results" of the work
(the product) is the principal distinction upon which decision makers rely to
differentiate employment from other work relationships, such as independent
contracting and joint employment. 3 The employment contract grounded the
employer's authority to direct the work in a contractual right.4 The means/ends
test in theory distinguishes the ordinary contract-in which both parties control
the ends of the contract but neither party has a right to control how the other
meets its contractual obligations-from the employment contract, in which one
party, the employer, has a right to determine how the other party, the employee,
meets its contractual obligations. Yet, the rendering of master-servant authority
as a contract also makes the means/end difference illusory by making ambiguous
the distinction between bargaining over the work and carrying out the work, or
between the activities of contracting and producing. The essence of the
employment contract is that the employer and employee do not agree on
contractually enforceable ends.
The definition of employment merges
domination and consent, or subordination and equality, and yet it also requires
decision makers to deconstruct this coincidence to distinguish employment from
other work relationships.
The ambiguity between contracting and producing destabilizes the
distinction between employment and non-employment by collapsing the
product/process distinction. This Article provides two main demonstrations of
this argument. First, this Article will excavate the doctrinal structure of the
employment contract through an analysis of its history and a comparison of the
employment contract to contract proper. Second, this Article examines judicial
disagreement over "upfront contractual specification" (UCS). 6
Claims of UCS present an intractable problem under the means/ends query.
In several disputes over the status of workers as independent contractors, and
over the status of companies as joint employers of their contractors' employees,

3.
See, e.g., Darden, 503 U.S. at 323-24 & n.3 (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v.
Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 740, 751-52 (1989)) ("[T]he hiring party's right to control the manner and
means by which the product is accomplished" determines employment status where federal statutes
do not provide a helpful definition of employment); Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61, 7475 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 726, 730 (1947))
(holding that the legal standard for employment status under federal and state wage and hour laws
requires distinguishing control over the terms and conditions of work from control over contractedfor results); S.G. Borello & Sons v. Dep't of Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 406 (Cal. 1989)
(quoting Laeng v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., 494 P.2d 1, 4-5 (Cal. 1972)) ("control-of-workdetails" test for distinguishing employees from independent contractors governs workers
compensation disputes).
4.
See JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 13
(1983); PHILLIP SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY, AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE 131-32, 137 (1969) (noting

that it was not clear legally that property ownership alone would give employers the right to control
employees); cases cited supra note 3.
5.
See infra Parts II-IV.
6.
See infra Parts V-VI.
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the written contracts governing the relationships include somewhat detailed and
comprehensive descriptions of the work.7 The alleged employer claims that the
work rules describe the "results" and not the "manner and means" of the work,
and that any monitoring of the progress of the work is an inspection of this
"product" that the workers or contractor expressly agreed to provide.9 The
alleged employer sometimes suggests that the contractual specification limits its
authority, providing affirmative evidence of a non-employment relationship.to
The other side-generally workers, a union, or a government entity-claims that
by telling the workers or contractor what to do, the contractually designated
instructions and work monitoring are, in fact, exercises of employer control over

7.
For example, the sixty-plus page standard contract between FedEx and its delivery
drivers included rules on vehicle specifications, maintenance, appearance, and use; uniforms,
insignia, and personal appearance; customer interaction; equipment; daily paperwork and
recordkeeping; work schedules; pick-up and delivery stops; insurance; driving; and the use of
helpers, substitutes, and extra drivers or trucks. See Wells v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 979
F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1014-15 (E.D. Mo. 2013) (citations omitted); Class Action Complaint at 7-8,
Wells, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1006 (Cause No. 4:06-cv-00422-RWS); Plaintiffs' Closing Brief Re: Phase
One Issues at 2, Estrada v. FedEx Ground, No. BC 210130, 2004 WL 5631425 (Cal. Super. Ct. July
26, 2004), affd sub nom. Estrada v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 327 (Ct.
App. 2007).
In another case, the contract between a paper product corporation and farm labor contractor for
hand-planting tree seedlings specified exactly how the workers should plant the seeds, down to the
width and length of the tool to use and how many seeds to handle at once. See Brief of Appellants at
9-12, 40-44, Martinez-Mendoza v. Champion Int'l Corp., 340 F.3d 1200 (11th Cir. 2003) (No. 0212171-JJ).
8.
See, e.g., Answer Brief of Appellee, Champion International Corp. at 32, MartinezMendoza, 340 F.3d 1200 (No. 02-12171-JJ) (quoting Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker
Protection Plan, 62 Fed. Reg. 11,733, 11,739-40 (Mar. 12, 1997) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt.
500)) (arguing that the belief that control is established merely by use of contractual specifications
is "misguided"); see also Wells, 979 F. Supp. 2d at 1015 (noting the employer's argument that the
core provisions of the Operating Agreement between the parties addressed the results, rather than
the physical performance, of the employees' work); Combined Reply Brief and Cross-Appeal Brief
of Appellant and Cross-Respondent FedEx Ground Package System, Inc. at 15, Estrada, 64 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 327 (No. B 189031) (arguing that "[p]ackage delivery with real-time tracking of delivery
status is the very service being provided, not the manner and means of providing it," so real-time
monitoring of delivery drivers through required use of scanners was not evidence of employee
status).
9.
See, e.g., Reply Brief of Petitioner/Cross-Respondent at 25-26, FedEx Home Delivery v.
NLRB, 563 F.3d 492 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Nos. 07-1391, 07-1436) (noting precedents for the
proposition that monitoring, evaluating, and improving performance is consistent with an
independent contractor relationship); Answer Brief of Appellee, supra note 8, at 39 (arguing that
observing and reporting on workers does not amount to control over those workers).
10. See Estrada, 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 332; Estrada, 2004 WL 5631425, at 4; see also Moreau
v. Air Fr., 343 F.3d 1179, 1188 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing detailed production specifications in
contract between airline and ground service contractors as cutting both in favor of, and against, joint
employment), amended and superseded by 356 F. 3d 942 (9th Cir. 2004). In particular, ensuring
compliance with detailed contractual specifications may, "in some situations, constitute 'indirect'
supervision of the employees' performance." Moreau, 343 F.3d at 1188.
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the details of the work." Judges1 2 disagree on how to evaluate UCS as a basis
for claiming or disclaiming control over the work relationship. 3
The law provides no resolution to their disagreement: the puzzle of upfront
contractual specification issues form the heart of the employment contract.
Employment is both a contract between civic equals and a relationship between a
subordinate and superior. The fusion of master-servant and contract law creates
a doctrinal ambiguity between what is "contracting" and what is contractual
performance, or "production," in employment.14
The distinction between contracting and producing, or contractual formation
and performance, differentiates employment from independent contracting
relationships. In both employment and independent contracting, the parties have
equal contractual rights to negotiate the terms and conditions of work.1 5 This is
simply the freedom of contract. Employment, however, entails control in
production: what distinguishes the two is what happens in production. Thus the
means/ends test for employment status asks whether the employer controls only
the "ends" of the work, as do all contracting parties, or also controls the "means"
of the work, the carrying out of contractual obligations.' 6 Yet employer and

11. See, e.g., EEOC v. N. Knox Sch. Corp., 154 F.3d 744, 748-49 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing the
EEOC's argument in an age discrimination case, which proved unsuccessful, that "detailed
specifications in the transportation contracts, which set 'the precise route and schedule of each
driver,"' as well as starting times, work days, rules for disciplining students, and other requirements,
evidenced employer control over school bus drivers); Wells, 979 F. Supp. 2d at 1013 (noting
plaintiffs' argument that the employer controlled and managed their routes to such an extent that
they were employees and not independent contractors); Brief of Appellants, supra note 8, at 40-44
(describing the almost plenary control that the employer had over the contractor's work); Reply
Brief of Appellants at 14-15, Martinez-Mendoza, 340 F.3d 1200 (No. 02-12171-JJ) (arguing that
the "performance requirements went far beyond simply setting out the ultimate standards for the
job" by meticulously detailing how the job was to be performed).
12. Unless otherwise noted, "courts" and "judges" refer to administrative agency tribunals
and their presiding legal decision makers as well as to courts and judges proper. This Article will
use them as abbreviated terms for "legal decision makers."
13. Compare NLRB v. Friendly Cab Co., 512 F.3d 1090, 1103 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding
that detailed rules incorporated in lease between taxi company and drivers about how to operate
vehicle indicate employer control), with SIDA of Haw., Inc. v. NLRB, 512 F.2d 354, 358-59 (9th
Cir. 1975) (concluding that the rules and regulations set forth by a taxicab association were not
instruments of control sufficient to create an employer-employee relationship between the
association and drivers, but instead were the drivers' contractual undertakings).
14.

See generally JOHN R. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM 286 (1st ed.

1924) ("[E]ven while [the laborer] is working at his job he is both producing and bargaining, and
the two are inseparable. His bargaining is his act of producing something for the employer and his
producing something acceptable is his method of the bargaining.").
15. E.g., EEOC v. North Knox School Corp., 154 F.3d 744, 748 (7th Cir. 1998) (arguing that
contractual specifications are consistent with the "freedom of contract" of both employees and
independent contractors); Carlson, supra note 1, at 339 (noting that a party could control both
employee and contractor by negotiating the terms of a contract).
16. See Christopher L. Tomlins, Law and Power in the Employment Relationship, in LABOR
LAW IN AMERICA: HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL ESSAYS 88 (Christopher L. Tomlins & Andrew J.

King eds., 1992) (noting that employment differed from other contracts, because the "employer was
entitled not only to receipt of the services contracted for in their entirety before payment but also to
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employee do not conclude a contractual negotiation and then proceed into a
discrete realm of production.' 7 There is no separation between contractual
formation and performance in employment.' 8 An underappreciated insight of
Wisconsin school economist John Commons is that employer and employee are
continuously on the labor market for the duration of their relationship: they are
simultaneously bargaining and performing the "contract" as the employer directs
the work and the employee works.' 9
Judges' disagreement over how to interpret UCS is a striking example of the
inability of the means/ends test to separate contractual independence in
negotiating the terms and conditions of work from obedience in the labor
20
In determining whether upfront specification of the work in the
process.
contract describes the "ends" of the work or evinces control over the "means" of
the work, courts disagree on where to locate it2 1-does UCS reside only at the
site of contractual formation? In this case, contractual designation of the work is
consistent with independent contracting: the contractual rules reflect the alleged
employer's entrepreneurial control over its property, and contractual
specification shields the productive process from further bargaining. 22 Or, does
UCS reside in production? In this case, it indicates employer control over the
work: the employer continues to "bargain" with the employee over the terms and
conditions of employment by directing the employee's work through the medium
23
of UCS.
The interpretative quandary of UCS is just one manifestation of the collapse
of the product/process distinction. The contradictory resources judges must use
to identify employment are the principal source of legal instability in the
employment/non-employment distinction. The employment contract both tenders
the means/ends distinction as the key to distinguishing employment from other
work relationships and makes it an irresolvable legal question.
intelligibility of employment depends on the
The sociolegal
institutionalization of employment, or the extent that employment is a recurrent

the obedience of the employee in the process of rendering them") [hereinafter Tomlins, Law and
Power].

17. See COMMONS, supra note
"continuously upon the labor market").
18. See id.
19.

14 (arguing that the employer and employee

are

See id; PHILLIP SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY, AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE 134 (1969) (noting

that the at-will employment contract "brings to culmination the union of contract and the market").
20. Compare SIDA of Haw., Inc. v. NLRB, 512 F.2d 354, 358 (9th Cir. 1975) (finding that
drivers are independent contractors, because contractual restrictions are not "instruments of control
for the benefit of the [the company]" but merely "standards of conduct to which all of the drivers
should adhere" and the drivers' contractual undertakings), with Nat'l Van Lines, 117 N.L.R.B.
1213, 1219-20 (1957) (concluding that the extensive and detailed provisions incorporated in a lease
agreement are sufficient to make contract drivers employees), vacated, 273 F.2d 402 (7th Cir.

1960).
21. See cases cited supra note 20; infra Parts V-VI.
22. See, e.g., Sida, 512 F.2d at 358.
23. See, e.g., Nat'I Van Lines, 117 N.L.R.B. at 1219-20.
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social practice comprised of certain recognized roles, rules, norms, rituals,
Certain jobs, like those of
media, expectations, activities, and organizations.
package delivery drivers and newspaper delivery persons, have changed scarcely
at all in half a century.2 5 Inconsistency still pervades legal decisions over the
employment status of these work relationships across the decades.26 Many have
pointed out that industrial employment practices featuring long-term, stable,
direct relationships between an employee and hierarchical firm have been
vanishing over the past several decades.27 Yet, the contracting/producing
ambiguity makes even what appear to be conventional features of typical
industrial work arrangements susceptible to disagreement or reinterpretation as
indicia of non-employment.28 Judges have disagreed, for example, on whether
giving a delivery driver additional routes and drivers to manage constitutes an
internal promotion of an employee (control in production) or a contractual
expansion of an independent contractor's business (independence in
contracting).29
While the contracting/producing ambiguity in the legal employment
relationship is permanent and continuous, in certain work relationshipsparticularly unionized, manufacturing work-decision makers do not question
the technological, temporal, bureaucratic, and other institutionalized markers of
employment that established it as a social practice. Amidst institutional
disruption or instability, however, the servitude-equality ambiguities would
permit legal reinterpretation of even industrial manufacturing work as nonemployment. 30 For instance, a manufacturer could "sell" a workstation on an

24. See generally Katherine V.W. Stone, The Decline of the Standard Contract of
Employment in the United States: A Socio-Regulatory Perspective, in RETHINKING WORKPLACE
REGULATION: BEYOND THE STANDARD CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT 58, 59 (Katherine V.W.

Stone & Harry Arthurs eds., 2013) (arguing that the employment contract was developed "as a
widespread social practice").
25. See, e.g., Lewiston Daily Sun v. Hanover Ins. Co., 407 A.2d 288, 290 (Me. 1979)
(explaining the newspaper delivery process, which has remained similar throughout the years).
26. See, e.g., id at 292 (holding the lower court's finding that a newspaper deliveryman was
an employee to be clearly erroneous and concluding that the deliveryman was an independent
contractor).
27. See, e.g., Katherine V.W. Stone & Harry Arthurs, The Transformation of Employment
Regimes: A

Worldwide Challenge, in RETHINKING WORKPLACE REGULATION: BEYOND THE

STANDARD CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT, supra note 24, at 1, 1 (arguing that "[e]mployment
relationships . .. have become increasingly unstable").
28. Compare Estrada v. FedEx Ground, No. BC 210130, 2004 WL 5631425, at 15 (Cal.
Super. Ct. July 26, 2004) (holding that the potential for promotion does not preclude employment
status), aff'd sub nom. Estrada v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 327 (Ct. App.
2007), with FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 499 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting
Corporate Express Delivery Sys. v. NLRB, 292 F.3d 777, 780-81 (D.C. Cir. 2002)) (finding
evidence of entrepreneurial potential to expand business to be indicative of an independent
contractor relationship).
29. See cases cited supra note 28.
30. This Article does not explain the causes of institutional instability and disruption that
fracture judicial consensus regarding the employment relationship. Likely factors include economic
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assembly line to an "independent contractor" and permit the contractor to "hire"
coworkers to take the contractor's shifts when needed. Replace the heavy,
integrated machinery of the factory with a logistics system, and replace the
workstation with a delivery truck, and you have the FedEx model of
"independent contracting." 31
Legal disagreement over employment status is less about how to adjust static
legal categories to changing work arrangements with the decomposition of
industrial employment, and more about the surfacing of doctrinal ambiguity with
the shifting and disorganization of technological, temporal, bureaucratic, and
other institutional markers that we have relied on to separate contracting from
producing. As judges seek to reconcile the contracting/producing tension,
allocating some features of work relationships to "contracting" and others to
"production," they participate-wittingly or not-in a contested reinstitutionalization of employment.
This Article suggests that judges often construct and interpose the written
work contract, and the practice of signing it, as an institutional referent. As an
institutional marker, contract appears in legal decisions in a role distinct from
that in which judges evaluate the legal meaning of its contents. This Article
argues that contract as a temporal-corporeal marker signifies non-employment
by purporting to separate contracting and producing and to establish a sphere of
production subsequent to contracting where the parties cannot vary the
contractual terms.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II discusses the context of
employment status disputes, the governing legal tests, and different accounts for
legal instability in the employment/non-employment distinction. Part III reviews
the history of the employment contract in the United States to introduce the
servitude-equality contradiction. Part IV shows that this contradiction has
doctrinal consequences for contemporary work law disputes because it creates an
ambiguity between contracting and producing in employment. Part V presents
the interpretive conundrum of upfront contractual specification in employment
status disputes and shows that judges' divergent interpretations are rooted in the
contracting/producing ambiguity.
Part II introduces the legal context in which disputes over employment status
arise, their significance, and the dominant legal tests. It discusses two accounts
for "why the law still can't tell an employee when it sees one." 32 One account
emphasizes imprecision in the legal tests for employment, which task courts with

decline over the past several decades, de-unionization, misclassification of workers by opportunistic
employers seeking to avoid the costs of work law compliance, technological change, multilateral
patterns of contracting in the organization of work, and the transformation into wage-labor
relationships of formerly less-commodified relations. See, e.g., Nw. Univ., N.L.R.B. Case 13-RC121359, at 2 (Mar. 26, 2014) (finding that college football players are employees and have a right to
unionize).
31. See infra text accompanying notes 507-17 (providing a closer look at the FedEx model).
32. Carlson, supra note 1, at 295.
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evaluating control in light of, or alongside, a lengthy and open-ended list of
different relational features. 3 Another account suggests that judges have trouble
adjusting legal standards developed around industrial work arrangements to
emergent post-industrial work,34 and that many resist any adjustments. Both
accounts have explanatory purchase, but are incomplete and do not explain
disagreement over upfront contractual specification.
Part III explains the nineteenth century formation of the employment
contract's basic contours as a double process involving a narrowing of the
hierarchy and repressive elements in some forms of work and the expansion of
hierarchy and domination in other work forms. As some of the status elements
were stripped from indentured servitudes, apprenticeships, and domestic servile
relations, judges and treatise writers extended the jurisdiction of master-servant
law from delimited categories of work relationships to hired labor generally, and
they assimilated the master's status authority into contract.35 Employers, courts,
legislatures, and collective bargaining played a role in transforming the strictures
of the master-servant employment relationship in domestic work relationships
and small-scale production into forms of authority for controlling larger scale
industry.36 Legislatures, when they moored many statutory rights to employment
status, reinforced the subordinate status of workers under the employment
contract and its status as a generic legal template for work relationships.3 Part
III concludes by noting doctrinal differences between the employment contract
and other contracts that make it difficult to apply the framework of contract law
to employment.
Part IV derives the contracting/producing ambiguity from the incorporation
of master-servant authority into contracts for labor services. This Article
elaborates the structural differences between employment and other contracts.
Due to the right of either party to exit the relationship at any time-grounded in
the Thirteenth Amendment on the employee's side-and to the inalienability of
human effort, the employee's contractual "acceptance" is through performance.
However, employment differs from other unilateral and incomplete contracts:
employer and employee continuously renew offer and acceptance in the course
of performance at each moment the employee performs work for the employer
and the employer accepts the work.38 The fusion of servitude and equality in the
employment contract made contracting and production, or contractual
negotiation and performance, ambiguous in employment; however, it also

33.
34.
35.
36.

See discussion infra Part II.C.1.
See discussion infra Part II.C.2.
See TOMLINS, supra note 2, at 231.
See id. at 230-31 (discussing the legal transformation of master-servant relationships to

contracting relationships); JUDITH STEPAN-NORRIS & MAURICE ZEITLIN, LEFT OUT: REDS AND

AMERICA'S INDUSTRIAL UNIONS (2003) (documenting relative resistance of Communist-led CIO
unions to conceding workplace rights to the authority employers claimed was inherent in their
positions).
37.
38.

See JEAN-CHRISTIAN VINEL, THE EMPLOYEE: A POLITICAL HISTORY 37 (2013).
See COMMONS, supra note 14.
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rendered this distinction the touchstone for distinguishing employment from
independent contracting and joint employment.
Part IV also provides examples of how the contracting/producing ambiguity
manifests in employment status disputes apart from creating an interpretive
puzzle out of UCS. This Part looks at judicial attempts to distinguish contracting
from production in work arrangements lacking the bureaucratic and temporal
markers of industrial employment that separated where employee and employer
met as equals from where they met as subordinate and superior. It also provides
examples of how the contracting/producing ambiguity drives legal disagreement
over employment status even in work relationships that closely resemble
industrial employment.
Part V shows that UCS poses an intractable quandary for evaluating claims
of control in employment status disputes and that the conundrum is rooted in the
contradictory incorporation of master-servant authority into contract. This Part
locates UCS along a spectrum of contractual designation of work relationships
and distinguishes it from two other points on the spectrum: "traditional" and
"meso" designation. Traditional designation refers to contractual provisions that
state the legal identity of the relationship (e.g., "I agree to be an independent
contractor").39 Meso designation of the work refers to contractual statements
that approach recitals of the definition of employment or express statements of
the alleged employer's right to control the work (e.g., "I agree to work under
your direction and control"). 40
Interpretations of traditional and meso
designation as evidence of employment are quite evident examples of formalism,
or the privileging of the contractual form over the substance of the relationship.
Neither traditional nor meso formalism deeply engages the means/ends
question.41 Traditional formalism preempts it or sits outside of it, and meso
formalism, which interprets meso-level designations of the work as a description
of the "ends" of the work, disposes of it in a rather shallow manner: it neutralizes
contractual provisions reciting the legal incidents of employment so that,
whether or not they are true statements about the relationship, they no longer
have the legal consequence of subjecting the relationship to work law simply by
virtue of their appearing in the contract. In contrast, upfront contractual
specification makes salient the ambiguity between contracting and producing in
employment, or between the activities of independent negotiation and control

39. See, e.g., In re FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 734 F. Supp. 2d 557, 560 (N.D. Ind.
2010) (noting that the Operating Agreement between FedEx and its drivers specifically provides
that both parties intend the drivers to provide services strictly as independent contractors and not as
employees).
40. See, e.g., Nat'l Van Lines, 117 N.L.R.B. 1213, 1215 (1957) ("[T]he agreement requires
the driver to comply with 'all rules and regulations' of the Employer which may be promulgated
'from time to time,' and to work under 'the general supervision' of the Employer"), vacated, 273
F.2d 402 (7th Cir. 1960).
41. See discussion infra Part V.A.3.
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over the means of the work. UCS presents a potentially new type of contractual
formalism-"high formalism"-that may not be formalism at all. 42
Judges disagree as to whether upfront specification of the work in the
written contract establishes only control over the contracted-for product or shows
control over the details of the work.43
Some intimate that contractual
specification is more probative of independent contractor status or bilateral
employment because it limits control over production, suggests careful
negotiation between parties with comparable bargaining leverage, and/or puts the
workers or contractor on meaningful notice as to what is expected, enabling
rational calculation of profit.44
The problem that UCS poses for the means/ends query is rooted in the
contracting/producing ambiguity. 45 On the one hand, UCS appears inconsistent
with employment: setting forth the work in the contract should establish a
marker between contractual formation and performance that restricts further
negotiation, which in employment assumes the form of the employer's openended discretion to extract an undefined amount of work from the employee in
production. On the other hand, upfront specification appears to be a medium of
control over the productive process that only purports to separate contracting and
producing and prevent the former from contaminating the latter.
Part V concludes by proposing that interpretative disagreements over UCS
reflect different understandings of where capitalist exploitation lies in
employment-whether in the express terms of the agreement or only in the
employer's open-ended authority to determine and alter the terms and conditions
of work during the course of the work.
Part VI suggests that as courts interpret how designation of a work
relationship in the written contract bears on the means/ends distinction, they also
tend to construct and interpose the written contract, and the practice of signing it,
as a temporal-corporeal marker of non-employment. To explore how judicial
appeals to the elaboration of work in the written contract help impute
institutional content to "contracting" and "producing," this Part draws on
Matthew Bodie's argument that major economic theories seeking to explain the
boundaries between firms and markets, or "hierarchies" and markets, actually
conceptualized the firm/market distinction in considerable part as an
employment/independent contracting distinction. 46 This Article suggests that

42. The author thanks Greg Klass for this insight.
43. See, e.g., EEOC v. N. Knox Sch. Corp., 154 F.3d 744, 748 (7th Cir. 1998) (demonstrating
disagreement between the EEOC and court in determining the meaning of UCS under the control
inquiry).
44. See, e.g., Martinez-Mendoza v. Champion Int'l Corp., 340 F.3d 1200, 1211 (1lth Cir.
2003) (holding that plaintiffs failed "to establish control solely on the basis of the contract
specifications that set ... performances standards").
45. See discussion infra Part V.B.2.
46. See Matthew T. Bodie, Participationas a Theory of Employment, 89 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 661, 696-97 (2013) (quoting Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information
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appeals to the contractual designation of the work facilitate a mapping of
contracting and producing onto conceptions of "markets" and "hierarchies,"
respectively. Judges sometimes appeal to contractual articulation of the work as
indicative of an inter-firm relationship defined by ex ante contractual terms,
rather than an intra-firm relationship in which an employer relies more on ex
post supervision and disciplinary correction. 47 It evokes the accompanying
conceptual binaries of the transaction costs-like contract drafting and
negotiating-typical of market relations, in opposition to the agency costs
typical of employment relationships. 48 By constructing and interposing the
contract as an institutional marker that claims to rectify the tension between
equality in contracting and servitude in production, judges work to stabilize the
employment/non-employment distinction.
This Article concludes, however, by tendering that the written contract is
often misleading as an institutional referent. A detailed or elaborate contractual
articulation of the work sometimes deposits the worker into a highly rationalized
and integrated productive process. Where the invisible direction of a logistics
regime replaces the more visible direction of integrated machinery and the
industrial foreman, constructing the contract as a signifier of non-employment
misconstrues differences in the productive process between industrial and
service work-differences that should not be of legal consequence in
determining employment status-as differences in authority relations in workdifferences that should be.
II.

EMPLOYMENT STATUS DISPUTES

A.

Employment Status andLegal Instability

A bevy of rights and obligations in the United States depend on the legal
status of workers as "employees" and the status of those they work for as
"employers": access to social insurance and welfare benefits; protection against
discrimination on the basis of gender, religion, disability, national origin, race,
age, and other statuses; the right to a healthy and safe workplace; rights to a
minimum wage and overtime pay; protected family and medical leave;
workplace organizing and collective bargaining rights; and certain privacy rights.
49
Several whistleblower protections depend on employee status, tying consumer
and investor protection to employment. Employment status determines the tax
obligations of firms for Social Security, Medicare, unemployment insurance, and

Costs, and Economic Organization,62 AM. ECON. REV.777, 777 (1972); R.H. Coase, The Nature of
the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 387, 403-04 (1937).
47. See discussion infra Part VI.B.
48. See discussion infra Part VI.B.
49. See, e.g., Ebelt v. Cnty. of Ogemaw, 231 F. Supp. 2d 563, 576 (E.D. Mich. 2002)
(Michigan Whistleblower Protection Act protects employees and does not protect independent
contractors).
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workers compensation. 50 It determines intellectual property ri hts,5 ' antitrust
liability, firm liability to third parties, and even criminal liability.5
Despite how much is at stake for workers and firms, inconsistency pervades
decisions by courts and administrative agencies determining who is, and who is
not, in an employment relationship.53 While decision makers have largely
agreed on the applicable legal standards, the results are not uniform or
predictable. 54 A court will find delivery drivers to be independent contractors in
one case and a different court in another case may find them to be employees, 5
based on seemingly minute or cosmetic differences in the work. The workers
that one court deems to be employees another court will find to be independent
contractors under the same legal tests. The endemic legal uncertainty tends to
benefit firms at the expense of workers.5 7 It encourages many firms to design
their business models around misclassification. 5 8 Employment is usually more

50. See Federal Insurance Contributions Act, 26 U.S.C. § 3111.
51. See, e.g., Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (granting employers rights in works
created by employees).
52. See, e.g., Federal Insurance Contributions Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3128 (2012)
(regarding Social Security and Medicare taxes drawn against employees' wages); Federal
Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3311 (regarding economic protections for employees
who lose their jobs); National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (granting employees
collective bargaining rights); Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 §§ 6-7, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206-207
(regarding employees' minimum wage and overtime pay rights); Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 § 4, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (prohibiting age discrimination in employment);
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (regarding employees' rights to
a healthy and safe workplace); Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C. §§ 20012009 (regarding employees' privacy rights); Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 § 102, 29
U.S.C. § 2612 (requiring employers to grant employees leave in certain situations); Civil Rights Act
of 1964 § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, color, national
origin, sex, and religion in employment); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 102, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112 (prohibiting disability discrimination in employment).
53. Compare FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 504 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding
that delivery drivers were independent contractors rather than employees), with Estrada v. FedEx
Ground Package Sys., Inc., 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 327, 335 (Ct. App. 2007) (agreeing with the trial
court's finding that delivery drivers are employees).
54. See, e.g., Richard C. Tinney, Annotation, Trucker as Independent Contractor or
Employee Under § 2(3) ofNational Labor Relations Act (29 USCS § 152(3)), 55 A.L.R. FED. 20, 28
(1981) (arguing that NLRB employment status determinations "disclose[] such inconsistencies and
differences of opinion that the result is utter chaos.").
55. See cases cited supra note 53.
56. Compare Craig v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 335 P.3d 66 (Kan. 2014) (finding
FedEx delivery drivers are employees as a matter of law under Kansas right-to-control test), with. In
re FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 734 F.Supp.2d 557 (N.D. Ind. 2010) (finding FedEx delivery
drivers are independent contractors under Kansas right-to-control test and granting summary
judgment to FedEx on issue of employment status).
57. But cf Karen R. Harned et al., Creating a Workable Legal Standardfor Defining an
Independent Contractor, 4 J. Bus. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 93, 94 (2010) (noting "the existence of
legal economic incentives for employers to use independent contractors" and "the potential for
abuse from misclassification of bona fide employees as independent contracts" before arguing that
legal scholarship has overlooked the burdens this ambiguity places on employers).
58. Millions of U.S. workers today lack rights, or have precarious rights, because their
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costly to a firm than another form of work relationship.59 Nonetheless, when a
court finds a company has misclassified its workers, the liability can be great.60
While employment status disputes come in a variety of employment/nonemployment dichotomies,61 two are of primary interest in this article: (1)
disputes over whether workers are "independent contractors" or "employees";

employers do not classify them as "employees" or do not accept legal responsibility as a joint
employer. See
U.S.
GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE,
GAO-09-717,
EMPLOYEE
MISCLASSIFICATION: IMPROVED COORDINATION, OUTREACH, AND TARGETING COULD BETTER
ENSURE DETECTION AND PREVENTION 1 (2009).
59. An exception is under the Copyright Act of 1976, where the default is for independent
contractors, but not employees, to have intellectual property rights in their work under the work-forhire doctrine. See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989) (quoting 17
U.S.C. § 201(a)-(b) (2012)) (citing id. § 102). In some instances, a firm may face tort liability if a
court deems it is not a statutory employer of an injured worker and covered by workers
compensation insurance. See, e.g., Patton v. Worthington Assoc., Inc. 89 A.3d 643 (Penn. 2014).
60. See, e.g., Vizcaino, 120 F.3d at 1008 (describing how Microsoft paid the IRS to settle a
dispute over taxes it should have withheld from workers' wages).
61.

See JOHN KRINSKY, FREE LABOR: WORKFARE AND THE CONTESTED LANGUAGE OF

NEOLIBERALISM 1 (2007) (discussing New York City's controversial Work Experience Program,
which critics attacked and compared to slavery for requiring welfare recipients to "work[] in the
same jobs as regular workers but without the full panoply of workers' rights); Jackson T. Kirklin,
Note, Title VII Protections for Inmates: A Model Approach for Safeguarding Civil Rights in
America's Prisons, Ill COLUM. L. REV. 1048, 1068 (2011) (discussing the circuit split in whether
prison inmates are considered employees such that they are protected under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964); see generally VINEL, supra note 37, at ch. 2 (citations omitted) (discussing
supervisor-employee disputes). The law excludes workers based on other statuses as well. The Fair
Labor Standards Act carves out exceptions for several occupations and types of employees,
including "white collar" employees. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 § 13, 29 U.S.C. § 213.
The National Labor Relations Act excludes domestic and agricultural workers. See National Labor
Relations Act § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (excluding domestic and agricultural workers from the
Act's definition of "employee"). Workers may lack meaningful rights due to their immigration
status as well. See RUBEN J. GARCIA, MARGINAL WORKERS: How LEGAL FAULT LINES DIVIDE
WORKERS AND LEAVE THEM WITHOUT PROTECTION 2-12 (2012) (citations omitted).
Under-enforcement by agencies overseeing legal enforcement, often a consequence of underfunding, and other forms of under-enforcement also deprive workers of statutory rights. A recent
groundbreaking survey of over 4,000 workers in low-wage industries in Chicago, New York, and
Los Angeles found that violations of minimum wage and overtime laws were rife and severe.
ANNETTE BERNHARDT ET AL., NAT'L EMP'T LAW PROJECT, BROKEN LAWS, UNPROTECTED
WORKERS: VIOLATIONS OF EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAWS IN AMERICA'S CITIES 2 (2009),
available
at
http://www.nelp.org/page/-/brokenlaws/BrokenLawsReport2009.pdf?nocdn= 1.
Eligibility requirements involving tenure make it difficult for many workers to access benefits and
protections given increased employee churning in the labor market over the past two decades.
Pension protections are structured around long-term employment, and Family and Medical Leave
Act benefits are conditioned on working for a particular employer for a certain number of hours.
See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 § 101(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A) (defining eligible
employees as those who have worked at least 1,250 hours for the employer in the previous twelvemonth period). Remedies for work law violations are often inadequate to compensate the worker or
deter violations. See generally Noah Zatz, Working Beyond the Reach or Grasp of Employment
Law, in THE GLOVES-OFF ECONOMY: WORKPLACE STANDARDS AT THE BOTTOM OF AMERICA'S
LABOR MARKET 31 (Annette Bernhardt et al. eds., 2008) (citations omitted) (arguing that
employees would benefit from better enforcement of existing employment laws and that focusing
only on the creation of new laws ignores a key component of the employment-regulation scheme).
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and (2) disputes over whether or not a client firm is a "joint employer" of its
contractor's direct employees, in which case it usually faces joint and several
liability for work law violations perpetrated on the contractor's employees.
Disputes over independent contracting and joint employment are prevalent in
certain industries: construction, high-tech, communications, trucking and
delivery services, janitorial services, agriculture, home health care, and child
care. 62
B.

Tests for Employment Status and the Means/Ends Inquiry

Most tests for employment status are iterations of the (a) master-servant
common law agency test and (b) "economic realities" test.63 The means/ends
(process/product) query is at the center of the agency test.64 While not always an
express element of the economic realities test, judges frequently apply it there, as
well. 6

1

Under most federal statutes, the master-servant common law agency
66
doctrine governs employment status. The employment contract is working for
another under the other's right of direction and control.67 The means/ends query
is the heart of the agency test.68 Part III on the historical development of the

62.

See KIM BOBo, WAGE THEFT IN AMERICA: WHY MILLIONS OF WORKING AMERICANS

ARE NOT GETTING PAID-AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT 39 (2009); cf Carlson, supra note 1,
at 308 (describing how early employment legislation often based employee status on the type of
work being performed).
63. See, e.g., Local 777, Democratic Union Org. Comm. v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 862, 904-05,
914 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (quoting United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 713 (1947)) (utilizing a
combination of the master-servant doctrine and the economic realities test to decide an employment
issue).
64. See id at 874.
65. See, e.g., id (applying the means/end query to the economic realities test).
66. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992) (common law agency
principles for identifying the master-servant relationship determine employment status where
federal statute does not include a helpful definition of employment); see also Marc Linder,
Dependent and Independent Contractors in Recent U.S. Labor Law: An Ambiguous Dichotomy
Rooted in Simulated Statutory Purposelessness,21 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 187, 195-97 (1999)
[hereinafter Linder, Dependent andIndependent Contractors](citations omitted) (noting that courts
apply the master-servant test under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Americans with
Disabilities Act, Occupational Safety and Health Act, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
67. See Kelley v. S. Pac. Co., 419 U.S. 318, 323-24 (1974). The RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY § 220(1) (1958), a secondary statement of the common law on which courts have
conferred quasi-law status in employment disputes, defines a servant as "a person employed to
perform services in the affairs of another and who with respect to the physical conduct in the
performance of the services is subject to the other's control or right to control."
68. The article uses the shorthand "agency test" to refer to the master-servant test, but note
that the latter is a restrictive version of the former. See Kelley v. S. Pac. Co., 419 U.S. 318, 323
(1974) (noting the trial court's reliance on an agency standard but holding that a master-servant
relationship between the plaintiff and defendant was also required for liability to be imposed under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act); see also Marc Linder, Towards Universal Worker Coverage
under the National Labor Relations Act: Making Room for Uncontrolled Employees, Dependent

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol66/iss2/2

16

Tomassetti: The Contracting/Producing Ambiguity and the Collapse of the Means
2014]

CONTRACTING/PRODUCING AMBIGUITY

331

[Generally] the [employee] relationship exists when the person for
whom services are performed has the right to control and direct the
individual who performs the services, not only as to the result to be
accomplished by the work but also as to the details and means by which
that result is accomplished. That is, an employee is subject to the will
and control of the employer not only as to what shall be done but how it
shall be done. . .. If an individual is subject to the control or direction in
general, of another merely as to the result to be accomplished by the
work and not as to the means andmethods for accomplishing the result,
he is an independent contractor, not an employee. 72

-

employment contract shows that the employment contract grounds the right to
direct the worker and coordinate the work process in contract. As an
entrepreneur, the employer also has an unqualified property right to determine
and control the product.69 The means/ends test ostensibly distinguishes the
contractual rights of the employer from the property rights of the entrepreneur. 70
The entrepreneur controls the product/ends, but only the employer directs the
process/means. From the view of contract, the means/ends test supposedly
distinguishes the employment contract-in which one party has a right to control
how the other party performs its contractual obligations-from ordinary
contracts, in which neither part has a right to control how the other party
performs its contractual obligations. 71 Courts ask whether the alleged employer
has a right to control only the "results," or "ends," of the work, or also has a right
to control its "details," or its "manner and means":

Courts applying the agency test generally consider a long, non-exclusive list
of factors to determine employment status.
These include the factors listed in
the Restatement (Second) of Agency, the first of which states the means/ends
query:
(a)
the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master
may exercise over the details of the work;
(b)
whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct
occupation or business;
the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the
(c)

Contractors, and Employee-Like Persons, 66 U. DET. L. REv. 555, 567-69 (1988) [hereinafter
Linder, Towards Universal Worker Coverage]; Linder, Dependent and Independent Contractors,
supra note 72, at 201.
69. See discussion infra Part V.B. 1.
70. See discussion infra Part V.B.1.
71. See discussion infra Part V.B.1.
72. Local 777, Democratic Union Org. Comm. v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 862, 897 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(alterations in original) (quoting Party Cab Co. v. United States, 172 F.2d 87, 92 (7th Cir. 1949)).
73. See, e.g., Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751-52 (1989) (listing
factors the Court uses to determine employment status).
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locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the employer or
by a specialist without supervision;
(d)
the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e)
whether the employer or the workman supplies the
instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the
work;
the length of time for which the person is employed;
(f)
the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
(g)
(h)
whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of
the employer;
whether or not the parties believe they are creating the
(i)
relation of master and servant; and
(j)
whether the principal is or is not in business.74
Other factors that courts often consider under the agency test-some of
which are variations on Restatement factors and sub-queries of the
process/product question-include whether the worker/entity works exclusively
for the alleged employer; whether the worker/entity conducts business in its own
name; whether the work presents opportunities for entrepreneurial gain and loss;
the extent of supervision; whether the alleged employer provides training;
whether the worker is subject to discipline; whether the worker has the right to
quit; whether the worker/entity can turn down assignments; whether the alleged
employer can assign additional work; and whether the alleged employer provides
benefits and withholds payroll taxes.75
Courts have applied agency principles since the late 1940s in National Labor
Relations Act and Social Security Act cases. 76 About twenty years ago, the
Supreme Court decided three cases that subsequent courts have interpreted as
requiring the agency test under most federal statutes: Community for Creative
Non-Violence v. Reid;" Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden; and
Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates v. Wells.79 Reid resolved competing

74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958).
75. See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992) (quoting Reid,
490 U.S. at 751-52) (listing factors, based on common law agency principles, the Court considers
when deciding whether an individual is an employee); Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 860 (2d Cir.
1992) (quoting Reid, 490 U.S. at 751-52) (same).
76.

See Local 777, Democratic Union Org. Comm., 603 F.2d at 905 (quoting H.R. REP. No.

80-510, at 32-33 (1947) (Conf. Rep.); H.R. REP. No. 80-245, at 18 (1947)) (noting Congress's
intent that courts apply traditional agency rules when making employment status determinations).
77. 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
78. 503 U.S. 318 (1992).
79. 538 U.S. 440 (2003); see id. at 445 (quoting Darden, 503 U.S. at 322-23); Darden, 503
U.S. at 327; Reid, 490 U.S. at 731; see also Marc Linder, Dependent and Independent Contractors
in Recent U.S. Labor Law: An Ambiguous Dichotomy Rooted in Simulated Statutory
Purposelessness, 21 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 187, 195-97 (1999) (citations omitted) (arguing that

courts "Dardenized" many statutes, including the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
Americans with Disabilities Act, Occupational Safety and Health Act, and Title VII of the Civil
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interpretations of the Copyright Act of 1976.o It held that the common law of
master-servant agency distinguished employees from independent contractors
under its work-for-hire provisions. ' In Darden, an Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 case, the Court followed Reid and held that the
agency test governed employee status when the statute did not provide a
constructive definition of employment and applying it would not pervert
82
statutory purpose.82
Most federal statutes do not define employment or do so in
a circular fashion. 8 3 The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),
for example, defines "employee" as "any individual employed by an employer"
and does not define "employed" or "employer." 84 In Clackamas, the Court
looked to common law agency principles to determine whether a doctorprincipal in a professional medical corporation was an "employee" for purposes
of the numerosity requirement of the Americans with Disabilities Act.85
To distinguish emplo ees from independent contractors under the "general
common law of agency," 6 the Court directed decision makers to evaluate the
"hiring party's right to control the manner and means by which the product is
accomplished." 87 Further, "all of the incidents of the relationship must be
assessed and weighed with no one factor being decisive," and there is "no
shorthand formula or magic phrase that can be applied to find the answer."88
The Court rejected a "control over the product test" based on the logic that the
hirer always controlled the product. 89 The Court looked to the Restatement for
guidance as to agency principles. 90 The Court also suggested that congressional

Rights Act of 1964, under which courts previously considered statutory purpose to inform their
determination of statutory coverage).
80. See Reid, 490 U.S. at 750.
81. See id Work-for-hire is a judge-created doctrine codified in the Copyright Act of 1909,
ch. 320, § 62, 35 Stat. 1075, and amended by the 1976 Act. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101, 201 (2012). The doctrine creates an exception to the vesting of authorship and copyright
ownership in a work's creator. If a work is made "for hire," both belong to the one for whom the
work was prepared. Id § 201(b). In Reid, the Supreme Court held that work by an independent
contractor was not a work-for-hire unless it fell within a list of discrete categories and the parties
had fulfilled a written requirement. Reid, 490 U.S. at 750; see also Catherine L. Fisk, Authors at
Work: The Origins of the Work-for-Hire Doctrine, 15 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 46 (2003) (citing
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101).
82. Darden, 503 U.S. at 327.
83. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6) (defining "employee" for purposes of employee benefit
plans).
84. Id. at § 1002(5).
85. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 448 (2003) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 2(2), 220(l)-2(a) (1958)).
86. Reid, 490 U.S. at 740. The Court directed courts to "the general common law of agency,
rather than . . . the law of any particular State." Id. For a discussion of the controversy over the
ontology of "general common law," see Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of General Law, 106
COLUM. L. REv. 503, 505 (2006).
87. Darden, 503 U.S. at 323 (quoting Reid, 490 U.S. at 751).
88. Darden, 503 U.S. at 324 (quoting NLRB v. United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. 254, 258 (1968)).
89. Reid, 490 U.S. at 741-42.
90. See id.
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amendments reacting to its decisions in NLRB v. Hearst Publicationsand United
States v. Silk9 1had rendered statutory pu ose a largely illegitimate consideration
in determining a work statute's coverage.
Darden noted that the FLSA standard covers some workers who might not
be employees under the agency test.93 The FLSA states that an entity "employs"
an individual if it "suffer[s] or permit[s]" that individual to work. 94 Courts still
look to Hearst and Silk to explicate the economic realities test.9 5 In finding that
newspaper delivery persons were employees under the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA), the Court in Hearst held that courts should look to the "mischief'
the statute was intended to address to determine its scope. 96 Based on the
NLRA's goal of lessening the disparity of bargaining power between employers
and workers, the Court suggested that employees could be distinguished by the
"[i]nequality of bargaining power in controversies over wages, hours and
Many courts term the FLSA inquiry as whether the
working conditions."
98
worker or contractor is "economically dependent" on the alleged employer.
Courts also ask whether the alleged employer has the "power to control the
work" or exercises "functional control" over the work, even if it does not
exercise "formal" or "operational" control. 99 What courts came to term the
"economic realities" or "economic fact" test of Hearst and Silk also governs
employment status disputes under the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker

91. 331 U.S. 704 (1947).
92. See Darden, 503 U.S. at 324-25; see also NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516
U.S. 85, 91-92 (1995) (quoting Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 891 (1984)) (arguing that
the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act amendments to the National Labor Relations Act overruled Hearst
Publ'ns); United States v. W.M. Webb, Inc., 397 U.S. 179, 186-88 (1970) (arguing that the 1948
Social Security Act amendments invalidated the "economic realities" test of Silk).
93. See Darden, 503 U.S. at 326 (citing Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 § 3(e), (g), 29
U.S.C. § 203(e), (g) (2012)).
94. 29 U.S.C. § 203(g).
95. See, e.g., Webb, 397 U.S. at 184 (discussing Silk). But see Darden, 503 U.S. at 324-25
(indicating that courts should use common law principles, not Hearst and Silk, when deciding who
is an employee under other statutes).
96. See Hearst, 322 U.S. at 126-27.
97. Id at 127.
98. See, e.g., Torres-Lopez v. May, Ill F.3d 633, 644 (9th Cir. 1997) (considering
farmworkers' economic dependency on the farm in determining their employment status).
99. In Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722 (1947), the Court posited that by
determining the number of cattle to be slaughtered, the slaughterhouse controlled the work hours of
its de-boners. See id at 730. The Court found the de-boners to be employees despite the
slaughterhouse not exercising supervisory control. See id (determining employment status requires
consideration of "the whole activity," not just "isolated factors"). Also probative of employee status
was that the de-boners' work was part of an "integrated unit of production." Id at 729. The Court
held that the FLSA standard was not about the formal right to control physical performance of
work. See id. at 730; see also Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61, 70 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting
Rutherford, 331 U.S. at 729-30) (citing id at 726); S.G. Borello & Sons v. Dep't of Indus.
Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 405 (Cal. 1989).
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Protection Act (AWPA) and the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA).o
Variations of it govern many state wage and hour law claims.1 ot
Whether there is a substantial difference between the economic realities and
agency tests is unclear. Several, if not most, of the factors in the tests overlap.
Courts consider factors from Hearst and Silk under the agency test, and several
appear in the Restatement.102 Many courts applying the economic realities test
expressly consider the "right to control" the work.10 The "suffer to work" and
"economic realities" standards purportedly center statutory purpose in the
analysis and are less preoccupied with distinguishing the labor process from the
productive process.1o However, scholars question the extent to which courts
have construed the economic realities test more broadly than the agency test and
taken seriously statutory purpose.' 05 While many courts consider not only the
human resources practices developed under Fordism under the economic
realities test, but also consider substantive control over the work, 106 others
construe "control" restrictively and require formal supervision, the setting of
worker schedules, and other indicia of Fordist employment to find

100. See, e.g., Haybarger v. Lawrence Cnty. Adult Prob. & Parole, 667 F.3d 408, 417-18 (3d
Cir. 2012) (quoting Hodgson v. Arnheim & Neely, Inc., 444 F.2d 609, 612 (3d Cir. 1971), rev'dsub
nom. Brennan v. Arnheim & Neely, Inc., 410 U.S. 512 (1973)) (discussing the "economic reality"
test used by federal courts to determine whether an individual supervisor has sufficient control to
function as an employer for purposes of imposing individual liability under the FLSA and FMLA);
Torres-Lopez, Ill F.3d at 644 (holding that the farmworkers were economically dependent on the
farm such that the farm was a joint employer for purposes of the FLSA and AWPA).
101. See, e.g., Laborers' Int'l Union of N. Am. v. Case Farms, Inc., 488 S.E.2d 632, 634 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1997) (quoting Poole v. Local 305 Nat'l Post Office Mail Handlers, 318 S.E.2d 105, 107
(N.C. Ct. App. 1984)) (citing Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 201 (2012)) (noting
that the policy of the state Wage and Hour Act, which is modeled after the FLSA, is to protect those
who, as a matter of economic reality, are dependent upon their employer).
102. See supra notes 76-78, 96-103 and accompanying text (discussing the factors that courts
look to in the agency and economic realities tests).
103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(1) (1958).
104. See, e.g., Local 777, Democratic Union Org. Comm. v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 862, 874 (1978)
(utilizing a combination of the "right to control" test and the economic realities test to decide
employment status).
1 05. See Benjamin F. Burry, Testing Economic Reality: FLSA and Title VII Protectionfor
Workfare Participants,2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 561, 565 (citing Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden,
503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992); Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 741-42 (1989));
J.F. Harris, Worker Unity and the Law: A ComparativeAnalysis of the NationalLabor Relations Act
and the FairLabor Standards Act, and the Hopefor the NLRA's Future, 13 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 107,
108 (2009); Linder, Dependent and Independent Contractors, supra note 79, at 208-11 (citations
omitted) (arguing that most courts ignore the "suffers or permits" standard and eject "economic
dependency" from the center of the test).
106. In Torres-Lopez, the court argued that factors bearing on the economic dependence of a
farm labor contractor included "whether responsibility under the contracts between a labor
contractor and an employer pass from one labor contractor to another without 'material changes"' in
addition to the "nature and degree of control," the "degree of supervision," and "preparation of
payroll." Torres-Lopez v. May, III F.3d 633, 639-40 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Rutherford Food
Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 730 (1947); 29 C.F.R. § 500.20(h)(4)(ii) (2013)).
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employment. 0 7 On the other hand, a few courts interpret the agency test in
broader terms that approach an evaluation of power over the enterprise. os The
product/process distinction tends to make some appearance under the economic
realities test and when courts apply an "entrepreneurial opportunities" version of
1 09
the agency test.
C.

Causes ofInstability in the Employment/Non-Employment Distinction

The primary accounts for instability in the legal distinction between
employment and non-employment are that (1) the legal tests are imprecise; and
(2) since the 1970s, courts have not adequately adjusted the law to apprehend
work arrangements that depart from the industrial norms around which it was
conceived.
1.

Imprecise and PliableLegal Standards

One explanation for the legal uncertainty regarding employment status is
that the legal standards are hopelessly imprecise and unwieldy: the agency and
economic realities tests are fact-intensive, open-ended, circular, and
And, the means/ends distinction permits virtually infinite
purposeless." 0
manipulation.
Under the agency test, the Supreme Court has required courts to consider a
salmagundi of factors without guidelines as to what weights, numbers, patterns,
There is no "magic phrase" or "shorthand
or clusters are significant.1

107. In Aimable v. Long & Scott Farms, 20 F.3d 434 (11th Cir. 1994), the court argued that
the exercise of administrative functions, including recruiting, hiring, and payroll, was necessary to
create a joint employment relationship between an agricultural business and its farm labor
contractor's employees, even though the contractor was a middleman without capital investment in
production or any discretion over the harvest. Id. at 439.
108. See, e.g., S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep't. of Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d 339, 405-06
(Cal. 1989) (holding that the court must consider the statutory purpose of legislation in a workers
compensation case where the statute defines independent contractor according to the common law
control test).
109. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
110. See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 1, at 335 ("However courts state the test of employee status,
they routinely concede its failure to produce predictable results for many workers whose status is
ambiguous"); Brishen Rogers, Toward Third-PartyLiabilityfor Wage Theft, 31 BERKELEY J. EMP.
& LAB. L. 1, 4 (2010) (quoting Bruce Goldstein et al., Enforcing Fair Labor Standards in the
Modern American Sweatshop: Rediscovering the Statutory Definition ofEmployment, 46 UCLA L.
REV. 983, 1055 (1999)); Stephen F. Befort, The Regulatory Void of Contingent Work, 10 EMP. RTS.
& EMP. POL'Y J. 235, 250 (2006); Linder, Dependent andIndependent Contractors,supra note 82.
111. See, e.g., Carlson,supra note 1, at 339-40.
112. See Rogers, supra note I10; see also Tinney, supra note 54, at 30 ("Although the general
principles that decisions are to be based on the common-law agency test of right to control, and that
the determination must be based on a consideration of all factors in a given case seem wellestablished ... how great a degree of control must exist, how the control is to be quantified, and
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formula."" 3 The lack of guidelines as to how much "control" is necessary, or
what sorts of factors are adequate or necessary to establish control, breeds
inconsistency.1 4 With respect to the major federal statutes, the Supreme Court
has promoted judge-made law as a primary arbiter of employment, sidelining, if
not dismissing, the role of administrative expertise in developing workable
standards." 5
The divergent ways of interpreting relational factors is rooted in what Marc
Linder calls "simulated purposelessness." 1' 6 Without statutory purpose, the
agency test has no animating rationale around which the various "incidents" of
the relationship could rally.1 17 Agency doctrine is concerned with a principal's
liability to third parties for the actions of its agent. 1 s. This concern tends to fit
awkwardly in employment status cases, which usually concern statutes regarding
an employer's obligations to its workers.' 9 Judges contemplate a celestial
horizon knowing it is in fact a crudely painted, tempera fresco of a sky on a
plaster wall.
Scholars levy the critiques of imprecision and purposeless at the economic
realities test as well. 12 Linder argues that courts have never used the "suffers or
permits to work" definition to expand FLSA coverage and that the economic

how various incidents of control are to be weighed comparatively are questions left unanswered by
Congress, the courts, and the NLRB.").
113. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 324 (1992) (quoting NLRB v. United
Ins. Co., 390 U.S. 254, 258 (1968)).
114. See Carlson, supra note 1, at 340; Linder, Dependent and Independent Contractors,
supra note 79, at 200.
115. The "[Supreme] Court observed that the [NLRB] did not have any special 'expertise' as
to an issue of 'pure agency law."' Aurora Packing Co. v. NLRB, 904 F.2d 73, 75 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(quoting United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. at 260). Apart from the partial exception of Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulations and FLSAIMSAPWA guidelines, one sees little
deference to administrative expertise. However, these regulations have not led to consistent
decision-making either. The MSAPWA joint employment guidelines retain the means/ends
framework. While courts are more solicitous to agency regulations than case determinations, in the
NLRA context, the Taft-Hartley Act and other historical developments, as well as congressional
hostility, are obstacles to NLRB rule-making. See JAMES GROSS, THE RESHAPING OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD: NATIONAL LABOR POLICY IN TRANSITION 1937-1947, at

265 (1981); James Brudney, Isolated and Politicized: The NLRB's Uncertain Future, 26 COMP.
LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 221, 223 (2005).
116. Linder, Dependent and Independent Contractors, supra note 79, at 227.
117. See generallyid at 191 (quoting Darden, 503 U.S. at 323) (discussing the Court's failure
to "identify any substantive purpose in using the common-law control test").
118. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 cmt. a (1958).
119. See Bodie, supra note 46, at 713-14. Bodie also notes that courts are not driven by a
concern with employer "control" in several kinds of disputes regarding an employer's vicarious
liability for the acts of an employee. Id. at 709-11; see also Stephen F. Befort, Revisiting the Black
Hole of Workplace Regulation: A Historicaland Comparative Perspective of Contingent Work, 24
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 153, 168 (2003) [hereinafter Befort, Black Hole].
120. See Linder, Dependent and Independent Contractors, supra note 79, at 207-08 (quoting
Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 130 (1947); Reich v. Priba Corp., 890 F. Supp. 586, 592
(N.D. Tex. 1995)) (citing Goldstein et al., supra note 114, at 1103, 1107); Befort, Black Hole, supra
note 126, at 172-73.
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realities test has "degenerated into a disembodied laundry list of factors."l21 He
contends that judges check off the factors under the FLSA and AWPA without
looking at statutory purpose.1 22
The lack of guidance and accumulation of administrative features in the list
of relational factors also makes the tests circular: Does a company's failure to
distribute W-4 forms indicate that its workers are independent contractors or that
it is violating payroll law?' 23 The circularity is quite evident in minimum wage
cases involving unpaid volunteers and low paid workers in institutionally
ambiguous relationships like graduate students.
The control inquiry is also extremely pliable and subject to abuse.1 25 In their
examination of "control," courts often focus on how much discretion is left to the
worker.126 But one can always identify some discretion left to the worker.1 27
Unfortunately, numerous courts today mimic in all solemnity Justice Smith's
sardonic critique in 1956:
Thus laborers are employed to empty a carload of coal. The employer
insists that he does not control them, that he did not hire their "services"
but only contracted for the "result," an empty car. The means of
unloading, he says, are their own, i.e., they can shovel right-handed or
left-handed, start at one end of the car or the other. Or a typist is
employed to type mailing stickers from a list of customers. Again the
employer argues that he has no control over the way the work is done,
meaning, presumably, that the typist can type the letters of the words
she must copy in any order she chooses.1 28

121. Id. (quoting Reich, 890 F. Supp. at 592) (citing Goldstein et al., supra note 111, at 1103,
1107).
122. See id. at 211.
123. See, e.g., Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., No. 99 CIV. 9033(RCC), 2002 WL 398663, at
*7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2002), vacated, 355 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding probative, for purposes
of the economic realities test, the fact that the defendants were not "involved in the maintenance of
[the p]laintiffs' employment records").
124. See Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483 (2004). The dissent argued that the low pay of
graduate student workers revealed their weak bargaining power, which would place their work
relationship squarely within the purposes of the NLRA. See id at 497 (Liebman & Walsh,
dissenting). The majority argued that the students' low pay showed that they were not employees.
See id. at 488 (majority opinion).
125. See Linder, Dependent and Independent Contractors,supra note 79, at 198.
126. See, e.g., Merchants Home Delivery Serv. v. NLRB, 580 F.2d 966, 974 (9th Cir. 1978)
(finding drivers' half-hour window for "early morning" arrival and permission to make "fine
routing" decisions evidence of independent contractor status); Johnson v. FedEx Home Delivery,
No. 04-CV-4935(JG)(VVP), 2011 WL 6153425, at *16 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2011) (finding drivers'
ability to choose "particular driving routes and precise schedules" evidence of independent
contractor status).
127. See Carlson,supra note 1, at 342; Befort, supra note 110, at 251.
128. Powell v. Appeal Bd. of Mich. Emp't Sec. Comm'n, 75 N.W.2d 874, 883 (Mich. 1956)
(Smith, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704 (1947)).
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In sum, the law defines employment by a non-exclusive enumerationl29 of
factors inflected with concepts that nobody seems to understand-"control" and
"economic dependency." Employment seems no more than an accumulation of
barnacles on an invisible boat that might not be a boat at all. This article also
critiques the means/end distinction, but this Article locates its malleability in the
contradictory employment contract.
2.

Adjusting IndustrialLaw to Post-IndustrialWork

Another explanation for the unstable legal distinction between employment
and non-employment is the challenge of adjusting work law ,to recognize
employment arrangements that no longer resemble the industrial models around
which it was conceived. 130 Under this account, legal inconsistency is due to the
stumbling and pratfalls as courts try to surmount this challenge and because
some courts maintain that work law only applies to a disappearing industrial
model of employment. Scholars have also claimed that many courts are
narrowing the coverage of work law statutes to conceptions of Fordist work,
"ossifying"l 3 1 work law and rendering it obsolete to many contemporary
employment relationships.' 32
United States work law was conceptualized around a particular
organizational model of ern loyment developed from the late nineteenth through
the mid-twentieth century.
The model entailed a long-term, full-time, direct
relationship between workers and a large, vertically integrated industrial
corporation that absorbed market risks, time-monetized the work, and set wages
based on institutional factors. 1 34 This firm organized production, financing,
sourcing, distribution, and marketing as a coherent corporate personality,
sometimes within a relatively stable oligopoly.' 35 Production was organized in a
bureaucratic hierarchy involving the Taylorist separation of conception and
execution.136 Engineers designed an integrated production process in which they
broke down the components of production into small parts and a fine division of

129. For a discussion of the jurisprudential problems with definition by enumeration, see
ALEXANDRA

GEORGE,

CONSTRUCTING

INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY

52-62

(2012)

(citations

omitted).
130. See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification ofAmerican Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L.
REV. 1527, 1536 (2002).
131. See VINEL, supra note 37, at 230; Estlund, supra note 130, at 1530.
132. Many features of post-World War II Fordist employment, such as the categorization of
supervisors as part of management, were the product of contentious political struggles. See
SANFORD
M. JACOBY,
EMPLOYING BUREAUCRACY: MANAGERS,
UNIONS,
AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF WORK IN THE 20TH CENTURY 194-97 (rev. ed. 2004); VINEL, supra note 37,

at 148-52.
133. See KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS 5 (2004).

134. See id.
135. See id. at 52.
136. See id. at 34.
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labor.137 Relatively unskilled workers, whose knowledge of the production
process had been appropriated, performed the work under the supervision of
foremen who carefully monitored their speed.' 38 Workers had "jobs," or
standardized sets of tasks that did not depend on the particular worker occupying
the position and that required firm-specific knowledge. 139 This model of
employment also included "human resource" practices involving internal job
ladders, rising pay with seniority, and benefits like health insurance and
pensions.1 4 0 Workers had predictable schedules and could expect long-term
employment.141 Employment was a "social practice."l 42
Under this account, work law and the legal tests for employment embody
assumptions of "markets and hierarchies," or firm/market distinctions and the
conceptual binaries distinguishing intra- from inter-firm relationships. Intra-firm
relations corresponded with hierarchically--organized production and centralized
decision-making; inter-firm relations corresponded with the "market" dynamics
of decentralized decision-making among participants without price-setting
power.1 4 3 This understanding of employment is also reflected in the theories of
Ronald Coase and others who sought to explain the existence of firms and the
bounding of firms and markets.1 44
The institution of Fordist industrial employment made its imprint on
statutory and jud e-made definitions of employment and the imagination of
decision makers.
Several factors in the agency and economic realities tests
track Fordist production, including tax treatment and benefits, supervision, skill,
whether the alleged employer provides training, the duration of the relationship,
and the extent the work is part of the company's regular or core business.1 46
Some courts find these features to be determinative of employment status and the

137. See id at 32 (citing HUGH G.J. AITKEN, TAYLORISM AT WATERTOWN ARSENAL:
SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT IN ACTION, 1908-1915, at 23 (1960)).

138. See id at 34.
139. See id at 41.
140. See id at 38 (citing BRUCE E. KAUFMAN, THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF THE FIELD
OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 23-27 (1993)).

141. See JACOBY, supra note 132, at 115-17 (citations omitted); STONE, supra note 133;
Katherine V.W. Stone, A Labor Law for the DigitalEra: The FutureofLabor and Employment Law
in the United States, in LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW AND ECONOMICS 689, 690 (Kenneth G.

Dau-Schmidt et al. eds., 2d ed. 2009) [hereinafter Stone, Digital]; Katherine V.W. Stone,
Rethinking Labour Law: Employment Protectionfor Boundaryless Workers, in BOUNDARIES AND
FRONTIERS OF LABOUR LAW: GOALS AND MEANS IN THE REGULATION OF WORK 155, 155 (Guy

Davidov & Brian Langille eds., 2006).
142. See Stone, supra note 24.
143. See Oliver E. Williamson, Introduction, in THE NATURE OF THE FIRM: ORIGINS,
EVOLUTION, AND DEVELOPMENT 3, 3 (Oliver E. Williamson & Sidney G. Winder eds., 1991).
144. See Coase, supra note 46, at 386; Oliver Williamson, The Economics of Organization:
The Transaction Cost Approach, 87 AM. J. OF Soc. 548, 556 (1981); see also Bodie, supra note 46,
at 663-64 (citing Coase, supra note 46, at 387-88).
145. See STONE, supra note 133, at 124-25.
146. See supra notes 74-75, 94-100 and accompanying text.
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question of control over the "process" versus the "product," despite their
belonging to an employment model unique to a particular historical era. 47
Common features of post-industrial work arrangements belie industrial
conceptions of employment.148 Today, firm boundaries do not necessarily
separate personal and proximate, relations based on "command" and
"commitment" from competitive relationships based on arms-length
interaction.149 Many "independent contracting," indirect employment, and even
standard employment relationships now centralize decision-making across firm
boundaries and decentralize decision-making within them. 50
Scholars note that the industrial model of employment is disintegrating, and
yet many courts are not adjusting the law to protect workers, or they are
adjusting it in an inconsistent manner.15 1 For example, firms that flatten
management hierarchies, use teamwork, and replace pre-defined jobs with
responsibilities defined by a worker's particular human and social capital,152

147. This conception of employment is also apparent in statutes and the methodologies courts
use to evaluate discrimination claims. See STONE, supra note 133, at 125.
148. See generally id at 6 (discussing the new concerns that have arisen in the post-industrial
workplace that were not present in the old industrial conception of employment).
149. See CHRIS TILLY & CHARLES TILLY, WORK UNDER CAPITALISM 121 (1998).

150. See, e.g., Judy Fudge, Fragmenting Work and FragmentingOrganizations: The Contract
of Employment and the Scope of Labour Regulation, 44 OSGOODE HALL. L.J. 609, 612 (2006)
(citing Hugh Collins, Independent Contractors and the Challenge of Vertical Disintegration to
Employment Protection Laws, 10 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 353, 353 (1990)) (discussing changing
organizational forms and their impact on the standard employment relationship); Walter W. Powell,
The CapitalistFirm in the Twenty-First Century: Emergency Patterns in Western Enterprise, in
THE TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY FIRM: CHANGING ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION IN INTERNATIONAL

PERSPECTIVE 33, 58 (Paul DiMaggio ed., 2001) (discussing the blurred boundaries of firms); Roger
Waldinger et al., Helots No More: A Case Study of the Justice for Janitors Campaign in Los
Angeles, in ORGANIZING

TO

WIN:

NEW

RESEARCH

ON UNION

STRATEGIES

102

(Kate

Bronfenbrenner et al. eds., 1998) (citations omitted) (discussing the organizational structure of
L.A.'s building services industry in the context of the Service Employees International Union's
"Justice for Janitors" campaign).
151. See STONE, supra note 133, at 124.
152. See STONE, supra note 133, at 201. Stone and others argue that many employers now
offer "employability" instead of long-term job security in exchange for workers' commitment and
effort. See id. at 111 (citing ROSABETH MOSS KANTER, FRONTIERS OF MANAGEMENT 192 (1997)).

Offering "employability" means providing training, varied experiences at work, networking, and
other opportunities to develop human capital. See id. In return, employers seek creative input from
employees to harness their cognitive abilities and knowledge of production processes. See id. at
194. Unlike under Taylorism, these employers except employees not to comply with bureaucratic
role requirements but to surpass them and define their own roles. See id. at 88; see also Catherine L.
Fisk, Reflections on the New Psychological Contract and the Ownership of Human Capital, 34
CONN. L. REV. 765, 768 (2001) (discussing the new employment contract, which takes into account
the flattened hierarchy and jobs defined by a worker's human capital); Katherine V.W. Stone,
Knowledge at Work: Disputes over the Ownership of Human Capital in the Changing Workplace,
34 CONN. L. REV. 721, 722 (2001) (discussing the flattened hierarchy and the focus on worker's
talents instead of pre-defined jobs); Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract:
Implications of the Changing Workplace for Labor on Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519,
554, 556 (2000) [hereinafter Stone, Contract] (quoting John R. Deckop et al., Getting More than
You Payfor: Organization Citizenship Behavior and Pay-for-PerformancePlans, 42 ACAD. MGMT.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2014

27

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 2
342

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 66: 315

complicate the Taylorist separation of conception and execution in production.
This makes it difficult for courts to differentiate employees from supervisors,
managers, and independent contractors.' 53 Katherine Stone has argued that the
acceptance by many courts of designations of workers as independent
contractors, supervisors, and managerial workers is unwarranted given the
tendency of firms to flatten managerial hierarchies and delegate authority and
discretion downward. 154 Several recent judicial decisions depriving nurses of
NLRA rights on the basis that they are "supervisors" conflate skill and
professional judgment with managerial direction.' 55
Further, some judges
concede to firm categorizations of workers as independent contractors because
they are subject to compensation schemes tied to individual performance and
market rates;156 however, even for "standard" employees (e.g., direct, full-time,
and not formally temporary workers), employers increasingly tie compensation
to performance, the exercise of individual license, and market changes, rather
than longevity and hours. 157
Post-industrial work arrangements also feature more hierarchy and
bureaucratic control across firm boundaries.158 Vertical de-integration, buyerdriven supply chains, and temporary agency work often centralize decisionmaking across firm lines but fragment management of the work relationship
across different entities.15 9 Such arrangements raise the question, "Who is the
employer?"1 60 Many courts equate the "control" element in the employment
contract with traditional, in-person, real-time, supervisory control and
bureaucratic integration. 6 ' The tendency to externalize costs and market risks to
low-wage "independent" contractors decouples economic dependence and job
security while coupling dependence and risk. The test for employment status

J. 420, 420 (1999)) (discussing how there is often no longer a hierarchy structure and pre-defined
jobs).
153. See Stone, Contract, supra note 152, at 554.
154. See STONE, supra note 133, at 214-15; Stone, Digital, supra note 141, at 695 (citing
NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706, 721 (2001)).
155. See VINEL, supra note 37, at 205; see also Collegiate Basketball Officials Ass'n v.
NLRB, 836 F.2d 143, 146, 149 (3d Cir. 1987) ("Officiating ill fits the usual distinction between
independent contractors and employees. Emphasis on whether the [basketball association]
supervises only the result of the official's job, versus how that result is achieved, makes little sense
when dealing with a specialized skill .... ).
156. See STONE, supra note 133, at 215.
157. See id
158. See Fudge, supra note 150, at 616.
159. See id.
160. See Paul Davies & Mark Freedland, The Complexities of the Employing Enterprise, in
BOUNDARIES AND FRONTIERS OF LABOUR LAW: GOALS AND MEANS IN THE REGULATION OF

WORK, supra note 141, at 273, 278; Fudge, supra note 150, at 617; Manfred Weiss, Re-Inventing
LabourLaw?, in THE IDEA OF LABOUR LAW 41, 46 (Guy Davidov & Brian Langille eds., 2011).
161. See Noah Zatz, Beyond Misclassification: Tackling the Independent Contractor
Problem Without Redefining Employment, 26 A.B.A. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 279, 282 (2011) (citing
ALAIN SUPIOT ET AL., BEYOND EMPLOYMENT: CHANGES IN WORK AND THE FUTURE OF LABOUR

LAW IN EUROPE 1 (2001)).
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based on industrial era employment has been especially problematic for
temporary workers, homeworkers, and independent contractors. 2
Under the NLRA, some courts accept firm categorizations of temporary and
part-time workers as "independent contractors" because they lack a stable longterm attachment to the firms they work for;'s3 however, full-time, non-temporary
workers have little expectation today of staying with one company for their
working lives.' 64 Many courts have likewise not protected workers against
company attempts to interfere with organizing and have not protected workers
when client firms use the NLRA's secondary action proscriptions, even in cases
where the client firm controls the intermediary contractor across the "market"
interface.' 6 5

In sum, scholars suggest that markets look more like hierarchies and
hierarchies look more like markets,166 but legal decision makers are not
consistently or adequately adjusting work law to apprehend these changes. Postindustrial changes in the organization of work blur the independent
contracting/employment and employment/joint employment distinctions if
employment is understood according to a particular historical model of industrial
work.' 67 Marc Linder tendered that the means/ends test is only coherent in
industrial manufacturing work.' 68 This Article suggests that the legal standards
for determining employment status were never coherent, even in the industrial
workplace.
3.

Incomplete Explanations

This paper proposes a different reason for legal instability in the distinction
between employment and other work relationships. The explanations regarding
imprecise and unwieldy legal tests and changes in the organization of work since
the 1970s have considerable explanatory purchase. They cannot, however,
explain disagreement over the interpretation of upfront contractual specification.
When work rules are specified in the contract, judges attach inconsistent and
contradictory meanings to the same work features and syndromes of features as

162.
163.
164.
165.
Southern

See STONE, supra note 141, at 214-15; Stone, Digital, supra note 141, at 695, 696.
See Stone, Digital, supra note 141, at 695-97.
See id. at 699.
See, e.g., Catherine L. Fisk et al., Union Representation of Immigrant Janitors in
California: Economic and Legal Challenges, in ORGANIZING IMMIGRANTS: THE

CHALLENGE FOR UNIONS IN CONTEMPORARY CALIFORNIA 199, 213 (Ruth Milkman ed., 2000)

(discussing how the NLRA's protection of the right to form labor unions does not in fact extend to
many workers in the building service industry); Nathan Newman, The Conflict ofthe Courts: RICO,
Labor, and Legal Preemption in Union Comprehensive Campaigns, 51 Drake L. Rev. 307, 323
(2003) (discussing companies interfering with individuals organizing based on the blurred lines
between what is considered inside and outside the firm).
166. See TILLY & TILLY, supra note 149, at 82; Charles Perrow, Economic Theories of
Organization, 15 THEORY & SoC'Y 11, 19 (1986).
167. See Fudge, supra note 153.
168. See Linder, Dependent and Independent Contractors,supra note 79, at 203.
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to how they bear on the means/ends distinction and on employment status
overall. This unsteadiness in interpretation is not a matter of differences in the
numbers, groupings, or relative weights of factors judges deem necessary to
establish employment, and it is a different issue than the question of what
quantum of control is necessary. It is also distinct from the challenge of
reconfiguring elements of industrial work reflected in the legal standards to postindustrial work. Incidents of the work that feature in the agency and economic
realities tests are refracted through the lens of UCS when they are designated in
the written contract. The problem of evaluating the meaning of UCS under the
means/ends question reveals contradiction at the heart of the employment
contract.
III. THE DOUBLE HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT:
SERVANT RELATIONS AND CONTRACT

THE FUSION

OF MASTER-

The history of the employment contract in the United States reveals why
judges must work with conflicting legal-conceptual tools to identify
employment.
It is a consequence of the nineteenth century origins of
employment as fusion of the household master's domestic authority over
servants with contract, the legal mechanism to facilitate voluntary and discrete
commodity exchanges between formally equal parties. This union of masterservant authority and contract rendered employment a relationship of both
servitude and equality.
In the second half of the nineteenth century, judges and treatise writers
extended the master-servant relationship to cover most work relationships and
assimilated this status relationship into contract, providing employers with more
control than they previously had under contracts for labor services.'6
The
nineteenth century also saw the liberalization and elimination of indentured
servitude in the United States,170 and at their convergence, these processes
established the modem employment contract in its basic contours. It was to this
legal relationship that the state anchored many statutory workplace rights in the
late nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

169. See Christopher Tomlins, Subordination, Authority, Law: Subjects in Labor History,
INT'L LAB. & WORKING-CLASS HIST., Spring 1995, at 56, 75 (quoting JAMES SCHOULER, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS 600 (2d ed. 1874); HORACE GAY WOOD, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 3-4 (1877)); see also TOMLINS, supra note 2, at
227 (discussing contracts giving employers more control).
170. See ROBERT J. STEINFELD, THE INVENTION OF FREE LABOR: THE EMPLOYMENT
RELATION IN ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAW AND CULTURE, 1350-1870, at 164 (1991).
171. See generally VINEL, supra note 37, at 13-22 (explaining the development of the
definition of an employee in the legal context from the late-nineteenth into the twentieth century).
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Toward Servitude

The employment contract has pre-industrial-actually medieval-origins in
master-servant law.172 That the hierarchical elements of master-servant law
remain in the contemporary employment contract is not a matter of "survival" or
a historical haunting or detritus, however.1 73 Judges and treatise writers
engineered the common law employment contract in the late nineteenth century
by expanding master-servant relations to cover increasing categories of nonslave workers, encasing master-servant relations in "contract," and
differentiating a now omnipresent generic legal category of employment from
independent contracting. 174 Hired labor relationships became subject to the
presumption that the hirer possessed managerial authority to direct the work and
discipline the worker.' 75
In the eighteenth century, master-servant rules applied only to a few types of
hired labor relationships-indentured servants, apprentices, and menial
servants.176 In law and social life, Americans generally conceived of hired labor
as distinct from servile labor. 77 During the first half of the nineteenth century,
as hired labor became more prevalent and work relations less heterogeneous,
judges and treatise writers extended master-servant law to cover increasing
categories of work relations, "engineering an extensive doctrinal migration of
vested authority beyond the more specific kinds of social relations that the law
concerning 'masters' and 'servants' had described in the colonies." 78 Courts
progressively purged the diffuse personal duties owed to others as a matter of
status and relieved employers of most of the master's custodial responsibilities.
Since contract did not provide employers with the enterprise control they
desired, courts, from the master's property right in the servant's labor, created a
nonnegotiable, implied contract term giving the employer plenary authority over
the employee's work. 179 The new relationship gave the employer the "right and
capacity, simply as an employer contractingfor the performance of services, to

172. See KAREN ORREN, BELATED FEUDALISM:
DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (1991).

LABOR,

THE LAW,

AND

LIBERAL

173. See TOMLINS, supra note 2, at 228-29.
174. See generally id at pt. 3 (citations omitted) (discussing the emergence of the common
law employment contract in the nineteenth century); Christopher L. Tomlins, Law and Power in the
Employment Relationship, in LABOR LAW IN AMERICA: HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL ESSAYS 71

(Christopher L. Tomlins & Andrew J. King eds., 1992) [hereinafter Tomlins, Law and Power]
(citations omitted) (describing the emergence of the common law employment contract).
175. See TOMLINS, supra note 2, at 231 ("[T]he exercise of power became decisive in
determining whether relations of employment between two parties existed.").
176. See id at 229.
177. See id at 229 ("During the colonial era, work for another in America comprehended not
one but at least two basic types of relationship: that between a householder and dependents
(menials, bound servants, apprentices) and that between principal and independent contractor, or
customer and supplier.").
178. Id at 226.
179. See id at 230-31, 283-84.
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exert the magisterial power of management, discipline, and control over
others."'8 0 Consequently, an employee owes not specialized labor services under
the employment contract, but the disposition of the employee's energetic
faculties to whatever the wants of the employer, as well as a kind of personal
deference or loyalty.' 8
It was not inevitable that the household model of subordination would
become the model for work, and legal templates for a work relationship based on
equality were available.' 8 2 Instead, the standard hired work relationship became
one between juridical unequals.
The master-servant relationship, a status
arrangement based on household authority, was among the most restrictive of
possible forms: the master could discipline the servant, and the master had a
personal authority over the servant and a property right in his/her labor.' 84 The
employment contract preserved much of this property right under the auspices of
contractual authority.
B.

Toward Equality

Another process in the development of the contemporary employment
contract in the United States was the shrinking and liberalization of indentured
servitude.'86 While other workers had contractual rights to bargain over the
scope of the conveyance, indentured servants conveyed a mostly unqualified
property interest in themselves to the master.187 In the colonial era, masters had
legal recourse to capture, specific performance, criminal penalties, and corporal
abuse to enforce their agreements.
By around 1775, the colonies had largely
limited specific performance to indentured servants, and, by 1800, native-born
white workers were not subject to specific performance or criminal penalties for
breaches of labor agreements.
The American Revolution somewhat

180. Id.
181. See JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 11, 13-

15, 84 (1983).
182. See TOMLINS, supra note 2, at 229 n.23. Tomlins argues that the doctrine of locatio
operis, which governed relationships in which one agreed to work for another, with the other's
material, in exchange for pay, but did not include the repressive strictures of master-servant law,
was available to the courts. Id. Instead, outworkers, bailees, artisans, and others were appropriated
under master-servant law. See id
183. See id. at 227; Tomlins, Law and Power, supra note 174, at 78 (noting that the courts at
this time issued numerous orders dealing with the relationship between master and servant).
184. See TOMLINS, supra note 2, at 231, 281, 283.
185. See id. at 283-84; see also ATLESON, supra note 181, at 15 (citing ALAN Fox, BEYOND
CONTRACT: WORK, POWER AND TRUST RELATIONS 188-89 (1974)).

186. See, e.g., STEINFELD, supra note 170, at 135 (observing that the pattern by 1800 in the
United States was to limit indentured servitude to minors and immigrants).
187. See id. at 136.
188. See ROBERT J. STEINFELD, COERCION, CONTRACT, AND FREE LABOR IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY 253 (2001) (stating that certain colonies in America subjected workers to
penal sanctions).
189. See id.
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transformed attitudes towards indentured servitude. 190 A significant decision by
the Indiana Supreme Court in 1821 denied masters specific performance and the
right to use physical coercion against a servant, even for voluntarily entered
indentures.19 Outside the South, Americans largely saw indentured servitude as
unfree labor by the 1820s.192 After 1830, adult males were not again held as
indentured servants in the United States because by the late 1830s, all had
completed service and there was a major drop in imported servants from England
after 1820.193 More Americans, particularly in the West and North, began to
associate indentured servitude with slavery and to redefine it as unfree labor.1 94
The drop-off of in servant imports and intermittently tight labor markets also left
195
By the mid-nineteenth century, masters no
employers competing for workers.
longer had recourse to capture, specific performance, criminal penalties, and
corporal abuse to control their servants. 196 Property rights in the conveyance of
labor were now determined at the will of the worker, because the employer had
no legal means to coerce the worker to continue in service.
Employers still sought to enforce labor contracts in the nineteenth century
through wage forfeiture and negative injunctions.198 State legislatures began
enacting pay statutes in the late 1870s and generally limited wage forfeiture by
requiring gayment for labor already performed and payment at periodic
intervals.
The liberalization was segmented-persons of color were subject to
penal sanctions in parts of the United States well into the twentieth century. 200
Employers also relied on enticement actions to control labor until the 1930s. 20 1
C.

Convergence

The development of the employment contract in the United States was a
double process entailing a loosening of the hierarchy and repressive elements in
some forms of work and the expansion of hierarchy and domination in other
work forms. The process culminated in the employment contract defined

190. See generally id. at 29-30 (discussing the decline of indentured servitude in America
after the American Revolution).
191. See STEINFELD, supra note 170, at 144-45 (quoting In re Clark, 1 Blackf. 122, 123-25
(Ind. 1821)) (discussing the case that "fundamentally redefin[ed] what constituted voluntary and
involuntary service").
192. See id. at 137 (observing a restriction in the scope of indentured servitude).
193. See STEINFELD, supra note 188, at 254; STEINFELD, supra note 170, at 171-72.
194. See STEINFELD, supra note 188, at 254.
195. See STEINFELD, supra note 170, at 165-66.
196. See id. at 172.
197. See id. at 157. The 1867 Anti-Peonage Act answered in the negative the lingering
question of whether states could enact statutes to provide for specific performance or criminal
penalties for labor contract breaches. See id. at 175.
198. See STEINFELD,supra note 188, at 8-9, 291.
199. See id. at 311-14.
200. See id. at 254.
201. See Tomlins, Law andPower, supra note 174, at 84-85.
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202

As some of the status elements
according to master-servant agency doctrine.
were stripped from indentured servitudes, apprenticeships, and domestic servile
relations-statutory provisions providing for criminal punishment and specific
performance in particular-judges and treatise writers extended the "magisterial"
authority of the master over the servant from its delimited categories of work
relationships to hired labor generally; workers not previously subject to the
strictures of master-servant law became subjugated to a new form of
authority.203 While indentured servitudes and apprenticeships become at-will,
and courts and legislatures deprived employers of certain modes of coercion, like
specific performance, for virtually all other hired labor, the relationship become
204
one of augmented domination.
The processes converged, as "American legal
texts began to make reference to a new 'generic' law of master and servant
encompassing all employees rather than the carefully delimited categories of
servants to whom colonial statutes had been addressed."205
What was left for white workers by the late 1870s was economic coercion,
submerged in the contractual idiom. Workers had a formal contractual right to
bargain to set conditions on the employer's use of their faculties. 20 6
Employment was finally "at-will" on the workers' side as well, a development
that initially benefited unskilled workers who had been subject to wage
forfeiture. 20 The concept of "free labor" came to mean that workers facing a
choice between a work relationship and other disagreeable alternatives were not
"coerced," as long as the alternative was not a non-pecuniary legal penalty.208
Otherwise, the law set few limits on workers' rights to alienate their human
capacities-assault and battery is one.209 Courts still enforce the duty of
loyalty.

210

D.

Statutory Regulation and Employment in the IndustrialOrder

Employers, courts, and legislatures translated the strictures of the masterservant employment relationship from personal, domestic work relationships and
small-scale production into forms of subordination appropriate for controlling

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

See TOMLINS, supra note 2, at 231.
See id at 230-31 (citing STEINFELD, supra note 170, at 7; WOOD, supra note 169, at 2).
See id at 260-61.
Id. at 260-61.
See Fox, supranote 185, at 181.
See Katherine V.W. Stone, Dismissal Law in the United States: The Past and Present of

At-Will Employment, in INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATIVE ON SOCIAL EUROPE 4 (2007), available

at http://papers.ssm.com/abstract=1342667.
208. See STEINFELD, supra note 188, at 175 (stating that wage workers generally could not
have their contracts enforced by "penal sanctions or specific performance" by the 1870s).
209. See Tomlins, Law and Power, supra note 174, at 88.
210. See, e.g., AK Steel Corp. v. Earley, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1340 (S.D. Ala. 2011) (citing
Orbit Elecs., Inc. v. Helm Instrument Co., 855 N.E.2d 91, 100 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006)) (noting that
common law principles dictate that employees have a duty to act with the "utmost good faith and
loyalty" toward their employer).
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larger-scale industry.211 "Employment" came to mean employer control not just
over a relationship between an individual master and worker or master and
workshop, but control over the coordination of collective work in a productive
enterprise.2 12

Courts reinterpreted and expanded the domestic authority of the master into
the managerial authority of a business to regulate collective work relations. 213
Acceding their legal authority to determine the expanse of the master's authority,
the courts made this authority, in contractual attire, subject to private rule.2 14
The "reasonable commands" of employers that the law obliged workers to obey
would include factory rules like usages and customs in addition to hours and
output quotas.215 The courts grounded a manager's authorit 6to coordinate the
work process in the employer's authority to direct the worker. 1
Statutory regulation of employment also played a role in the materialization
of the employment contract as both the standard legal template for industrial
work and one that required complete employee submission to a work process
Progressive reforms
designed and controlled by the capitalist firm.217
"strengthened the inequity of the wage bargain by making it the source of a
number of social rights that were trade-offs for the worker's social and technical
submission to the new industrial order."2 18 Certain labor unions also reinforced
this authority in consummating bargains in which they conceded management
prerogative in exchange for rising wages, job security, and other benefits. 9
E.

What is "Contractual"About Employment?

Contract's attempt to digest master-servant relations and to resolve the
tension between liberty of contract and liberty of person by making employment
at-will makes for a very strange contract. As many have noted, employment
scarcely appears to be a contract at all.220

211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

See TOMLINS, supra note 2, at 284-85.
See id..
See id.
See id.
See VINEL, supra note 37, at 27.
See TOMLINS, supra note 2, at 284-85.
See VINEL, supra note 37, at 27.
Id. at 37.

219. See generally, JUDITH STEPAN-NORRIS & MAURICE ZEITLIN, LEFT OUT: REDS AND

AMERICA'S INDUSTRIAL UNIONS (2003) (showing that Communist-led CIO unions were relatively
unusual in resisting the abdication of many features of workplace democracy to management);
VINEL, supra note 37 (discussing the role of collective bargaining in the United States in
reproducing the employee's subordinate status within the economic enterprise).
220. Several scholars have identified differences between employment and contracts proper.
See, e.g., FOX, supra note 185, at 183-90 (discussing the differences between contract of
employment and pure contract caused by infusing the employment contract with master-servant
relations); MARK FREEDLAND, THE PERSONAL EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT 15, 61 (2003) (discussing

the difference between the contract of employment and pure contract as related to the doctrines of
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The most oft noted difference between the commercial contract and
employment is a systematic absence of comparable bargaining power.2 2 1 The
warrant for contract, as part of the social compact, is to enable people to create
legally binding relations based on consent.
Labor is relatively inelastic
compared to other commodities 223 because its producer has limited options for
withdrawing labor from the market or decreasing its supply following
decreases in demand or price.224 As Max Weber argued, the "propertyless

contractual intention and consideration); PHILLIP SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY, AND INDUSTRIAL
JUSTICE 135-36 (1969) (noting that while contractual freedom impacted the emergence of
employment contract, pure contract was not an adequate foundation for governing employment
relationships). Contract hombooks address the trouble courts have in applying the framework of
contract law to employment. See, e.g., BRUCE W. FRIER & JAMES J. WHITE, THE MODERN LAW OF
CONTRACTS 47, 353 (3d ed. 2012) (discussing the complexities of at-will employment). This
section does not intend to provide an in-depth treatment.
221. E.g., Aditi Bagchi, The Myth of Equality in the Employment Relation, 2009 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 579, 580-81 (2009) (noting prevalence of critique that employees and employers do not have
equal "bargaining power"). Bagchi argues that "bargaining power" does not capture what is most
troubling about the employment relationship, noting that many contractual relationships reveal
unequal bargaining power. However, she defines bargaining power narrowly to refer only to the
influences of a worker's resources in determining the terms of an employment relationship,
overlooking the role of bargaining power in shaping whether an individual is able to bargain into the
regime of contract rather than into that of employment in the first instance. Bagchi's understanding
of "status" is closer to a Weberian and Marxian notion of bargaining power-a lack of resources to
bargain for anything but an employment relationship, a one-sided agreement of servitude. Id.; see
also, infra, Parts IIl-IV; SELZNICK, supra note 220, at 136.
222. See, e.g., EMILE DURKHEIM, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CIVIC MORALS 203-04 (1983);

224. See generally BEVERLY J. SILVER, FORCES OF LABOR: WORKERS' MOVEMENTS

&

Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 298 F.3d 778, 783 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding arbitration
agreement between employer and employee was procedurally unconscionable due to "inequality of
bargaining power which results in no real negotiation and an absence of meaningful choice"); see
also SELZNICK, supra note 227, at 55. See generally Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of
Contract, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 269 (1986).
223. See KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION 72 (1944) (following Karl Marx by
noting that labor, along with money and land, are "false" commodities because they are not
produced for sale and have no independent value).
GLOBALIZATION SINCE 1870, at 13, 38-40 (2008) (discussing "workers' power" in marketplace
bargaining and the "spatial," "technological," "product," and "financial" "fixes" available to those
who possess wealth or control commodities apart from the ability to work); Claus Offe & Helmut
Wiesenthal, Two Logics of Collective Action: TheoreticalNotes on Social Class and Organizational
Form, I POL. POWER & Soc. THEORY 67, 70, 74-78 (1980) (discussing the relative inability of
workers to make the reproduction of labor power more efficient and the steeper preference curve of
the owner of only labor power relative to the owner of capital with respect to employment). The
elasticity of labor varies according to institutional arrangements. For instance, in some places,
workers withdraw labor from the market and rely on agricultural self-sustenance. Several countries
have a more developed labor market infrastructure for enabling workers to withdraw labor from the
market for education, re-skilling, and life activities like childbearing and retirement. Labor elasticity
is also determined by norms of fairness (e.g., the "white premium"), relative compensation, the
availability of family labor, and law itself. See TILLY & TILLY, supra note 149, at 215 ("Our central
claim is that the labor market itself is decisively shaped by social relations.").
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stratum" offers its services for sale under the "compulsion of the whip of
hunger." 225
The lack of definiteness in employment is also anathema to the purpose of
contract, insofar as a regime of contract should provide the legal infrastructure
for the exchange and enforcement of promises that enable calculable
226
Employees agree to place their energies under the
expectations in commerce.
employer's control, and the employer promises a certain payment-usually an
hourly wage or salary, but sometimes commission, piece-rate, or other
227
method.
Regardless, the "exchange [isfor] an indefinite amount of laborfor
a definite amount ofpayment."228 In production, the employer seeks to extract as
much value as possible from the worker, but critical terms of extraction are
unspecified: How hard should the employee work? How fast? Under what
conditions? With what rights to object?
The open-endedness of employment, particularly with respect to the missing
quantity term and malleable price term, sits uncomfortably in contract. 230 A
contract could allow one party to agree to follow the other party's instructions
regarding some aspect of an exchange, for example, to follow a buyer's
reasonable shipping directions, and such a contract need not fail for
indefiniteness.2
However, a contract that allowed one party to determine the
essence of the bargain, for instance, to determine the quantity term (without any
232
agreement to exclusive dealing), would fail for indefiniteness.
Further, while
features
of
the
relationship
can
bargain
about
many
employees and employers
and seek to impose conditions on the employer's right to dispose ,of the
employee's capacities, with limited exceptions provided mostly by statute, the

225. MAX WEBER, GENERAL ECONOMIC HISTORY 277 (Frank H. Knight trans., Greenberg
1927) (1923).

&

226. See SELZNICK, supra note 220, at 56-57 (explaining that the specificity of contract is
well-suited for a market economy in which parties want to calculate their costs ex ante); see also
Stewart Macaulay, An Empirical View of Contract, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 465, 478 (1985)
(acknowledging that contract law promises to secure the expectations of parties but questioning its
ability to do so in practice). See, e.g., N. Indiana Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon Cnty. Coal Co., 799 F.2d
265, 273 (7th Cir. 1986) (arguing for importance of "creating stability in contract relations and
preserving reasonable expectations").
227. See Julia Tomassetti, 1 SAGE REFERENCE, SOCIOLOGY OF WORK: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA
123 (Vicki Smith ed. 2013).
228. Id. (emphasis added).
229. See ATLESON, supra note 181, at 13; Fox, supra note 185, at 183; SELZNICK, supra note
220, at 135.
230. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-201 cmt. 1 (2012) (requiring a quantity term in contracts); see also
id. § 2-306 cmts. 1-3 (requiring good faith when conforming to quantity estimates); tan Ayres
Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99
YALE L.J. 87, 95 (1989) (discussing the UCC's default rules for filling in price and quantity terms).
231. See, e.g., Centronics Corp. v. Genicom Corp., 562 A.2d 187, 188 (N.H. 1989) (discussing
contract requiring buyer to increase amount of funds in escrow account as directed by seller).
232. See, e.g., Sun Printing & Publ'g Ass'n v. Remington Paper & Power Co., 139 N.E. 470,
471 (N.Y. 1923) (contract for sale of paper missing both prices and time terms during which prices
would apply was an unenforceable "agreement to agree"); note 237, infra.
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terms are difficult to enforce or unenforceable. 233 And, rather than a right to
damages or equitable relief, the parties have a right to exit the relationship. 4
While all contracts are incomplete, the essence of employment is its
incompleteness.
Authoritative outside bodies-courts-have authority to
interpret contracts and resolve disputes. Courts and legislatures have developed
sets of interpretive principles and standardized terms-for instance, based on
industry standards, course of dealing or performance, or statute-to fill
235
contractual gaps and ambiguities.
By contrast, the employment contract gives
the employer authority to direct contractual performance and to determine
unspecified or ambiguous contract terms, like those noted above.236 Parties to a
commercial contract may agree that one party will interpret contractual terms;
however, under contract law, courts determine whether the interpretation is
consistent with the parties' promises.237 Master-servant status relations inserted
into every employment contract an implied term giving the employer authority to
determine both the rules of the contract and whether the employer's rules are
consistent with the contract.238 This includes circumstances where the employer

233. See, e.g., Asmus v. Pacific Bell, 999 P.2d 71 (Cal. 2000). In Asmus, the court held that a
company could unilaterally terminate an employment security provision in the contracts of its nonat-will managerial employees that was to last until a specified event occurred before that event
occurred. The court decided so despite the absence of any of the factors ordinarily needed to modify
a contract, such as unanticipated circumstances and additional consideration (e.g., Angel v. Murray,
322 A.2d 630, 637 (R.I. 1974), or a missing contract duration term (e.g., Haines v. City of New
York, 364 N.E.2d 820, 822 (N.Y. 1977). Likewise, none of the parties contended that the provision
was ambiguous (e.g., ConFold Pac., Inc. v. Polaris Indus., 433 F.3d 952, 955-56 (7th Cir. 2006); see
also Rachel Arrow-Richman, The Role of Contract in the Modern Employment Relationship, 10
Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev. 1, 2-3 (2003). Courts make it difficult for employees and employers to
contract out of at-will employment. Courts have also rejected the widely accepted tenet that they
will not question the adequacy of contractual consideration in the employment context. See Fisher
re contracting out of at-will employment. Note statutes for rest breaks, etc.
234. The judicial and legislative reluctance to govern the conduct of parties towards one
another in employment is similar to their (mostly) former reluctance to govern conduct inside
marriage, another relationship treated as a quasi-status arrangement in law. See Jill Elaine Hasday,
Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CALIF. L. REv. 1373, 1380 (2000). In
response to the nineteenth century woman's movement against marital rape, for instance, rather than
criminalize marital rape, states tended to respond by loosening restrictions on the availability of
divorce. They made marriage more "at-will." See id
235. In commercial requirements and outputs contracts, for example, which also lack a
specified quantity for exchange, courts generally require exclusive dealings to support a contract.
See, e.g., Mid-South Packers, Inc. v. Shoney's, Inc., 761 F.2d 1117, 1120-21 (5th Cir. 1985). In
such circumstances, courts will impute "reasonable" maximum and minimum quantities, and
impose a duty of good faith. See id at 1123; U.C.C. § 2-306 cmts. 1-3, 5 (2012); J.P. Kostritsky,
"Why Infer"? What the New InstitutionalEconomics Has to Say About Law-Supplied Default Rules,
73 TUL. L. REv. 497, 529 (1998).
236. See, e.g., Tomlins, Law and Power, supra note 174, at 74 (discussing the level of control
that employers have over their employees).
237. See Fox, supra note 185, at 183-84.
238. See id. at 187-88. See generally Rachel Arnow-Richman, The Role of Contract in the
Modem Employment Relationship, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 1 (2003) (discussing idiosyncrasies
and inconsistencies in judicial attempts to apply contract law to employment relationships).
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seems to unilaterally change agreed-upon wages or other terms.239 Again, the
basic "remedy" is exit.
A lease theory of employment, whereby the worker "leases" his/her capacity
to work, might seem to make employment fit better in the contractual paradigm
by allowing for more indefiniteness. Yet employment does not fit comfortably
under a lease theory either. A lease gives the lessee a property right in the leased
goods.240 In the case of employment, the employer cannot use or control this
property-it cannot put in motion the worker's capacity to labor-without the
worker's simultaneous and continuous engagement of will or provision of
assent.241 As explained later in this Article, this also means that the offer,
acceptance, and consideration necessary for the law to recognize agreements as
enforceable in contract, is plagued by indeterminacy in employment, and much
more so than in a unilateral contract.
If contract is supposed to facilitate commercial life by helping people map
out relationships, create enforceable expectations, and allocate risk, then
employment does not seem much of a contract.
IV.

THE CONTRACTING/PRODUCING
MEANS/END DISTINCTION

AMBIGUITY

AND

COLLAPSE

OF

THE

Embedded in employment contract is an ambiguity between contractual
formation (contracting) and contractual performance (production). This is the
"contracting/producing" ambiguity or tension, and it collapses the means/end
distinction for determining employment status.
A.

Contractingor Producing?

The problem with the lease-theory of employment brings us to where the
fusion of master-servant relations and contract makes a riddle of the means/ends
inquiry for distinguishing employment from other work relationships. The

239. See id. at 183-84; see also ATLESON, supra note 181, at 13 (nothing that while the ability
to quit an at-will relationship might seem to give both parties equal rights to interpret the contract,
the employment contract gives the employer more interpretive rights); SELZNICK, supra note 220, at
132, 136 (noting the same). Disagreement over completed work illustrates this point. Take the
example of an employment relationship between a restaurant and waiter. One night, a table vanishes
before paying, and the restaurant deducts the tab from the waiter's earnings. While the waiter
believes the restaurant has violated their agreement, the waiter generally lacks a contractual right to
the promised wages or other legal recourse for challenging the restaurant's "interpretation" of the
contract and ostensibly unilateral alteration of its terms. Certain state statutes might require the
restaurant to pay. When an employer pays less than agreed upon, the employee generally must look
for relief to a minimum wage statute or applicable state statute that requires payment of unpaid but
promised wages. Likewise, employees seeking promised bonuses, commissions, holidays, other
benefits, or damages from broken promises regarding these things must generally look for a relevant
state statute.
240. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1024 (10th ed. 2014).
241. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
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employment contract merges production and contracting, yet makes these
activities key to distinguishing bilateral employment from independent
contracting and joint employment.
The employment contract gives both parties equal bargaining rights over the
terms and conditions of employment; however, it gives the employer authority to
242
direct the work.
It presumes that the worker assents to the employer's rights
to demand obedience and fidelity and to discipline the worker.243 As discussed
above, we cannot make sense of this by theorizing employment as a "lease,"
whereby the worker grants a property right in the use of his/her capacity to work
to the employer: the employer cannot use or control this "property"-it cannot
put the worker's capacity to labor in motion-without the worker's constant,
244
simultaneous assent.
John Commons, the Wisconsin School economist
regarded as the father of institutional economics, noted that workers sell their
willingness to work, a "promise to obey commands," rather than selling the use
of their capacities to work. 245 However, because the relationship is at-will, the
worker does not actually promise to obey commands: the worker can "breach"
the agreement at any time without the legal consequence of incurring contractual
damages.2 4 6

The only way to construe employment as a "contract" is to think of it as a
contract that is continuously renewed at each moment the relationship endures
and in which both employee and employer provide consideration through
performance. Enforceable contracts generally require consideration, which the
promisee can provide through a return promise or performance. Neither party
provides consideration through a return promise in employment: by default,
employment is at-will, so the employee only "promises" to obey commands so
long as she or he feels like it. Likewise, the employer only "promises" to provide
work so long as it feels like it. This is called illusory consideration in contract
law.247 The promise as consideration option also is generally unavailable in the

242. See SELZNICK, supra note 220, at 136.
243. See SELZNICK, supra note 220, at 136-37; TOMLINS, supra note 2, at 295 (citing Fox,
supra note 188, at 188-89); Tomlins, Law and Power, supra note 177, at 88.
244. See supra note 246.
245. COMMONS, supra note 14, at 284.
246. See COMMONS, supra note 14, at 284 (citing Clyatt v. U.S., 197 U.S. 207, 218 (1904)).
In other words, the law treats the capacity to work as alienable and exchangeable through contract,
but the employee does not enter a contract to exchange an amount of his capacity to work. See id
(citing Clyatt, 197 U.S. at 218). The remedy for an employee's "breach" of quitting work is noncontractual-that of exit from the relationship. See id So, in the employment contract, the employer
promises to pay the worker for following its orders as long as the employer chooses to give orders,
and the worker accepts this contractual offer at every moment the employee works. See id at 28485.
247. See Petroleum Refractionating Corp. v. Kendrick Oil Co., 65 F.2d 997, 999 (10th Cir.
1933). Apart from resounding as an unenforceable "agreement to agree," a contract in which a party
promises to provide a willingness to work or to obey commands is also difficult to comprehend
under a will or consent theory of contract and under the Thirteenth Amendment's proscription
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employment context, because, as noted above, it would create a contract that was
too indefinite to enforce: the employee agrees to obey employer commands that
will determine essential parts of the bargain, namely, how much labor or value
the employee will actually provide the employer for a given amount of work.
Thus, an employee provides consideration through performance, as does the
employer. The employee "accepts" an offer of employment by following the
employer's instructions in the course of production. Likewise, the employer
makes a contractual offer by directing the employee in the work. If employment
is a "contract," it involves a continuing renewal of offer and acceptance at each
moment the employee works under the employer's direction.
The worker "assents" through performance-working under the empoyer's
control.
Likewise, the employer assents by accepting the work.
As
Commons concluded:
The labor contract therefore is not a contract, it is a continuing implied
renewal of contracts at every minute and hour, based on the continuance
of what is deemed, on the employer's side, to be satisfactory service,
and, on the laborer's side, what is deemed to be satisfactory conditions
and compensation.250

If employment is a "contract" in which offer and acceptance are
continuously renewed through performance at each moment that the relationship
lasts, then bargaining over the work and carrying out the work merge: employee
and employer bargain as they produce. Thus, employment is not a simple
unilateral contract and courts do not treat it as such. In a unilateral contract, a
contract in which one party accepts the contract through performance, courts
tend to impose an option contract that prevents the offeror from revoking the
251
offer once the offeree begins performance.
Employment, however, entails a
continuing negotiation between employee and employer as to terms and
conditions under which the employer can dispose of the worker's energies in the
course of this disposal or in the course of contractual performance.22 And,
courts do not impose an option contract in employment.
The employee
"bargains" over the terms and conditions of work by satisfactorily following the

against involuntary servitude. If an individual could alienate the capacity to will, then that
individual would not have the capacity to contract in the first instance.
248. See id. at 285.
249. See id.
250. Id
251. Cf U.C.C. § 2-206 cmt. 3 (2011-2012) (describing when the "beginning of performance
by an offeree can be effective as acceptance"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 45, 62
& cmt c. (1981) (describing when an option contract is created and the effect beginning
performance has on a contract capable of being accepted by performance, as well as explaining that
the justification for these rules is "to protect the offeree in justifiable reliance on the offeror's
promise").
252. See COMMONS, supra note 14, at 285.
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employer's instructions, and the employer "bargains" as it directs the
work: Contracting and producing are not separate activities in employment.
Likewise then, in the rubric of contract, to say employment is at-will simply
means that at some point, the parties may decide to stop bargaining. Employer
and employee do not consummate a contract with enforceable ends through a
process of contractual formation and then proceed to the business of carrying out
their contractual obligations.
Without referring to the independent
contracting/employment distinction, and perhaps realizing its implications, John
Commons' understanding of the doctrinal structure of employment astutely
states the problem: "His [the worker's] bargaining is his act of producing
something for the employer and his producing something acceptable is his
method of bargaining," and the "laborer is thus continuously on the labor
market-even while he is working at his job he is both producing and
,253
bargaining, and the two are inseparable."
Neither employee nor employer
conclude contractual negotiation and proceed into a separate realm of production
in the employment relationship. 254
The problem is that the "control" standard and means/ends query for
employment asks courts to distinguish contracting from producing and
contractual obligations from performance to distinguish employment from
independent contracting: the distinction between employment and independent
255
contracting is whether the alleged employer controls production.
Contractual
independence is a feature of both employment and independent contracting
relationships-both parties have a right to bargain over the terms and conditions
of employment.256 So, it may look like one party is controlling the work, but, if
the parties are still negotiating, then one party could be getting its way by driving
a hard bargain, not because it is an employer. This is consistent with an
independent contracting relationship. Thus, the means/ends test asks whether the
alleged employer control not only the contracted for "ends," but also contractual
performance or production-the "means." Again, however, bargaining and
producing are simultaneous in employment, and the contractual ends are not
distinct from contractual performance: there is no distinction between the
contracted-for "ends" or "results" of the work and the "means" of the work. The
standard is unintelligible. In employment, what is equality in contracting is
simultaneously subordination in production. The ambiguity between contracting

253. COMMONS, supranote 14, at 286 (emphasis added).
254. See id.
255. See, e.g., C.C. Eastern, Inc. v. NLRB, 60 F.3d 855, 858 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citing Seafarers
Local 777 v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 862, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1979)) (stating that the distinction between an
employee and an independent contractor "is a function of the amount of control that the company
has over the way in which the worker performs his job"); C. C. Eastern adopts the contradiction by
positing the imagined distinction between the contracted-for "job" and control over the performance
of the job.
256. See, e.g., SELZNICK, supra note 220, at 139 ("The continued ascendance of contract was
assured by the celebration of voluntarism and bargaining as foundations of labor policy.").
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and production embedded in the means/ends query is behind much of the lack of
judicial agreement as to what constitutes employment.
B.

Separating Contractual Formationfrom Performance: Temporal and
BureaucraticInstitutionalMarkers

Since contracting and producing are not distinct phenomena in employment,
they do not offer stable guidance to courts' attempts to distinguish control and
independence as to the "manner and means" of the work. John Commons made
sense of employment despite its confounding legal structure, by appealing to
industrial engineering and human resources practices in the organization of the
hierarchical industrial firm of the Fordist system.257 As intimated in Part II,
many work arrangements seem to lack many of the bureaucratic and temporal
markers of Fordist employment as a social practice.258 These work arrangements
challenge the ability of judges to deconstruct the coincidence of domination and
consent, and of subordination and equality, which define employment. 259 The
ambiguity between contracting and production creates interpretative challenge in
employment status disputes that is partially consistent with the theory that
moving towards "post-industrial" work arrangements misaligns work law and
work.2o However, that ambiguity challenges the theory to the extent it assumes
that industrial work arrangements were, by contrast, not contradictory under the
law.
Judges tasked with distinguishing employment from independent contracting
in "non-standard" employment often struggle with reorganizing temporal and
bureaucratic markers to distinguish contracting--characterized by voluntariness
and equality-from production in employment-characterized by subservience.
In a vertically integrated manufacturing firm, human resources personnel might
hire the worker and explain salary and benefits, while distinct personnel in a
261
manufacturing division later supervise the worker on a factory floor.
These
organizational markers of Fordist employment separated the processes of labor

257. See VINEL, supra note 37, at 82-83 (citing COMMONS, supra note 14, at 315); see also
COMMONS, supra note 14, at ch. 8 (citations omitted) (discussing wage bargaining in the industrial
age by explaining the employer-employee contractual relationship).
258. See supratext accompanying notes 149-54.
259. See generally Carlson, supra note 1, at 344-47 (citing Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 320 (1992)) (providing examples of how bureaucratic and temporal markers
like work scheduling and contract terms affect judges' decision process when analyzing the control
issue in employment status disputes).
260. See, e.g., STONE, supra note 133, at 6 ("[W]ork arrangements characteristic of the new
era place stress on the existing labor laws and employment institutions that were designed for an
earlier age.").
261. See ARCHIBALD COX, ET. AL, LABOR LAW 248 (13th ed. 2001) (noting loss of
supervisors' authority over employee retention to personnel departments by 1940s). See generally.
JACOBY, supra note 139 (explaining rise of personnel departments in the United States).
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market sorting and contracting from the process of production. 262 Many postindustrial work arrangements appear to mix contracting and productionintermingling where employee and employer meet as equals and where they
meet as superior and subordinate. 263
In NLRB v. Labor Ready, Inc.,264 the court considered whether a temporary
employment agency's non-solicitation policy violated the NLRA by covering
persons registered with the agency awaiting assignment. 265 Registrants usually
received one-day assignments, which they could accept or decline.266 They
received compensation only for completed assignments.267 The agency paid
them at the end of the day, at which time it deemed registrants to have "quit"
their employment. 268 At some point, the agency switched from giving phone
assignments to requiring registrants seeking work to appear at the office.26 This
prompted several unionized registrants to organize in protest of the policy while
270
at the agency awaiting assignments.

262. See generally STONE, supra note 133, at 5 ("In [continuous and industrial production
processes], large firms established internal labor markets with narrow job definitions and clearly
defined, hierarchical job ladders.").
263. Even where organizational markers seem to adequately distinguish contracting and
production, the social contradictions of servitude and equality in employment confound judicial
inquiry. There is a historical association of work with the (white, male) independent citizen in the
United States. See EVELYN NAKANO GLENN, UNEQUAL FREEDOM 1-2 (2002). Judges tend to
conceptualize production as requiring some independence on the part of workers, and not just to
confirm that the relationship is one of bargained-for exchange in which the worker confers a
valuable service on the hirer. See Noah D. Zatz, The Impossibility of Work Law, in THE IDEA OF
LABOUR LAW, supra note 141, at 234, 236 (citing Morgan v. MacDonald, 41 F.3d 1291, 1293 (9th
Cir. 1994); Harker v. State Use Indus., 990 F.2d 131, 133 (4th Cir. 1993)). Employment status
decisions reveal ambivalence and inconsistency regarding how much independence in production
employment requires. In cases involving work relationships that are intertwined with other
institutional relationships, like prison work, workfare, and medical residency, judges sometimes
find the relationship is not employment because there is too much control in production rather than
not enough control, as in the cases analyzed in this article. In Brown University, 342 N.L.R.B. 483
(2004), for example, the NLRB argued that evidence of non-employment status included that "most
[graduate student assistants] perform under the direction and control of faculty members from their
particular department," and "[graduate student assistants] generally do not teach independently." Id.
at 489. Despite the value of their services to the university, which the NLRB did not deny, the
NLRB found that these workers were not independent enough to be employees. Id. at 490; see also
Zatz, supra, at 236 (citing Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 810 (7th Cir. 1992); Noah D. Zatz,
Working at the Boundaries of Markets: PrisonLabor and the Economic Dimension of Employment
Relationships, 61 VAND. L. REV. 857, 912 (2008) [hereinafter Zatz, Boundaries]).
264. 253 F.3d 195 (4th Cir. 2001).
265. See id. at 196.
266. See id. at 196-97.
267. See id. at 197.
268. See id.
269. See id. at 197 & n.l.
270. See id. at 197-98.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol66/iss2/2

44

Tomassetti: The Contracting/Producing Ambiguity and the Collapse of the Means

2014]

CONTRACTING/PRODUCING AMBIGUITY

359

The NLRA prohibits employers from interfering with employee collective
action rights, including through non-solicitation policies.271 The main question
before the court was whether the registrants were "employees" while awaiting
assignment, which depended on whether their employment relationship with the
272
The court
agency continued between assignments and after each day of work.
argued that requiring registrants' physical presence at the agency to receive
assignments was a form of "control" indicating the employment relationship
continued between assignments. 273 The court also argued that the agency's
practice of keeping registrant applications on file between assignments belied its
claim that registrants "quit" at the end of an assignment. 274
In Labor Ready, Inc., the court faced a work arrangement that lacked the
temporal, spatial, and bureaucratic markers separating the hiring rocess from
supervisory direction in the vertically integrated industrial firm.
What the
agency Labor Ready interpreted as part of a process of contracting and labor
market sorting-registrants looking for jobs in the waiting room-the court
interpreted as part of Labor Ready's process of producing its worker-leasing
service. 276
A work-for-hire case under the Copyright Act provides another example of
the quandary of distinguishing contracting and production in non-industrial work
arrangements.277 One of the factors indicating employee status under the
common law agency test is the hirer's right to assign additional projects.278 In
Aymes v. Bonelli, the court considered whether a company's right to assign
additional projects to a computer programmer was strong evidence of the
programmers' employee status.so The court reasoned:
This [right to assign additional projects] is fairly strong evidence that
Aymes was an employee, since independent contractors are typically
hired only for particular projects. However, this factor carries less
weight than those evaluated above, because the delegation of additional
projects to Aymes is not inconsistent with the idea that he was Island's

271. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2012); Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 531-32 (1992)
(quoting 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(1)); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 110 (1955)
(citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(1)); Labor Ready, Inc., 253 F.3d at 196.
272. See LaborReady, Inc., 253 F.3d at 199.
273. See id at 201.
274. See id. at 200.
275. See id. at 200-01.
276. See id. at 201.
277. See, e.g., Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 864 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding that a computer
program was not a work-for-hire and therefore, under the Copyright Act, its creator, and not the
company for which it was created, owned the copyright).
278. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992); Cmty. for Creative
Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 752 (1989).
279. 980 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1992).
280. See id. at 863.
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independent trouble shooter who might be asked to intervene as
computerproblems arose.281
Yet the ambiguity between equality in contractual formation and
subordination in contractual performance also thwarts the product/process
distinction in work relationships that resemble standard industrial models in
nearly every way.
One illustration is the problem courts have in distinguishing between the
employer's at-will and disciplinary authority and the discretion of a company to
terminate or not to renew the contract of putative independent contractors. 282
The contracting/producing
ambiguity is particularly problematic in
distinguishing these features of employment and independent contracting when
workers sign short-term but automatically renewable contracts and tend to have
stable, long-term relationships with the firm for which they work, consistent with
the industrial model.2 83
In an employment status case regarding delivery drivers, Aetna Freight
Lines, Inc. v. NLRB, 284 the court found that a company's refusal to renew a
delivery driver's lease represented employer control over the means and manner
of work in the form of discipline: "Aetna exercises control over the hiring and
firing of drivers engaged by the multiple owners by refusing to execute leases
where drivers of the leased equipment are found unacceptable and by emploing
lease cancellation as a means of enforcing driver discipline and discharge."
286
In Estrada v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., the court argued
that the giant package delivery company FedEx could terminate delivery
drivers at will by retaining the right not to renew the driver's contract without
any cause and doing so in practice.287 The Estrada trial court also rejected
the company's attempt to characterize its "Contractor Relations" division as
a "liaison" for contractual negotiation.288 It rebuffed what it saw as FedEx's
renaming of industrial bureaucratic markers to disguise its disciplinary and
at-will authority over production as an incident of contracting:

281. Id (emphasis added).
282. See Aetna Freight Lines, Inc. v. NLRB, 520 F.2d 928, 930 (6th Cir. 1975) (citing Ace
Doran Hauling & Rigging Co. v. NLRB, 462 F.2d 190, 192 (6th Cir. 1972)) (finding that a
company's authority and control, including right not to renew contract, indicated employee status
despite the contractual term independent contractor).
283. See, e.g., Estrada v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 327, 332 (Ct.
App. 2007) (citing S.G. Borrello & Sons v. Dep't of Ind. Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 403 (Cal. 1989).
284. 520 F.2d 928 (6th Cir. 1975).
285. Id. at 930.
286. 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 327 (Ct. App. 2007).
287. See id at 332 (citing Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 269 Cal. Rptr. at 654).
288. See Estrada v. FedEx Ground, No. BC 210130, 2004 WL 5631425, at 11 (Cal. Super. Ct.
July 26, 2004), aff'd sub nom. Estrada v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 327
(Ct. App. 2007).
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According to [FedEx personnel], Contractor Relations is a liaison
between [FedEx] and [the drivers] in order to guarantee the independent
contractor model. The purpose of Contractor Relations is to review
recommendations for contract termination or non-renewal and to make
certain that terminal managers do not overstep their bounds.
However, a closer look shows that Contractor Relations is nothing more
than a mere branch of management ... Contractor Relations must be
seen in a role akin to Human Relations over employees, wherein the
highest levels of management have the final say. 289
The court found that FedEx had "almost absolute unilateral control over
contract termination to the point of it being the same as termination at will." 290
In another FedEx case, the court also found that drivers could "effectively be
terminated at will given that the [contract] provides for nonrenewal without
cause." 291
In another FedEx case, the court interpreted FedEx's authority to cancel a
driver's contract renewal for any or no reason as an incident of market sorting
rather than an employer's at-will authority. The court argued that this authority
"isn't atypical of an independent contractor relationship where a hiring party can
simply decide not to re-hire a worker." 292 Likewise, length and continuity of service
is a factor pointing towards an employment relationship.293 Although drivers tended
to have long-term relationships with FedEx and received seniority bonuses,294 the
court argued that because the contracts were for a definite term and FedEx could
choose not to renew them, the drivers' length of service also did not point towards an
employment relationship.295 These disagreements over how to interpret short-term
contracts with automatic renewals are based on the contradictory attempt to combine
master-servant authority with contract in employment. In the rubric of contract, since
the employee and employer bargain and perform simultaneously, to say employment
is "at-will," simply means that at some point, the parties stop bargaining.

289. Id. at 11-12 (emphasis added).
290. Id. at 13.
291. Wells v. FedEx Ground PackageSys., Inc., 979 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1025 (E.D. Mo. 2013).
292. In re FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 734 F.Supp.2d 557, 595 (N.D. Ind. 2010), rev'd
in part, Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 765 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2014); Slayman v.
FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 765 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir. 2014).
293. Craig v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 335 P.3d 66, 87 (Kan. 2014) (citing Dole v.
Snell, 875 F.2d 802, 811 (10th Cir. 1989); Home Design, Inc. v. Kansas Dept. of Human Resources,
2 P.3d 789 (Kan. App. 2000)).
294. FedEx Ground Package, 734 F.Supp.2d at 568; Estrada, 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 333 (noting
California drivers worked an average of 8 years for FedEx).
295. FedEx Ground Package, 734 F.Supp.2d at 596. C.f Alexander, 765 F.3d at 996 (finding
that FedEx drivers' "length of time for performance of services" is evidence of an employment
relationship); Craig, 335 P.3d at 87 (arguing "duration and continuity of the relationship between
FedEx and its delivery drivers point directly to an employer/employee relationship.").
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Disagreement over what FedEx terms its "business discussions" between
management and delivery drivers also demonstrates the force of the
contracting/producing ambiguity in standard employment. In Wells v. FedEx
Ground Package System, Inc., FedEx characterized manager-driver meetings
in which the manager reviewed the driver's file as a basis for making decisions
regarding discipline, termination, and bonuses as inter-firm business
discussions.297 Rejecting this characterization, the court found that business
discussions were a means by which "FedEx monitored and disciplined Plaintiffs
to control the work process" in its capacity as their employer.298 In other words,
the court saw business discussions as akin to typical employee performance
evaluation meetings. 299
In two other FedEx cases, however, the court interpreted business
discussions as inter-firm contractual negotiation, arguing that "contractors are
not subject to reprimands or other discipline,"300 and that "business discussions"
were optional and not indicative of FedEx control over the work or at-will
authority, even though "not participating will reflect poorly on the contractor
upon contract renewal." 30
This disagreement evokes the contracting/producing ambiguity and recalls
Commons' characterization of the "job": "The job is the laborer's going
business, consisting in his continuing transactions of offering a product in
exchange for compensation and choosing between alternative opportunities. And
the jobs are a part of the goin business of the employer, consisting, on his side,
of the identical transactions."
V.

UPFRONT

CONTRACTUAL

SPECIFICATION

AND

THE

MEANS/END

DISTINCTION

A.

ContractualDesignation of the Work and the Spectrum of Contractual
Formalism

This Article locates the phenomenon of upfront contractual specification at
one end of a spectrum of ways to designate the work relationship in the

296. 979 F. Supp. 2d 1006 (E.D. Mo. 2013).
297. See id. at 1017.
298. Id. at 1024-25 (citing Williams v. Sodexho Operations, LLC, No. 4:08CV920 JCH, 2009
WL 2592312, at *3-4 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 20, 2009).
299. See Craig, 335 P.3d at 84 ("Given that the oversight procedures can eventually lead to a
driver's termination, the 'advisory' nature of the procedures appears to be suspect, at best.")
300. FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 498 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
301. In re FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 942, 982 (N.D. Ind. 2012); see
also EEOC v. N. Knox School Corp., 154 F.3d 744, 749 (7th Cir. 1998) (disagreeing with the
EEOC that it was evidence of employment that the school board "supervise[d] and discipline[d]
drivers by monitoring their performance and taking it into account when deciding whether to enter
into a new contract with an incumbent driver").
302. COMMONS, supra note 14, at 286.
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governing written contract.
Contractual provisions describing the work
relationship at issue in employment status disputes range from statements
declaring the legal category into which the relationship purportedly fits (e.g., "I
agree to be an independent contractor"), 303 to recitations of the legal definition of
employment (e.g., "independent contractor agrees to work under my direction
and control") or independent contracting (e.g., "I will not control the manner and
means of your work"),304 to provisions describing the work tasks in great
detail.30"
This Article terms these levels of designation, respectively,
"traditional" designation, "meso" level designation, and upfront contractual
specification.
It is clear that certain interpretations of traditional designation and mesolevel designations reciting the definition of employment are exercises of legal
formalism. By "formalism" this Article refers to the privileging of legal form
over substance, regardless of its relationship to the latter. In contractual
formalism, decision makers ratify contractual labels and utterances as legal
evidence of a contract regardless of their accuracy and transparency. 06
Traditional formalism preempts the means/ends inquiry. Meso formalism's
attempt to submerge the contracting/producing ambiguity is rather shallow.
Traditional and meso-level designations of the work do not preclude an

303. See FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 498 ("[C]ontractors sign a Standard Contractor
Operating Agreement that specifies the contractor is not an employee of FedEx 'for any
purpose' . . . ."); see also Carlson, supra note 1, at 341 ("[A] test of statutory coverage giving
significant weight to a written contract between the parties raises the risk that employers will create
the appearance of an independent contractor relationship on paper simply to avoid employment
laws.").
304. See FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 498 ("[T]he contractors sign a[n] . . . [a]greement
that . .. confirms the 'manner and means of reaching mutual business objectives' is within the
contractor's discretion .... ).
305. See, e.g., EEOC v. N. Knox Sch. Corp., 154 F.3d 744, 748 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting the
"detailed specifications in the transportation contracts, which set 'the precise route and schedule of
each driver,"' as well as starting times, work days, rules for disciplining students, and other
requirements).
306. This understanding of formalism is closest to Arthur Stinchcombe's concept of
"formality" as an "abstraction" . . . that ... can be taken as a 'fact,' so that most people, most of the
time, do not have to go behind it" and that has some authority to govern behavior. ARTHUR L.
STINCHCOMBE, WHEN FORMALITY WORKS:

AUTHORITY AND

ABSTRACTION

IN LAW AND

ORGANIZATIONS 2, 41 (2001). This definition implies that not all legal formalism is undesirable as
empty ritual; rather, the abstractions should be evaluated based on their "adequacy" in capturing the
underlying substance, "communicability," and flexibility in the face of change. Id. at 21-41; see also
Milton C. Regan, Jr., How Does Law Matter?, I GREEN BAG 2D 265, 269 (1998) (citing S. Pac. Co.
v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1916) (Holmes, J., dissenting); OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE
COMMON LAW 1 (1881)). This understanding of formalism is related to, but narrower than, that of
classical legal orthodoxy, which emphasizes rules and demonstrative reasoning. See, e.g, Frederick
Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 510 (1988) ("Formalism is the way in which rules achieve
their 'ruleness' precisely by doing what is supposed to be the failing of formalism: screening off
from a decisionmaker factors that a sensitive decisionmaker would otherwise take into account.
Moreover, it appears that this screening off takes place largely through the force of the language in
which rules are written.").
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employment contract, a contract that is continuously renewed as the employer
"bargains for" the terms and conditions of work by directing the work and the
employee contractually "accepts" again and again via compliance with the
employer's commands. In UCS, however, the contracting/producing ambiguity
manifests a more troublesome interpretative problem for evaluating claims of
control over the work relationship. UCS is potentially a form of "high"
formalism,307 but may not be formalism at all.
1.

TraditionalFormalism

"

By "traditional" designation of the work, this Article refers to the written
contract stating the legal relationship (or definition of the relationship) that it
purports to create. For example, the written contract between FedEx and its
drivers stated, "Both [FedEx] and Contractor intend that Contractor will provide
these services strictly as an independent contractor, and not as an employee of
[FedEx] for any purpose." 308 In traditional contractual formalism, judges treat
these utterances in the contract as performative legal acts, even when they
contradict the substantive legal elements of the relationship.3 0 9 Many judges
interpret written contractual terms stating that employees are "independent
contractors" as evidence of party "intent" regarding the relationship.
They
thus subordinate the statutory work law to contract and create a right of the
parties to contract out of statutory work law through such expressed "intent."3
Under traditional formalism, stating the legal relationship in the contract is the
magical incantation that can transform any work relationship into independent
312
contracting.

307. The author credits Gregory Klass for the suggestion that one might conceptualize upfront
contractual specification as "high" formalism.
308. In re FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 734 F. Supp. 2d 557, 560 (N.D. Ind. 2010)
(quoting employment contract).
309. See FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 512-13 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Garland, J.,
dissenting) (critiquing the majority for relying on the contract's labeling of FedEx drivers as
"contractor[s]" as evidence of the drivers' entrepreneurial opportunity, because "the label FedEx
puts on its relationship with its workers does not affect whether they have entrepreneurial
opportunity for gain or loss.").
310. See, e.g., FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d at 504 ("[T]he parties' intent
expressed in the contract[] augurs strongly in favor of independent contractor status.").
311. See id at 495, 504. Scholars and decision makers have critiqued cases for prioritizing the
formality of contractual "intent" over work law. See Zatz, Beyond Misclassification,supra note 61,
at 285. This application of formalism sanctions the use of economic coercion to force workers to
contract out of statutory rights that are premised on the very basis that workers and employers have
unequal bargaining power. See id at 290.
312. See FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 504 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (arguing that
designation of drivers as "independent contractors" in standard contract indicated drivers' intent to
be independent contractors); St. Joseph News-Press, 345 NLRB 474, 479 (2005) ("[A] party's intent
with regard to the nature of the relationship created weighs strongly in favor of finding independent
contractor status."); C.C. Eastern, Inc., 60 F.3d 855, 858-60 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (noting that "the
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Meso Formalism

The contractual terms at issue in many employment status disputes also
suggest a meso-level of formalism in legal reasoning: judicial deference to the
designation of workers as "independent contractors" even when they agree to
contractual terms that recite the definition of employment. Under meso
formalism, contractual provisions approaching an express statement that the
alleged employer has the right to control the means of the work, or reciting the
legal definition of employment (e.g., "I agree to work under your direction and
control") are no longer probative of employee status.
For example, the contract between furniture delivery drivers and the delivery
company in National Van Lines required the drivers to work under "the eneral
supervision" of the company.313 In SIDA of Hawaii, Inc. v. NLRB, 14 the
contract required drivers to abide by rules and regulations that included obeying
orders of dispatchers.315 The court in both cases found that the contracts were
not evidence that the alleged employers' controlled the means of the drivers'
work."'
Provisions in the standard written contract between FedEx and its delivery
drivers repeated several legal incidents of employment under the agency test and
also restated the definition of common law employment: drivers agreed to
cooperate" with FedEx supervisory personnel. 1 Drivers agreed to make any
deliveries as FedEx requested them, including "in such other areas as Contractor
may be asked to provide service" outside their assigned service areas. 318 The
FedEx contract thus expressly gave FedEx a right to assign extra work, a
Restatement factor indicating employee status and reflecting an employer's
ongoing authority to direct the work in production. 319 Judges have deployed
meso formalism to find that contractual provisions almost expressly requiring
workers to perform work for the alleged employer under its right of control do
not reflect control over the means of the work.320
FedEx drivers also agreed to the company's open-ended authority to alter
workloads-FedEx had the right to unilaterally reconfigure service areas. 32 1

contract between the Company and each individual driver characterizes the driver as an independent
contractor").
313. Nat'l Van Lines, 117 N.L.R.B. 1213, 1215 (1957), vacated, 273 F.2d 402 (7th Cir. 1960).
314. 512 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1975).
315. Id. at 358 nI.
316. See id. at 358; Nat'1 Van Lines, 273 F.2d at 407.
317. See In re FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 734 F. Supp. 2d 557, 560-61 (N.D. Ind.
2010) (second alteration in original) (noting that the contract requires the driver to "[c]ooperate with
[FedEx's] employees, customers and other contractors").
318. Id.
319. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)(a) (1958).
320. See SIDA ofHaw., Inc., 512 F.2d at 358-59; In re FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 734
F. Supp. 2d at 600.
321. See id. at 560-61.
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FedEx also claimed the open-ended control of the employer to alter the terms of
the contract without regard to the rules for contractual modification under nonemployment contracts: drivers agreed to follow whatever "standards" FedEx
might "promulgate[ ]from time to time."322 Thus, the contract expressly gave
FedEx the right to alter the contract terms in the course of the work
relationship; 32 in the same contract in which FedEx delivery drivers agreed that
they were "independent contractors," they also agreed to be employees.
Nonetheless, the court in FedEx Ground Package System interpreted these
provisions as describing the "results" of the work-the "standards of service" the
drivers agreed to provide.324 Under meso formalism, the contract recites the
incidents that define employment as opposed to independent contracting, but
because they appear in the contract, they no longer have the legal meaning they
would otherwise have. 325
Meso formalism inverts traditional formalism: traditional formalism treats
statements in the contract as true, regardless of whether they are true statements
about the work relationship; meso formalism treats true statements in the
contract (or accurate descriptions about the alleged employer's control over the
work relationship) as irrelevant evidence of control. Even if the statements
accurately and quite literally describe the alleged employer's rights to control the
means of the work, judges using meso-formalistic reasoning interpret the
provisions as describing the "ends" of the work-the provisions evince
independence in contracting, not subordination in production.
3.

Upfront ContractualSpecification: High Formalism?

Upfront contractual specification refers to the setting forth of detailed and
extensive work rules in the written contract governing the work. This Article
includes under upfront contractual specification contracts in which the detailed
and somewhat comprehensive elaboration of the work is not just artifice
disguising the alleged employer's open-ended authority over production-as in
meso formalism-but to some extent meaningfully directs the worker. While the
written contracts at issue in employment status decisions often include
provisions ranging across the spectrum, and usually include a traditional level
designation of the work, this Article focuses on cases in which the contracts as a

322. Id at 564.
323. See id at 580. The trial court in Estrada questioned whether the FedEx work arrangement
was one of upfront contractual specification-despite the extensive instructions telling the drivers
what to do and how to do it, FedEx obligated the drivers to act like employees. See Estrada v.
FedEx Ground, No. BC 210130, 2004 WL 5631425, at 8-9 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 26, 2004), aj'd
sub nom. Estrada v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 327 (Ct. App. 2007).
324. See In re FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 734 F. Supp. 2d at 588.
325. In another case, drivers agreed to make deliveries "when requested" by the delivery
company. See Merchs. Home Delivery Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 580 F.2d 966, 969-70 (9th Cir. 1978).
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whole approach the UCS end of the spectrum based on their apparently extensive
elaboration of work requirements.
This Article distinguishes these cases to elucidate how the
contracting/producing ambiguity manifests and isolates the special problem that
upfront contractual specification poses. In traditional and meso formalism,
judges appeal to contract as the mystical portal that removes substantive terms of
the work relationship from beneath the govemance of protective work law and
into the unregulated space of voluntary agreement. Traditional formalism
preempts the means/ends query, since the performative utterance labels the legal
relationship at the outset. Meso formalism, which interprets meso-level
designation of the work as a description of the "ends" of the work, manipulates
and disposes of the means/ends query in a shallow manner. Under meso
formalism, the fact of contractual designation purges the meaning that statements
regarding the employer's authority would ordinarily have under the legal
standards for employment status. Thus, meso formalism barely submerges the
producing/contracting ambiguity in relationships more closely resembling
employment than non-employment.
While the reasoning may still have
institutional consequences,
it is at least evident that the written contract in
these work relationships is an arbitrary symbol does not in fact separate the
moments of contracting and producing by extracting contractual negotiation
from the productive process.
By virtue of its contractual designation,
subordination in production becomes independence in contracting-"You agreed
in writing to work under my right of control and therefore I, the employer, am
not controlling your work." As demonstrated below, upfront contractual
specification presents a trickier manifestation of the contracting/producing
ambiguity. The contracting/producing ambiguity makes it difficult to determine
whether interpreting UCS as evidence of non-employment is contractual
formalism at all.
Section B will illustrate the phenomenon of UCS and the interpretative
disagreements it engenders in efforts to evaluate control over the work
relationship. Again, this Article conceptualizes meso designation and UCS on a
spectrum.
The contracts in the cases below, as interpreted by the decision

326. See infra Part V.
327. As lying between meso designation and UCS, the author would conceptualize a
contract's re-characterization of the contextual parameters of industrial work associated with
employer control (e.g., a 40-hour work week) as contractual obligations or job tasks. See In re
FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 734 F. Supp. 2d 557, 590 (N.D. Ind. 2010) ("In the Operating
Agreement, though, FedEx says it will provide enough packages to make full use of the contractor's
vehicle; FedEx is required to fulfill this obligation pursuant to the parties' agreement, so it isn't
necessarily indicative of employee status"); see also, Michelle A. Travis, Recapturing the
Transformation Potential of Antidiscrimination Law, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 3, 25-28 (2005)
(critiquing courts in disability accommodation cases for redefining employment "practices," like a
full-time work week, as job tasks).
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makers, fall closer to the UCS end of the spectrum, although most also include
traditional and meso designations of the work.32 8
B.

Upfront ContractualSpecification and the Means/Ends Distinction
1.

Control over the Contracted-for-Productor Control over the Work?

In several legal disputes over whether certain work relationships are
"employment" relationships, the written contract governing the work includes
detailed and somewhat comprehensive rules.329 Does contractual specification
reflect only the entrepreneur's prerogative to determine what to produce, then
exercise property rights in carefully defining the product?
Or, is the
specification an exercise of that right to control the work, the exercise of an
employer's contractual authority to determine how to produce?
Parties present conflicting claims as to the legal effect of UCS and the
alleged employer's monitoring of the implementation of contractual detail. The
alleged employer will argue that contractual designation of tasks does not
indicate control over the details of the work, but rather its specification of the
"results" of the work-the product or service that the worker/contractor
It may claim that any monitoring of the work
expressly agreed to provide.
was minimal and only to ensure that the worker/contractor produced according
to contractual specifications. It sometimes suggests that, by telling the workers
or contractor what to do, upfront contractual specification is more consistent
with an independent contracting relationship, because the directives exhaust its
authority, exclude discretionary control, suggest comparable bargaining power,
The
and put the contractor on notice as to the exact parameters of the work.
other side contends that the alleged employer is exerting control over the means
and manner of the work through contractual designation and that such intrusive
management of the work process cannot be consistent with an arms-length

328. Another complication in attempting to isolate judicial disagreement over UCS is that
judges may disagree as to whether the contract in fact provides meaningful direction, i.e., whether
the contract is an example of UCS. To exclude differences in interpretations of UCS that are a
product of judicial disagreement over whether the phenomenon exists, the author uses cases in
which both the record reveals that the contract includes relatively extensive and detailed work rules
and the decision makers interpret the contract as providing meaningful direction.
329. See Wells v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 979 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1014-15 (E.D.
Mo. 2013) (citations omitted) (describing extensive work requirements in the FedEx drivers'
contract); Plaintiffs' Closing Brief Re: Phase One Issues at 2, Estrada v. FedEx Ground, No. BC
210130, 2004 WL 5631425 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 26, 2004), ajfd sub nom. Estrada v. FedEx Ground
Package Sys., Inc., 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 327 (Ct. App. 2007) (discussing 66-page FedEx contract).
330. See Reply Brief of Petitioner/Cross-Respondent at 25-26, FedEx Home Delivery v.
NLRB, 563 F.3d 492 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Nos. 07-1391, 07-1436).
331. See In re FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 734 F. Supp. 2d at 594 ("FedEx managers
can only go on four customer service rides a year, which binds FedEx from mandating additional
oversight"); Brief of Petitioner/Cross-Respondent at 52-53, FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563
F.3d 492 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Nos. 07-1391, 07-1436).
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relationship between independent businesses.332 Employment status decisions
therefore reveal deep conflict over how to interpret UCS as a basis for claiming
or disclaiming control over work relationships.
In EEOC v. North Knox School Corp., a case over the employment status
of school bus drivers, the court addressed "detailed specifications in the
transportation contracts, which set 'the precise route and schedule of each
driver,"' 334 as well as when school drivers must work and disciplinary rules for
dealing with students, 335 among others. The court claimed to find a "deep[]
flaw" in the EEOC's argument that UCS showed employee status: "Certainly
one can 'control' the conduct of another contracting party by setting out in detail
his obligations; this is nothing more than the freedom of contract. This sort of
one-time 'control' is significantly different than the discretionary control an
employer exercises daily over its employees' conduct." 336 The court analogized
the rules in the school bus drivers' contract as akin to product specifications in a
government defense contract for military equipment:
The precise specifications do not make the contractor an employee of
the government. Of course an employment contract may also precisely
set out the obligations of the parties, so we do not suggest that precise
contractual obligations necessarily show that the hired party is an

332. See, e.g., Reply Brief of Appellants at 14-15, Martinez-Mendoza v. Champion Int'l
Corp., 340 F.3d 1200 (1 Ith Cir. 2003) (No. 02-12171-JJ) (arguing that the "performance
requirements [in the contract] went far beyond simply setting out the ultimate standards for the job"
and constituted control over the details of the work).
333. 154 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 1998).
334. Id at 748.
335. Id The court upheld the district court's finding that school bus drivers alleging age
discrimination based on school board policy prohibiting contracts with drivers 70 years of age or
older were independent contractors. Id at 746, 75 1.
336. Id at 748. The court's main argument was that the state controlled the drivers (via
statute), not the school district. See id at 747-48. It interpreted state statutory law as both requiring
the district to exercise control over the drivers' work and permitting the district to use independent
contractors. Id. The court also invoked other constraints on the school district's discretion that
required it to control the drivers-the logistic and bureaucratic imperatives of the service and public
preferences to ensure children went to school. The decision agreed with the school district's brief
that the nature of the work in driving children to school required control over driver routes and
schedules, as well as authority to unilaterally alter drivers' routes. See id. at 749 (citing IND. CODE §
20-9.1-2-12, -13 (1997), repealed by P.L. 1-2005 § 240 (April 25, 2005); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Darden; 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992)). The court's position was that any control over the means of
the driver's work dictated by these constraints was irrelevant under the control test. See id. at 74748. In another article, the author shows that judges in employment status decisions frequently
construct and appeal to exogenous constraints on an alleged employer's entrepreneurial property
rights to argue that any control over the means of work shaped by these constraints is exempt from
the control test. Julia Tomassetti, Exogenous Constraints and Entrepreneurial Property Rights (Jan.
13, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). The constraints judges invoke include
product markets, state regulation, technology/logistics, labor markets, and bureaucratic
coordination. The author argues that these "the control doesn't count" arguments beg the question
and expand employer property rights so as to consume work law protections. See id.
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independent contractor. But they certainly do not, as the EEOC
suggests, necessarily show he is an employee.
In SIDA of Hawaii, Inc., the court overturned a National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) decision finding that taxi drivers who had voted to unionize were
employees rather than independent contractors.
The court found that rules in
drivers' contracts with the taxi company regarding, personal appearance, vehicle
condition, required trips, and recreational conduct while not driving, and a rule
that drivers "must obey the orders of dispatchers," 339 were part of the product"performance requirements"-rather than control over the work:
And certainly SIDA does maintain control over its drivers to the extent
that the standard driver's contract imposes certain performance
requirements and subjects drivers to SIDA's rules and regulations. We
are not persuaded, however, by the Board's conclusion that the
provisions of the driver's contract and the rules and regulations (and the
means of enforcing them) evidence SIDA's substantial control over the
drivers. By executing a contract with SIDA, the drivers do not submit
themselves to SIDA's control as employees, but merely agree to
associate with SIDA and to comply with its procedures. 340
The interpretative disagreement extends to features of the relationship that
judges usually find probative of employment under the agency and economic
realities tests. Specifying these in the contract appears to make judges question
the rules' legal valence. FedEx, for example, requires its delivery drivers to sign
an over 60-page agreement that details FedEx's nationwide "standard of
service." 341 The NLRB Regional Director in FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB
noted that the "take it or leave it" Operating Agreement342 required a full-time

337. N. Knox Sch. Corp., 154 F.3d at 748.
338. SIDA ofHaw., Inc. v. NLRB, 512 F.2d 354, 356, 360 (9th Cir. 1975).
339. Id. at 358 n.I. The rule regarding dispatchers sounds much like supervisory direction
under the agency test. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958) ("In determining
whether one acting for another is a servant or an independent contractor, the following ... [is]
considered: . . . the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise over the
details of the work. . . ."). It nearly recites the definition of employment and is closer to a meso
designation of the work. Compare SIDA of Haw., Inc., 512 F.2d at 358 n.l ("the driver must obey
the orders of dispatchers"), with discussion supra Part V.A.2 ("Under meso formalism, contractual
provisions approaching an express statement that the alleged employer has the right to control the
means of the work, or reciting the legal definition of employment . .. are no longer probative of
employment status.").
340. Id. at 358 (footnote omitted).
341. FedEx Home Delivery, Nos. 1-RC-22034, 1-RC-22035, 2006 NLRB Reg. Dir. Dec.
LEXIS 264 at 15, 27 n.34 (Sept. 20, 2006), vacated, 563 F.3d 492 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Plaintiffs'
Closing Brief Re: Phase One Issues, supra note 7, at 2.
342. See Plaintiffs' Closing Brief Re: Phase One Issues, supra note 7, at 2, 19.
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Tuesday through Saturday work-week 343 and specified work requirements
regarding the driver uniform, driver appearance344 and grooming, vehicle
appearance, logo display,345 daily driver logs and vehicle inspection reports,346
equipment, how to drive safely, leaving packages at empty residences, 4 7 using
trucks during off-hours, 348 using supplementary FedEx drivers, 349 mandatory
package assignments, insurance types and amounts,350 and physical examination
by a FedEx-approved physician.35 The Regional Director found the contract to
be evidence that FedEx "exercises substantial control over all the contractors'
performance of their functions." 352
On appeal, the company referred to the contract rules in terms of the drivers'
"agreement" to provide a particular service that FedEx specified 353 and alleged
that amici "mislabel[ed] contractual undertakings as 'control."' 354 In opposition,
the NLRB interpreted the contract as establishing FedEx's control over the
means of the work and argued that "the agreement prescribes the drivers'
compensation, their work requirements, and their service area." 355
The D.C. Circuit agreed with FedEx.356 It conceded the Regional Director's
finding that many of the rules imposed by FedEx on its drivers were the opposite
of those the NLRB found in prior cases to be inconsistent with employmentrules regarding, for example, uniforms and grooming, vehicle appearance, logo
display, and insurance coverage. 357 The hirer's designation and provision of the
instrumentalities of work, the worker's inability to turn down tasks, the hirer's
control over when and how long to work, and the inability to do business in its
own name under the agreement were all evidence of employment status under

343. In re FedEx Home Delivery, Cases 1-RC-22034, 1-RC-22035, slip op. at 9,34 (N.L.R.B.
Sept. 20, 2006), available at http://www.lrlaw.com/pdfs/NLRB%20RD%20Decision%201-RC22034%20and%2022035%20%28Wilmington%29.pdf.
344. Id. at 34.
345. Id. at 10.
346. Id. at 33.
347. Id. at 13.
348. Id. at 8.
349. Id. at 34.
350. Id. at 27-29.
351. FedEx Home Delivery, Nos. 1-RC-22034, 1-RC-22035, 2006 NLRB Reg. Dir. Dec.
LEXIS 264 at 20, 25, 40, 53-54 (Sept. 20, 2006), vacated, 563 F.3d 492 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
352. Id. at 53-54.
353. E.g., Brief of Petitioner/Cross-Respondent at 3-6, 9, 15, FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d
492 (Nos. 07-1391, 07-1436).
354. Supplemental Brief of Petitioner/Cross-Respondent Responding to Brief of Amici Curiae
Washington Legal Foundation, United States Business & Industry Council, & Allied Educational
Foundation at 1, FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d 492 (Nos. 07-1391, 07-1436).
355. Brief for the NLRB at 38, FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.2d 492 (Nos. 07-1391, 07-1436).
356. FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 500-01.
357. Id. (citing Argix Direct, Inc., 343 N.L.R.B. 1017, 1021 (2004); Dial-A-Mattress
Operating Corp., 326 N.L.R.B. 884, 891 (1998)).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2014

57

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 2
372

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 66: 315

the Darden/CCNV test that governed the dispute. 3s 8 However, the majority
argued, "those distinctions, though not irrelevant, reflect differences in the type
of service the contractors are providing rather than differences in the
employment relationship." 359 In disagreement with the NLRB, the dissent, and
other decisions that considered the employee status of FedEx drivers, 3 60 the court
argued that the rules described the ends of the work: FedEx had a "somewhat
unique" business model, 361 and "[a] contractor agrees to provide a service in
return for compensation."362
In another FedEx case, the judge similarly found:
Various provisions of the Operating Agreement authorize FedEx to
control the days of service, the contractor's daily workload, and certain
time windows when pick-ups and deliveries must be made. These
requirements weigh in favor of employee status, but are more suggestive
of a results-orientedapproach to management when viewed with the
totality of circumstances. FedEx has contracted for the performance of
certain work and has the right to require that the work be completed as
agreed. 363
In National Van Lines,364 the contract between furniture delivery drivers and
the delivery company obligated the drivers, among other rules, to keep the
company informed daily as to their whereabouts, to work under the company's

358. Id at 501 (citing Argix, 343 N.L.R.B. at 1021; Dial-A-Mattress, 326 N.L.R.B. at 891);
see also Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323-24 (1992) (citing Cmty. for
Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751-52 (1989)) (setting forth the Darden test);
NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 258-59 (1968).
359. FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 501. In arguing that upfront contractual specification
did not demonstrate that school bus drivers were employees, the court in EEOC v. North Knox
School Corp., 154 F.3d 744, 748, (7th Cir. 1998) stated, "There is nothing significant, for example,
in North Knox requiring as a term of the contract that a driver begin his route at a certain time."
360. See Wells v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 979 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1024 (E.D. Mo.
2013); Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 765 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2014) ("Most
obviously, no reasonable jury could find that the 'results' sought by FedEx includes detailed
specifications as to the delivery driver's fashion choices and grooming. And no reasonable jury
could find that the 'results' FedEx seeks include having all of its vehicles containing shelves built to
exactly the same specifications."). But see In re FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d
942, 977, 979-80, 983-84, 988 (N.D. Ind. 2012).
361. FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 501. The court also argued that any control the
company exercised over the drivers was necessitated by putatively exogenous constraints on its
production, like customer preferences and state regulation. See id. (citing Corporate Express
Delivery Sys. v. NLRB, 292 F.3d 777, 780 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). The court construed customer
preferences as entirely independent of FedEx's design of its service, despite also claiming that
FedEx had a "somewhat unique" business model. Id
362. Id. at 500.
363. In re FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 734 F. Supp. 2d 557, 589 (N.D. Ind. 2010)
(emphasis added).
364. 117 N.L.R.B. 1213 (1957), vacated, 273 F.2d 402 (7th Cir. 1960).
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"general supervision,"365 and to follow a lengthy manual of rules and
regulations, which included detailed rules regarding uniforms, customer
interaction and other demeanor and dialogue requirements, "Ethics of Personal
Conduct," how to handle particular kinds of furniture and fabrication materials,
loading and unloading, and driving and parking.3 66 The NLRB found that the
drivers were employees and not independent contractors, arguing that the
"minute and comprehensive detail in which the manual regulates the conduct of
the drivers in the performance of their duties ... shows conclusively that the
Employer controls not only the end to be achieved but also the means to be used
in reaching such end." 367 The Seventh Circuit also applied the means/ends test,
368
however, and disagreed.
It classified the contractual specifications and
incorporated manual as relating to the ends of the work-the "desire of National
-to operate its business successfully." 369
In Moreau v. Air France,370 an FMLA joint employment dispute in.which
the court applied an FLSA economic dependency test,3 7 1 the court suggested that
detailed production rules in contracts between Air France and its ground service
contractors cut both ways. 37 The contract with its cargo handler, for example,
specified how many full time employees, and in what positions, the contractor
must dedicate to Air France. Air France had terminated the plaintiff for taking
leave to care for his ill father following its refusal to grant leave. 373 If Air France
was a joint employer of the employees of its ground service contractors, the
employees counted towards the 50-employee-within-75-miles threshold required
to subject Air France to FMLA leave obligations. 374 The court noted, "Air
France was ... very specific about how it wanted its work performed, and it
checked to ensure that its standards were met and that the service provider's
overall performance adhered to Air France's specifications."375 "Air France's
actions in specifying the work to be performed and following up to ensure
adequate performance" could "constitute 'some control over the work or
working conditions of the employee."' 376 On the other hand, the specificity of
the contracts evinced arms-length negotiation with independent contractors: "the

365. Id. at 1215.
366. Id at 1215, 1219-20.
367. Id. at 1219-20.
368. Nat'1 Van Lines, Inc., 273 F.2d at 406-07.
369. Id. But see S.G. Borrello & Sons v. Dep't Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 408 (Cal. 1989)
(citing United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 706, 718 (1947)) (criticizing agricultural company for
trying to "avoid its statutory obligations by carving up its production process into minute steps, then
asserting that it lacks 'control' over the exact means by which one such step is performed by the
responsible workers").
370. 343 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2003), amended by 356 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2004).
371. Id. at 1181.
372. Id at 1188.
373. Id. at 1187.
374. Id. at 1181-82.
375. Moreau, 356 F.3d at 951.
376. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(B)(ii) (2012).
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service contracts were negotiated and quite specific; there is no indication they
could simply be passed on to another contractor." 377 Thus, the "specific" welldefined responsibilities in the contracts were consistent with a joint employer's
control over the work, but also evidence that the contracts were likely unique to
these contractors, suggesting their economic independence from Air France. 378
Courts also suggest that UCS is a partial substitute for traditional
supervision and scheduling, and thus consistent with independent contracting. 37 9
In a FedEx delivery driver case, the court reasoned that the contract bounded
FedEx's authority and suggested a limited need or interest in real-time
supervision: "FedEx has contracted for the performance of certain work and has
the right to require that the work be completed as agreed. As long as contractors
complete their daily assigned work, they can decide their work schedule." 380
Here, ex ante contractual specification seems to replace ex post monitoring.
In Knox, the school district suggested that UCS limited and disposed of the
need for supervisory direction:
Once North Knox enters into four-year contracts with school bus drivers
or contractors, it exercises no control or supervision over the school bus
drivers .... So long as the school bus drivers comply with the terms of
the contract, there will be no interaction between them and North Knox
during the terms of the contract . . .. They do not reserve the right to
accompany the school bus drivers while they drive their daily routes. 38 2
The court then distinguished UCS from the "discretionary control an
employer daily exercises over its employees' conduct." 383

.

377. Moreau, 356 F.3d at 951.
378. See id at 950-51.
379. In re FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 942, 982 (N.D. Ind. 2012)
(citing P.S. ex rel. Nelson v. The Farm, Inc., 658 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1299 (D. Kan, 2009), for
proposition that "requirement not necessarily indicative of control where it also limited the
purported employer from exercising more control.").
380. In re FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 942, 977 (N.D. Ind. 2012).
381. In a FLSA overtime pay dispute regarding the employee status of cable installers working
for a cable broker and cable company, the court intimates that contractual specification of the work
is inversely related to control over the means of the work. It found that contract requirements that
the workers "install the cable systems in accordance with [broker's] and [cable company's] strict
specifications," as well as wear an ID badge and uniform, display the company sign on their trucks,
was consistent with independent contracting. Herman v. Mid-AtI. Installation Servs., 164 F. Supp.
2d 667, 670, 672-73 (D. Md. 2000), aff'd sub nom. Chao v. Mid-Atl. Installation Servs., Inc., 16
Fed. App'x 104, 108 (4th Cir. 2001). However, it then stated that the installers' compliance with the
specifications in their contract with the broker was evidence of the broker's lack of control: "Other
than assigning routes, [broker] does not exert significant control over them; instead, the Installers
are personally responsiblefor providing their trucks and tools, for the quality of their work, and for
adherence to contractspecifications."Id. at 677 (emphasis added).
382. Brief of Appellees at 18, 27, EEOC v. N. Knox Sch. Corp., 154 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 1998)
(No. 97-3704).
383. N. Know Sch. Corp., 154 F.3d at 748.
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UCS may be evidence that the alleged employer's claim over the workers'
time is bounded.384 A FedEx employment status decision suggested that the
contract predictably restricted the company's claim over their time, consistent
with independent contracting:
Within the confines of the Operating Agreement's terms, FedEx has
retained the right to determine some time parameters for providing
service to customers, but FedEx doesn't have authority to dictate what
hours or how many hours drivers work. Drivers must work certain days
of the week, deliver all packages assigned to them that day based on a
nine to eleven hour work day, and, on occasion, meet pick-up and
delivery windows, but aren't otherwise required to work a set
schedule.3 8 5

In contrast, another judge interpreted what it deemed to be "broad"
obligations rather than "specific rules or procedures to follow" in the FedEx
contract as evidence of independent contractor status because they left discretion
386
as to how to accomplish the directives to the drivers.
Courts also disagree as to how to interpret work monitoring and disciplinary
action that is allegedly pursuant to contractual directives.3 87 Some courts suggest
that, if contractual designation of work rules represent contractual agreement
over the "ends" of the work, then any monitoring of those ends, even frequently
during the productive process, cannot reflect control over the means of the
work.
In Merchants Home Delivery Service,389 Merchants issued reprimands
when it felt that a delivery driver's performance did not meet contractual
standards, which included vehicle appearance and maintenance, and which

384. See In re FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 942, 978-79 (N.D. Ind.
2012); see also FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 499 n.5, 514 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(citing C.C. Eastern, Inc. v. NLRB, 60 F.3d 855, 860, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1995)) (suggesting that
contract provision stating "FedEx [sought] to 'make full use of the Contractor's equipment' was
not evidence that company reserved right to control the work, because "it is undisputed the
contractors are only obligated to provide service five days a week").
385. In re FedEx GroundPackageSys., Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d at 978-79.
386. See Johnson v. FedEx Home Delivery, No. 04-CV-4935(JG)(VVP), 2011 WL 6153425,
at *15-16 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2011). The court noted that the contract also contained more specific
work rules, but interpreted these as "incidental control over the results." Id at * 16 (citing In re Ted
Is Back Corp., 475 N.E.2d 113, 114 (N.Y. 1984)).
387. See Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 335 F.3d 61, 74-75 (2d Cir. 2003). In Zheng, a wage
and hour dispute regarding whether a clothing company was a joint employer of garment sewers
directly employed by its contractors, the court sought to provide the trial court guidance in
distinguishing, under the economic realities test, "supervision" that "demonstrates effective control
of the terms and conditions of the plaintiff's employment" from "supervision with respect to
contractual warranties of quality and time of delivery," the latter of which was "perfectly consistent
with a typical, legitimate subcontracting arrangement." Id. at 74-75.
388. See Merchs. Home Delivery Serv., Inc., 230 N.L.R.B. 290, 291-92 (1977), vacated, 580
F.2d 966 (9th Cir. 1978).
389. 230 N.L.R.B. 290 (1977), vacated, 580 F.2d 966 (9th Cir. 1978).
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Merchants monitored daily.3 9 0
Disagreeing with the NLRB, the court
characterized the performance reprimands as control over the "results" of the
drivers' work. 39 1 The court argued that "Merchants is able to enforce
compliance [with the contractual provisions] by notices of substandard
performance[,]" which could lead to its canceling a driver's contract.392 The
NLRB saw this as evidence of Merchant's "right to exercise daily control and
The court, however, enveloped
supervision over the deliverymen." 393
Merchants' daily work monitoring into an evaluation of the "results," arguing
"there is a difference between directing the means and manner of performance of
work and exercising an ex post facto right to reprimand when the end result is
unsatisfactory."3

94

FedEx monitored drivers through a package tracking device, daily
recordkeeping requirements and van service audits, daily inspections of drivers'
appearance and grooming in order for permission to leave the terminal, and
occasional supervisory ride-alongs and customer audits.395 A federal district
court suggested that FedEx did not supervise delivery drivers in the "true sense
of the word" and compared the relationship between FedEx and the drivers as set
out in the Operating Agreement to government construction contracts:
It strikes us that a general contractor on a major project ... would
develop, in conjunction with the engineers, very detailed and specific
instructions as to the work desired of the subcontractors, including the
exact way certain items should be installed or erected, along with very
specific cutoffs and deadlines for completion of various phases of the
project. Surely it would not be seriously argued that such indicia would
396
turn subcontractors into employees.
In a dispute over whether Sears exercised an employer's control over the
employees of the contractor that sold and installed its home improvement items,
the court interpreted work requirements in the Licensing Agreement between
Sears and the contractor. 397 According to the court, upfront contractual
specification could not really be good evidence of employment because it "is not
the specificity or rigor with which a contract characterizes the conditions of its

390. Id at 291-92.
391. Merchs. Home Delivery Serv., Inc., 580 F.2d at 974.
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. In re FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 942, 981-982 (N.D. Ind. 2012);
In re FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 734 F. Supp. 2d 557, 565 (N.D. Ind. 2010);
Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 765 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2014).
396. See id. at 983 (citing Home Design, Inc. v. Kan. Dept. of Human Res., 2 P.3d 789, 793
(Kan. Ct. App. 2000)).
397. See Brown v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 31 Employee Benefit Cas. (BNA) 2467, 2470 (N.D.
Ill. Sept. 24, 2003), af'd, 125 F. App'x 44 (7th Cir. 2004).
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performance, but the existence of discretionary control" that characterized
control over the means of the work. 398 Quoting Knox, the court categorized UCS
as "one-time control." 399 Another case interpreted Knox and Hermann v. MidAtlantic Installation to mean that regardless of the intensity or amount of
supervision, supervising workers was not evidence of control over the means of
the work if it was pursuant to contractual directives. 400 Considering these
arguments together, if contractual specification of the work is so detailed as to
necessarily exclude the exercise of discretionary authority, then UCS, even
accompanied by intensive supervision of the work, looks more like independent
contracting.
In contrast, AWPA regulations addressing the relationship between UCS and
control under the "economic reality" test are more ambivalent regarding the
relationship between contractual specification and supervision. With respect to
whether an agricultural grower is a joint employer of farm workers along with its
farm labor contractor (FLC), the regulations provide, "contractual terms through
which the grower's ultimate standards or requirements for the FLC's
performance are defined" "would not, in themselves, constitute indirect control
of the work."4 01 The regulations also state, however, that supervision pursuant to
contractual directives may be evidence of control over the means of the work:
Where the grower not only specifies in the contract the size or ripeness
of the produce to be harvested, but also appears in the field to check
on the details of the work and communicates to the FLC any
deficiencies observed, the circumstances must be closely examined to
determine if . .. there may be a [joint] employment relationship.402

398. Id. (citing Hojnacki v. Klein-Acosta, 285 F.3d 544, 551 (7th Cir. 2002)).
399. Id (quoting Hojnacki, 285 F.3d at 551).
400. Sahinovic v. Consol. Delivery & Logistics, Inc., No. C 02-4966 SBA, 2004 WL
5833528, at *5-7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2004) (citing EEOC v. N. Knox Sch. Corp., 154 F.3d 744,
748 (7th Cir. 1998); Herman v. Mid-AtI. Installation Servs., Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 667, 670 (D. Md.
2000); Penland v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., No. C-92-3744 MHP, 1993 WL 204257, at *4 (N.D.
Cal. June 9, 1993); Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc. v. Superior Court, 269 Cal. Rptr. 647, 653 (Ct.
App. 1990)); see also Kerr v. WGN Cont'l Broad. Co., No. 01 C 07196, 2002 WL 1477629, at *4
(N.D. Ill. July 9, 2002) ("The control that WGN exercised over Kerr stems from the contract
between WGN and Trio Video, and not from any employment relationship between Kerr and
WGN.").
401. Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Plan, 62 Fed. Reg. 11,733, 11,73940 (Mar. 12, 1997) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 500).
402. Id at 11,740; see also Michael H. LeRoy, Farm Labor Contractors and Agricultural
Producers as Joint Employers Under the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act:
An Empirical Public Policy Analysis, 19 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 175, 180 (1998).
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Service Work Involving Customer Interaction

Many of the examples above involve service work entailing customer
interaction.4 03 In such work arrangements, production is simultaneous with
exchange or consumption. 404 Unlike the case of a manufacturing worker
producing a car, the taxi driver produces its service as the company trades it and
the passenger consumes it. Recipients consume the product of package delivery
as the drivers produce. These "results" are not exchangeable in the form of
temporally stable entities as in manufacturing, agricultural labor, or even most
intellectual property.405 It may seem then, that disagreement over how to
interpret UCS under the means/ends standard is an artifact of service work
requiring customer or consumer interaction: where production and
exchange/consumption are simultaneous, the "manner and means" of the work
are by definition part of the tradable, consumable "ends" of the work. The
product is a process. The contract between FedEx and its delivery drivers
describes the "results" of the work as processes and with gerunds-it obliges
drivers "to achieve the goal of efficient pick-up, delivery, handling, loading and
unloading of packages and equipment." 406 The Restatement's distinction
between a hirer's control over "results" and over the worker's "physical
activities" 407 is awkward if not unintelligible in work involving coincidental
production and consumption.
The alleged employer has a plenpotentiary property right to determine the
product and control it in commerce.40 Since the traded, consumable "ends" are
a work process, the right of the entrepreneur to define and control its product
necessarily blurs into the right of the employer to direct the work. When
production and trade are simultaneous, judicial attempts to extract the ends of the
work from the means of the work can resound in tautology. For instance, Knox
argued that "school bus drivers," but not the "drivers' conduct" were subject to
extensive control.4 09 In a FedEx case, the judge agreed with FedEx that the
contractually designated work rules were "customer service" requirements, and
"FedEx's customer service requirements focus on the results expected of
contractors in performing their assigned work, not the means and methods of

403. See supra text accompanying notes 337-44, 348-59, 370-73, 377-79, 389, 392-93, 39697, 404.
404. See, e.g., James M. Carman & Eric Langeard, Growth Strategiesfor Service Firms, 1
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 7, 8 (1980) (noting the "simultaneous production and consumption" of
services).
405. See Peter Hill, Tangibles, Intangibles, and Services: A New Taxonomy for the
ClassificationofOutput, 32 CAN. J. ECON. 426,427 (1999).
406. Johnson v. FedEx Home Delivery, No. 04-CV-4935(JG)(VVP), 2011 WL 6153425, at
*16 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2011).
407. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(1) cmt. e (1958).
408. See supra, Part Ill.
409. See, e.g., id. at 747-48.
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their performance,"4 10 although servicing customers coincided with the labor
process. When the "result" is a work process, courts sometimes deem even
extensive and continuous direction and monitoring of the work to be an
inspection of the "results." 4 11 In section C, however, the author will argue that
the ambiguity between contracting and producing is also at work in the collapse
of the means/ends distinction in attempts to interpret UCS.412
3.

Non-Service Work and Upftont ContractualSpecification

Furthermore, the contradiction of UCS as a basis for claiming or disclaiming
control over the work in determining employment status is not confined to cases
involving service work.4 13 Take, for example, Martinez-Mendoza v. Champion
International Corp.,414 an FLSA and AWPA case. The 11th Circuit considered
whether a paper product manufacturer, Champion, that hired a FLC to supply
workers to plant tree seedlings on the Champion's land was a joint employer of
the workers along with the FLC. 41' Although the "economic reality" standard
governed, the bulk of the court's argument addressed whether Champion
controlled the work.416

410. In re FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 734 F. Supp. 2d 557, 600 (N.D. Ind. 2010).
411. Sahinovic v. Consol. Delivery & Logistics, Inc., No. C 02-4966 SBA, 2004 WL
5833528, at *5-7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2004) (citing EEOC v. N. Knox Sch. Corp., 154 F.3d 744,
748 (7th Cir. 1998); Herman v. Mid-Atl. Installation Servs., Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 667, 670 (D. Md.
2000); Penland v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., No. C-92-3744 MHP, 1993 WL 204257 (N.D. Cal.
June 9, 1993); Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc. v. Superior Court, 269 Cal. Rptr. 647, 653 (Ct. App.
1990)).
412. When branding is an important part of the alleged employer's business, decision makers
often draw on a second doctrinal ambiguity created by the incorporation of master-servant authority
into contracts for labor services-the property/contract ambiguity. By grounding the employer's
right to direct the work in contract, rather than property, the employment contract creates alternative
rationales for understanding control over work relations-as pursuant to the entrepreneur's property
rights to control its non-labor inputs in production, or, pursuant to the employer's contractual rights
to control the labor process. "Work" requires the application of the worker's efforts to the
employer's property. The brand is the company's property. So, by manipulating the
property/contract ambiguity, a court can rationalize any amount of control over labor process for
service workers marked with that brand (e.g., wearing a company logo) as control over the ends of
the work, since it has an entrepreneurial property right to control how contractors/workers handle its
non-labor property during the work. The productive process imbibes and legally digests the work
process. This is how the D.C. Circuit court rationalized all of FedEx's work requirements and
supervision as consistent with independent contracting: "[O]nce a driver wears FedEx's logo,
FedEx has an interest in making sure her conduct reflects favorably on that logo. . . ." FedEx Home
Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 501 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
413. One could also characterize manufacturing work as performing a series of manipulations
on certain material objects in conformance with the engineering of machinery and tools.
414. Martinez-Mendoza v. Champion Int'l Corp., 340 F.3d 1200, 1206 (1 lth Cir. 2003).
415. Id. at 1206-07.
416. See id. at 1209-15 (citing Charles v. Burton, 169 F.3d 1322, 1328-29 (11th Cir. 1999);
Aimable v. Long & Scott Farms, 20 F.3d 434, 440 (1lth Cir. 1994); Migrant and Seasonal
Agricultural Worker Protection Plan, 62 Fed. Reg. 11,733, 11,739-40 (March 12, 1997) (to be
codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 500)).
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The court's query centered on the contracts between Champion and the FLC,
which laid out the seed planting in extreme detail.417 In addition to stating
general requirements like the time of year for planting, the contract contained
directives on the manual tasks of individual and groups of workers, including the
handling of seedlings, their spacing, methods for planting the seedlings, and
tools to use.4 18 The court remarked, "[P]laintiffs relied heavily upon the
provisions contained in the six contracts . .. specifically the planting
specifications. They argued that the precision with which they had been drafted
showed that Champion ultimately controlled every facet of their work, such as to
render it their joint employer." 9 The court agreed with Champion, however,
that the specifications did not represent control over the work but were a
determination of the product-"performance standards" and "agricultural
decisions."42 0 The court argued that the specifications were what Department of
Labor (DOL) regulations referred to as "contractual terms through which the
grower's ultimate standards or requirements for the FLC's performance are
defined" that "would not, in themselves, constitute indirect control of the
work. 421 To the workers, UCS revealed an employer's exertion of contractual
authority over them as to how to produce. 422 To the court and Champion, the
directives apear an exercise of an entrepreneur's property rights to specify what
to produce.
The court defined the "drafting of planting specifications" in the
paper company's contract with its farm labor contractor as "unquestionably an
agricultural decision."424
The court extended its argument that upfront contractual directives
evidenced control over the ends rather than the means of the work to reason that
the presence and oversight of Champion personnel in directing the FLC and
work was not probative of joint employment: "While it is uncontested that
Champion personnel were present on the job sites, they did not supervise the
laborers; they were there simply to ensure that [the FLC] complied with the

417. See id at 1210.
418. See id. at 1206 n.19; Brief of Appellants, supra note 11, at 10-12, 40-44 (citing Antenor
v. D&S Farms, 88 F.3d 925, 933 (11th Cir. 1996); Aimable, 20 F.3d at 440; Haywood v. Barnes,
109 F.R.D. 568, 591 (E.D.N.C. 1986)) (describing the almost plenary control that the employer had
over the contractor's work); Reply Brief of Appellants, supra note II, at 14-15.
419. Martinez-Mendoza, 340 F.3d at 1206; see also Reply Brief of Appellants, supra note 11,
at 13-15 (citing Usery v. Pilgrim Equip. Co., 527 F.2d 1308, 1312 (5th Cir. 1976); Migrant and
Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Plan, 62 Fed. Reg. at 11,739) (stating plaintiffs argument
for "[c]ontrol through contract specifications").
420. Martinez-Mendoza, 340 F.3d at 1211 (quoting Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker
Protection Plan, 62 Fed. Reg. at 11,739-40); see also Answer Brief of Appellee, supra note 11, at
30, 32-33 (citing EEOC v. N. Knox Sch. Corp., 154 F.3d 744, 748 (7th Cir. 1998); Migrant and
Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Plan, 62 Fed. Reg. at 11,739-40).
421. Martinez-Mendoza, 340 F.3d at 1211 (quoting Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker
Protection Plan, 62 Fed. Reg. at 11,739-40).
422. See id. at 1210.
423. See id. at 1207.
424. Id. at 1211.
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contract specifications."425
Further, while the workers argued that the
contractual specifications made it unnecessary for Champion to supervise the
work extensively,426 and thus should not be evidence that Champion lacked a
"right to control" the work, the court argued that the de minimis supervision
evidenced a lack of control.427
In sum, UCS poses an intractable problem under the means/ends query, and
courts adopt fundamentally contradictory approaches to deal with it. Some
courts interpret upfront contractual specification as evidence that an employer
has the right to control the means and manner of work. 428 Others interpret it as
evidence that the alleged employer has a right to control only the results of the
work.429 Some suggest that it is probative of non-employment status because the
contractual specification limits supervisory control over the work, reveals
relative symmetry in bargaining leverage, and substitutes for monitoring the
work. 430
C.

Upfront Contractual Specification
Contradiction

and

the

Servitude-Equality

This section shows that judicial disagreement over the use of upfront
contractual specification as a basis for disclaiming or claiming alleged employer
control over the work is grounded in the fundamental contradiction between
servitude and equality in employment. The contracting/producing ambiguity
explains much of the legal unintelligibility of the means/ends query in these
disputes.

425. Id. The court again characterized Champion's supervision as the type contemplated under
DOL regulations-"action during or after the conclusion of the work to confirm satisfaction of the
contract's ultimate performance standards." Id. (citing Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker
Protection Plan, 62 Fed. Reg. at 11,740). Comments on the MSAWPA regulations reflect the
difficulty of interpreting upfront contractual specification and control under the economic reality
standard. The regulations seem to suggest a sliding scale between contractual directives and
monitoring in determining whether an agricultural entity is a joint employer along with its FLC:
"Where the grower not only specifies in the contract the size or ripeness of the produce to be
harvested, but also appears in the field to check on the details of the work and communicates to the
FLC any deficiencies observed, the circumstances must be closely examined to determine
if... there may be a[ joint] employment relationship." Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker
Protection Plan, 62 Fed. Reg. at 11,740.
426. Reply Brief of Appellants, supranote I1, at 12.
427. Martinez-Mendoza, 340 F.3d at 1211.
428. See, e.g., Nat'l Van Lines, Inc., 117 N.L.R.B. 1213, 1219-20 (1957), vacated, 273 F.2d
402 (7th Cir. 1960).
429. See, e.g., In re FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 942, 988-89 (N.D. Ind.
2012) ("FedEx's customer service requirements focus on the results expected of contractors in
performing their assigned work, not the means and methods of their performance."); EEOC v. N.
Knox Sch. Corp., 154 F.3d 744, 748 (7th Cir. 1998).
430. See, e.g., In re FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 942, 982 (N.D. Ind.
2012); Moreau v. Air France, 343 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2003), amended by 356 F.3d 942, 951 (9th
Cir. 2004).
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Incidents of Contractingor Producing?

The employment contract and means/ends query denote a social relationship
involving control over contractual performance and independence in contractual
formation, but this relationship also merges contractual formation and
performance. The contractual "exchange" is of something that is inalienable as a
commodity and that the employer cannot use without the worker's continuing,
demonstrated assent. Employer and employee provide contractual consideration
through performance. 431
Yet, as demonstrated in Part IV, the
contracting/producing distinction, as expressed in the means/end query, separates
employment from independent contracting and joint employmentindependence in contracting is consistent with both, but control over production
is an incident of employment alone. The unintelligibility of the means/ends test
lies in its assumption that the law can conceptualize a "contract" in which one
party has a right to determine how the other will perform its contractual
obligations (the "means" to reach the "ends"), when the parties to a masterservant relationship by design to not agree to contractual obligations (the "ends")
with the definiteness necessary to constitute an enforceable contract.
Disputes involving UCS illustrate this problem: are detailed contractual
directives evidence of control over the details of the work in production, or are
they consistent with the putative contractor's "freedom of contract"?4 32 Do they
indicate that bargaining over the work has ended with the signing of a contract
and that the parties have reached agreement on contractually enforceable results?
Is any apparent control over the work the result of one party driving a hard
bargain as to the other's contractual obligations? Or, are bargaining and
performance still simultaneous: do the contractual directives state the employer's
right to control the work relationship? Does UCS evince independence in
contracting or subordination in production?
To some courts, contractual work specifications are incidents of contractual
433
In refusing to enforce an
independence, not subordination in production.
NLRB decision finding taxi drivers to be employees of a taxi company, the
Ninth Circuit in SIDA of Hawaii v. NLRB suggested that upfront contractual
specification entailed only the phenomenon of contracting and not producing:
"By executing a contract with SIDA, the drivers do not submit themselves to
SIDA's control as employees, but merely agree to associate with SIDA and to
comply with its procedures."4 34 In EEOC v. North Knox School Corp., the court

431. See COMMONS, supranote 14, at 285 (citing Arthur v. Oakes, 63 F. 310, 317-18 (7th Cir.
1894); Comment, Present Day Labor Litigation, 30 YALE L.J. 618, 619-20 (1921) (critiquing the
action of enticement, when an employer sues a third party for causing a breach of an employment
contract, on the basis that employment is not a real contract).
432. N. Knox Sch. Corp., 154 F.3d at 748.
433. See SIDA of Haw., Inc. v. NLRB, 512 F.2d 354, 358 (9th Cir. 1975).
434. Id.
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argued that UCS was "nothing more than the freedom of contract.',43 In FedEx
Home Delivery v. NLRB, the majority referred to specifications in the standard
contract between FedEx and delivery drivers as entailing the "type of service"
the contractors agreed to provide "rather than .. . [an] employment
relationship."4 36 The court invoked the symmetry of a contractual exchange: "If
a contractor does not do what she says, FedEx suffers damages, just as she does
if FedEx does not pay what is owed." 437
These courts resolved the
contracting/producing ambiguity by allocating the contracted-for rules to the
sphere of contracting, where the parties are presumably independent.438
To other courts, UCS evidences control in production and is not solely a
contractual phenomenon.43 9 Allocating the contractually specified work tasks to
the sphere of producing thus reveals employer control over the means and
manner of work.44 0 In National Van Lines, the NLRB found that furniture
delivery drivers were employees and not independent contractors, since the
"minute and comprehensive detail in which the manual regulates the conduct of
the drivers in the performance of their duties . .. shows conclusively that the
Employer controls not only the end to be achieved but also the means to be used
in reaching such end.""' The dissent in FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB took
issue with the majority's characterization of work rules in the contract and other
FedEx policies as "merely 'reflect[ing] differences in the type of service the
contractors are providing rather than differences in the employment
relationship."'44 2
The majority, following the arguments of FedEx, had
characterized the work rules as a designation of FedEx's "relatively unique"
business model. 44 3
2.

ExtractingContractingfrom Producing

The synchronous moments of contracting and producing, or contractual
formation and performance in employment, makes the means/ends distinction
inscrutable in UCS cases, perhaps even more than when judges cannot identify
telltale bureaucratic and temporal markers of industrial employment. Under
UCS, the designation of the work in the written contract seems more than an

435. N. Knox Sch. Corp., 154 F.3d at 748.
436. FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 501 (D.C. Cir. 2009); see also N. Knox
Sch. Corp., 154 F.3d at 748 ("There is nothing significant ... in North Knox requiring as a term of
the contract that a driver begin his route at a certain time.").
437. FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 500.
438. See id
439. See FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 511 (Garland, J., dissenting); Nat'l Van Lines,
117 N.L.R.B. 1213, 1219-20 (1957), vacated, 273 F.2d 402 (7th Cir. 1960).
440. See Nat ' Van Lines, 117 N.L.R.B. at 1219-20.
441. Id Note that compliance with the rules in the drivers' manual was a term of the drivers'
contract. Id at 1216.
442. FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 511 (Garland, J., dissenting).
443. Id. at 501.
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arbitrary legal symbol purporting to separate contracting and producing: it might
actually delimit a realm of production in which the worker is independent. On
the other hand, a physically or personally intrusive and fine-grained colonization
of the work process seems to controvert claims of independence in the labor
process, even if such parameters are set forth in the contract. And, if the
relationship is at-will and the alleged employer is invested with far reater
bargaining power, then bargaining and production are still simultaneous.
The manner in which some courts defend their designation of contractual
specification of work directives as incidents of contracting suggests they are not
deploying legal formalism, or privileging the contractual form; as discussed in
the previous Section B some courts suggest that UCS is more consistent with
independent contracting than employment. 445 The contractual designation of
work directives may appear to exhaust the authority over the
workers/contractors 446 and suggest the alleged employer has no further interest in
directing the work beyond that designation. It may seem to be a substitute in
part for direct, in person, real-time supervision.447 To some courts, UCS puts the
worker on meaningful notice of what is required, and if the alleged employer's
supervision does not digress from the contractual specifications, this further
shows that specification of the work is a specification of its results, not of its
manner and means.448 Some courts see UCS as evidence that the parties are
truly independent businesses that have carefully negotiated and described the
work in enough contractual detail so as to enable rational calculations of
anticipated gain.449
Under this interpretation, UCS indicates that the worker's "physical
activities and his time" are not "surrendered to the control of the master."450

444. See COMMONS, supra note 14, at 285.
445. See John Bruntz, The Employee/Independent Contractor Dichotomy: A Rose Is Not
Always a Rose, 8 HOFsTRA LAB. L.J. 337, 376 (1991) (advising companies that want to use
independent contractors rather than employees to draft a "written agreement that details the
worker's duties.").
446. See, e.g., Johnson v. FedEx Home Delivery, No. 04-CV-4935 (JG)(VVP), 2011 WL
6153425, at *13 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2011) (noting that "an employer generally directs an employee
as to which tasks to perform, while an independent contractor is obligated only to perform whatever
tasks it has agreed to by contract").
447. See In re FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 942, 982 (N.D. Ind. 2012);
Merchs. Home Delivery Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 580 F.2d 966, 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1978) ("there is a
difference between directing the means and manner of performance of work and exercising an ex
post facto right to reprimand when the end result is unsatisfactory.").
448. See, e.g., Sahinovic v. Consol. Delivery & Logistics, Inc., No. C 02-4966 SBA, 2004 WL
5833528, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2004) (quoting EEOC v. N. Knox Sch. Bd., 154 F.3d 744, 748
(7th Cir. 1998)) ("Plaintiffs have submitted no evidence of [the alleged employer] imposing
supervision beyond the scope required for the performance of the delivery services. None of the
supervision Plaintiffs have identified was discretionary.").
449. See, e.g., Martinez-Mendoza, 340 F.3d at 1210 n.32 (llth Cir. 2003) ("[B]efore it
formulated its price, [the plaintiffs employer] assessed the possible negative effects the
specification might have on the laborer's' pay and therefore its profits.").
450. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(1) cmt. e (1958).
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UCS is evidence of independent contracting because the contractual detail in the
contract leaves the hiring party no discretion over contractual performance.
Detailed and comprehensive rules must limit the space for further negotiation
during the course of the work. In employment, this market negotiation appears as
the employer's discretion to direct the work and vary the terms and conditions of
work.
If such discretion is limited, it must not be employment. Here, equality
in contracting is not subordination in production.
Courts suggest that by exhausting the alleged employer's authority and
putting the worker on meaningful notice, UCS separates contractual formation
from performance and assures that further bargaining-any further struggle and
contest indicative of that between employee and employer-does not enter into
the productive process. It prevents the alleged employer from dominating
contractual performance and defends a realm of worker independence in
production.
Thus, the court in EEOC v. North Knox School Corp. interpreted
UCS in school bus drivers' contracts with the school board as follows:
"Certainly one can 'control' the conduct of another contracting party by setting
out in detail his obligations; this is nothing more than the freedom of contract.
This sort of one-time 'control' is significantly different than the discretionary
control an employer daily exercises over its employees' conduct." 453 Thus,
courts have suggested that contractual specification of the work cannot be
evidence of control over the work relationship, since it is not "the specificity or
rigor with which a contract characterizes the conditions of its performance, but
the existence of discretionary control" that defines employment. 454 The contract,
not a supervisor or manager, directs the work. 455 And a contract cannot interfere
with, or intervene in, the productive process. For instance, the school district in
Knox argued, "Once North Knox enters into four-year contracts with school bus
drivers or contractors, it exercises no control or supervision over the school bus

451. See, e.g., Rachel Arnow-Richman, The Role of Contract in the Modern Employment
Relationship, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REv. 1, 2 (2003).
452. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)(a) (1958) adds to the ambiguity of
the meaning of UCS. It lists as the first factor to be considered in determining whether one is a
"servant" or "independent contractor," "the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master
may exercise over the details of the work." Id. (emphasis added). If "by the agreement" refers to the
alleged employer's authority that is designated in a written contract, then UCS can be consistent
with an employment relationship, depending on how the decision maker interprets "extent of
control" and nature of the "details." Other decision makers, however, may feel that "agreement"
refers to the whole bargain between the parties. Under this interpretation, UCS can be consistent
with independent contracting on the principle that work requirements designated in a written
contract preclude one party from exercising extra-contractual control in the relationship: specified
terms establish the limits of the parties' legal duties to one another, and one party cannot exercise
any control "by the agreement."
453. EEOC v. N. Knox Sch. Corp., 154 F.3d 744, 748 (7th Cir. 1998).
454. Brown v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 31 Employee Benefits Cas. 2467, 2470 (N.D. Ill. 2003)
(citing Hojnacki v. Klein-Acosta, 285 F.3d 544, 551 (7th Cir. 2002)).
455. See Balinski v. Press Pub. Co., 179 A. 897, 900-901 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1935) (quoting
Simonton v. Morton, 119 A. 732, 734-35 (Pa. 1923)).
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drivers. The element of 'control' is completely absent."4 56 UCS can only be
evidence of independence in contracting, not subordination in production.
If careful contractual specification provides both parties a basis for making
rational economic calculations, then it would seem to supply a quantity term.
Thus, the court in FedEx Home Delivery emphasizes the investment planning
that drivers must undertake before signing a contract.458 And, as discussed in
Part IlI, this missing quantity term is a defining-if not the defining-feature of
employment.459 UCS prevents one party from extracting an undefined amount of
labor from the other.
On the other hand, the contracting/producing ambiguity also makes UCS
seem consistent with employment. Arguing that contractual formation has
absorbed entirely any control over production-that the rules are simply the
agreed-upon service-looks like "high" formalism.
As noted, traditional
formalism interprets contractual labels as revealing party intent, and thus in the
employment context presumes that the agreements are the outcome of voluntary
bargaining-and thereby warrant giving parties the right to summon the state's
coercive intervention. This is of course a dubious technique for deciding
whether parties should have rights and obligations under laws premised on the
lack of such voluntarism. Likewise, UCS may be a spectral screen-perhaps it
does not really filter contractual formation and performance to leave a basin full
of independent production.
The content and scope of the rules may seem incompatible with independent
contracting.
Courts have rejected the notion that setting forth the work
requirements upfront in the contract really limits employer discretion over the
labor process, as opposed to being the medium of that exercise. In National Van
Lines, the NLRB found that furniture delivery drivers were employees and not
independent contractors, since the "minute and comprehensive detail in which
the manual regulates the conduct of the drivers in the performance of their
duties .. . shows conclusively that the Employer controls not only the end to be
achieved but also the means to be used in reaching such end."460
Almost by definition, strict uniform, grooming, demeanor, and customer
dialogue requirements are hardly conceived of as specifications of the results. 4 6 1

456. Brief of Appellees, supranote 382, at 18.
457. Scholars have suggested that, in an employment context, the employer tends to rely on ex
post monitoring and sanctions rather than ex ante contractual specification. See, e.g., J.P. Kostritsky,
"Why Infer"? What the New InstitutionalEconomics Has to Say About Law-Supplied Default Rules,
73 TUL. L. REV. 497, 509 n.77 (1998) (suggesting that, in the agency context, a hirer is more likely
to use "private devices" like supervision and screening, rather than contractual specification). In
considering supervision and discipline as evidence of employment, many variations of the agency
and economic realities tests are consistent with this understanding.
458. FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 498-99 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
459. See supra Part Ill.
460. See Nat'l Van Lines, 117 NLRB 1213, 1219-20 (1957) vacated, 273 F.2d 402 (7th Cir.
1960) (emphasis added).
461. Estrada v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 327, 336-37 (quoting State
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For instance, a court ruling on the FedEx delivery drivers' employment status
remarked that many instructions in the contract, like those regarding the uniform,
driver appearance, logo display, and paperwork and recordkeeping requirements,
"required [FedEx contractor] and its drivers to look and act like FedEx
employees while they performed FedEx services."4 62 A company's direction of
such bodily and psychic presentations belies imageries of the independent
contractor not having a boss dictate when to tip the hat or say "yes sir." Further,
requirements for criminal background checks, "moral character" rules, 463 and
drug testing, may seem too personally invasive in a purportedly arms-length
relationship between independent firms.
Rules that break down tasks into minute and discrete manual, verbal, or
embodied manipulations appear too intrusive to be independent contracting.464
When the contract couples these manipulations with time-discipline (e.g., "leave
terminal to pick up students at 7 am" or "plant 40 seedlings per hour"), 465 even
less so. Adding payment terms calculated according to time which the worker
must commit to complete these work directives, whether specified in terms of
time-monetization-hourly wage-or not-piece rates466-makes the contract
appear even more like employment. The contract may describe a highly
rationalized, integrated production process that risks little to the vagaries of the
worker's discretion or the market. 467
An alleged employer's extensive
supervision of the work, even if pursuant to specific contractual directives, also
describes a rather etiolated form of independence-the boss constantly looking
over one's shoulder. UCS may formalize the manipulability of the control
inquiry when decision makers allow an employer to "carv[e] up its production
process into minute steps, then asserting that it lacks 'control' over the exact
means by which one such step is performed by the responsible workers." 468

Comp. Ins. Fund v. Brown, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 98, 105 (Ct. App. 1995)); Alexander v. FedEx Ground
Package Sys., Inc., 765 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2014) ("Most obviously, no reasonable jury could
find that the 'results' sought by FedEx includes detailed specifications as to the delivery driver's
fashion choices and grooming.").
462. Huggins v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 592 F.3d 853, 859 (8th Cir. 2010).
463. EEOC v. N. Knox Sch., Corp., 154 F.3d 744, 748 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting Ind. Code
§ 20-9.1-3-1(a), (c) (1997), repealed by P.L. 1-2005 § 240 (April 25, 2005)).
464. See Nat'l Van Lines, 117 N.L.R.B. at 1219-20.
465. Cf TILLY & TILLY, supra note 149, at 149 (describing the movement of the coal, health
care, and textile industries "toward monetization and time-discipline, but in different manners and
on quite distinct schedules").
466. Id
467. In other words, despite UCS, the company is "making" the service, not "buying" services
on the "market." For a fuller discussion of the relationship of employment to economic theories of
the firm, see Julia Tomassetti, From Hierarchies to Markets: FedEx Drivers and the Work Contract
as Institutional Marker (Oct. 6, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (draft available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2515818).
468. S.G. Borrello & Sons v. Dep't Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 408 (Cal. 1989) (citing
United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 706, 718 (1947)).
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Some courts also doubt that UCS in fact creates a work relationship that is
not at-will. 469 These courts look beyond designation of the work in the contract
to see if the worker has enforceable expectations apart from payment for
completed work.470 If a putative contractor cannot actually challenge the alleged
employer's interpretation of the workers' purported contractual violation that
forms the basis of the "contract" termination or nonrenewal, then the alleged
employer has relatively unfettered discretion to terminate the relationship.47 In
Wells v. FedEx, the court found that "Plaintiffs could effectively be terminated at
will given that the [contract] provides for nonrenewal without cause."4 72 Estrada
found that "[FedEx] guarantees itself the sole right to interpret by obfuscation of
available remedies to those [drivers] who would challenge its interpretation."
And, FedEx had "almost absolute unilateral control over contract termination to
the point of it being the same as termination at will." 47 3 It also found
questionable FedEx's claims that, apart from quitting their jobs, drivers had any
contractual recourse to remedies (e.g., arbitration or court) for FedEx's apparent
breach of contract. These courts did not find that UCS confined bargaining to
outside of the productive process: drivers "accepted" the terms of the Operating
Agreement by following them during the course of production, and FedEx
repeatedly "offered" them each moment it provided work, making the "contract"
continuously renewed in production. 474 Contractual designation of the work
requirements was not enough to limit the alleged employer's unilateral discretion
The
to vary the terms and conditions of work during production.
employment/non-employment distinction is then, hard to make without
evaluating whether there is a large differential in bargaining power that
persuades one party to concede to an employment relationship, but sign a
contract that states otherwise, and who lacks the leverage to insist that the
employer follow the written terms.
In sum, on the one hand, UCS appears inconsistent with employment: setting
forth the work in the contract should establish a marker between contractual
formation and performance that restricts further negotiation, or an employer's
open-ended discretion to extract an undefined amount of work from the
employee in production. On the other hand, upfront specification appears to be a
medium of control over the productive process that only purports to separate
contracting and producing.

469. See Wells v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 979 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1025 (E.D. Mo.
2013).
470. See id. (citing Skidmore v. Haggard, 110 S.W.2d, 726, 730 (Mo. 1937)).
471. See id. at 1020 (citing Estrada v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 327,
336 (Ct. App. 2007)).
472. Wells v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Nos. 4:10-CV-2080-JAR, 4:06-CV-00422-JAR,
2013 WL 5435484, at *16 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 27, 2013).
473. Estrada, 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 336.
474. See id at 336-37; see also supra Part V.A.
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As elaborated in Part VI even without specification of time-discipline or
time-monetization, and even with minimal industrial supervision, UCS may be
an arbitrary temporal and corporeal marker that does not limit the employer's
ongoing adjustment of the terms and conditions of work.
D.

CapitalistExploitation and Upfront ContractualSpecification

"Exploitation" refers to a more powerful party's appropriation of the product
of direct producers.475 According to Max Weber, under capitalism, this
exploitation would happen through "formally" voluntary, but actually
"compelled," agreements to work for another 476 --here, the employment contract.
The employment relationship was the sociolegal form the capitalist work
relationship assumed, as understood by Weber and Karl Marx: a relationship
between a direct producer with little or no control over productive resources-an
"employee"-and one who controls productive property (capital)-the
"employer." To borrow from Weber, in the fusion of master-servant relations
and contract, the United States acquired the legal form to regulate its
"propertyless stratum ... a class compelled to sell its labor services to live,"
necessary to a capitalist system.477 This stratum comprises free labor workers
who enter agreements to sell their labor, "in the formal sense voluntarily, but
actually under the compulsion of the whip of hunger" 478-and are thereby subject
to masterless slavery. Weber referred to the "characteristic form of the
utilization of capital" under modem capitalism as the "exploitation of other
people's labour on a contractual basis."479 This occurs at the expense of
workers' well being and to the advantage of employers.
It places the
responsibility of sustenance and survival on workers themselves, but excludes
them from access to productive resources. 480

475. Erik Olin Wright, The Shadow of Exploitation in Weber's Class Analysis, 67 AM. Soc.
REV. 832, 845 (2002).
476. 2 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 729-730, 731 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich
eds., Univ. of Cal. Press 1978) (1922). Wythe Holt, George Wythe: Early Modern Judge, 58 ALA.
L. REV. 1009, 1034 n.131 (2007).
477. WEBER, supra note 225.
478. Id
479. MAX WEBER, THE AGRARIAN SOCIOLOGY OF ANCIENT CIVILIZATIONS 50 (R.I. Frank

trans., 1976) (1909).
480. See KARL MARx, 3 CAPITAL (1894), reprinted in KARL MARX: SELECTED WRITINGS

415, 497-99 (David McLellan ed., 1977); Wright, supra note 475, at 845 n.24; Maurice Zeitlin, On
Classes, Class Conflict, and the State: An IntroductoryNote, in CLASSES, CLASS CONFLICT, AND
THE STATE: EMPIRICAL STUDIES IN CLASS ANALYSIS 1, 3 (Maurice Zeitlin ed., 1980);
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CapitalistExploitation and Employment

Max Weber and Karl Marx's understanding of capitalist exploitation in
employment has two sites, or dimensions. 481
The first dimension is what this Article will refer to as "contract"
exploitation. It is in the express and definite terms of the employment contractfor example, terms stating the exchange of an amount of work time for a certain
payment or a piecework rate. The exploitation is in the extent these terms
disfavor the worker and make it difficult to live with dignity. The agreement to
work for poverty wages or be on-call for long periods for little or no
compensation are examples of contract exploitation. Marx's primary example of
contract exploitation in his time was that of the worker agreeing to work for a
full day, or to provide "surplus" labor time, even though the worker can produce
enough value to reproduce his/her ability to work in less than a full day.482 As
an example of the form that power struggles assumed at this site of exploitation
in his time, Marx cited labor unrest over the length of the working day. 48 3
Weber primarily addressed this dimension of exploitation, in which the worker is
compelled to assent to unfavorable contractual terms due to the unequal
bargaining power.484
The second dimension of capitalist exploitation occurs in production. It is
either unspecified in the express agreement or in terms subject to the employer's
interpretation. The employer's superior bargaining power appears not only in
the stated terms of the contract, but also in the open-ended nature of
employment: what distinguished employment from other contractual
relationships between unequal parties was that the employee agreed to a very
special kind of onerous "term"-placing one's energetic faculties under
another's control.485 The employment contract gives the employer unilateral
control to direct human work, including to vary the intensity of the extraction of
labor. The employer's drive to extract as much as possible in the conversion of
labor effort into labor encounters resistance from workers seeking to mitigate
this usage of their vitality:
Within production, on the other hand, the containment of the conflict of
interests between the performers of labor effort and the appropriators of
that effort requires the ongoing exercise of domination through complex

481. This is a less strict interpretation, or at least extended application, of Marx's theory of
exploitation in production as being based on the worker's provision of surplus labor time and thus
surplus labor for which the worker was not recompensed. See KARL MARX, RESULTS OF THE
IMMEDIATE PROCESS OF PRODUCTION (1933), reprinted in KARL MARX: SELECTED WRITINGS,

supra note 480, at 508, 512-14; see also Wright, supra note 475, at 845 n.24.
482. See Karl MARX, 1 CAPITAL (1867), reprinted in KARL MARX: SELECTED WRITINGS,

supra note 480, at 415, 474-75; Wright, supra note 475, at 845.
483. See id.
484. See Wright, supra note 475, at 846.
485. See RICHARD BIERNACKI, THE FABRICATION OF LABOR 279 (1995).
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forms of surveillance, discipline, and control of the labor process. The
conflict over exploitation is not settled in the reciprocal compromise of a
contractual moment; it is continually present in the ongoing interactions
through which labor is performed.48
The conversion of labor effort into labor product in production is a distinct
site of the capitalist's commercial harvest48 or a site of class conflict and
register of class oppression distinct from the specified terms of the exchange.488
Exploitation in employment is thus based on both the definite contractual
terms and on the outcome of the struggle between employer and employee in
489
Further, for Weber and Marx, the imbalance of power in the
production.
market conditions the workers' agreement to the definite terms and to placing
his/her energies at the employer's disposal. Inequality between one who controls
little or no productive property, and who has little other than labor power to offer
for sale in exchange for the necessaries of life, and one who controls greater
productive property, shapes both kinds of exploitation. 490
2.

Exploitation and Upfront ContractualSpecification

Judges' differing interpretations of UCS and their rationales tend to chart
different understandings of capitalist exploitation in employment. In their
interpretations of contractual designation of the work, courts are making
decisions (whether consciously or not) about how to construct the constituent
legal categories of capitalist class relations.
On the one hand, when courts seek to determine whether the contract limits
the alleged employer's open-ended authority to control the work, they recognize
exploitation in production-that employment is based on the unspecified terms
of the agreement and stronger party's continuing "bargaining". to control the
work of the party with less leverage during the labor process. Adequate
specification of the work might indicate that the worker has not agreed to
dispose of the worker's energies however requested by the alleged employer
during production. Courts recognize exploitation in production when they find

486. See Wright, supra note 475, at 846.
487. See KARL MARx, RESULTS OF THE IMMEDIATE PROCESS OF PRODUCTION, in KARL

MARX: SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 480, at 508, 508-09; WEBER, supra note 479, at 729.
488. See MARX, RESULTS OF THE IMMEDIATE PROCESS OF PRODUCTION, in KARL MARX:

SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 480, at 509; WEBER, supra note 479, at 730.
489. Compare supra Part V.C.2 with WEBER, supra note 479, at 730 (defining exploitation in
an employment context); Wright, supra note 475, at 845-46 (examining instances of exploitation in
capitalist employment).
490. Minimum wage statutes are an example of the legislature recognizing contract
exploitation in employment. See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 398-99 (1937) ("The
exploitation of a class of workers who are in an unequal position with respect to bargaining power
and are thus relatively defenseless against the denial of a living wage is not only detrimental to their
health and wellbeing but casts a direct burden for their support upon the community.").
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that traditional and meso-level designations, by contrast, do not restrict the
alleged employer's right to alter the terms and conditions of work in the course
of the work.
However, some judges fail to recognize contract exploitation when they
deem that UCS must be evidence of non-employment on the basis that it restricts
the employer from further intensifying its extraction of labor effort.
Comprehensive and detailed contractual terms may seem to quantify either the
amount of labor product to be exchanged or the intensity of extractionof labor
effort, and thus to prevent exploitation in production. However, as argued
above,. when UCS states an intrusive, micro-colonization of the employee's time
or arduous work/time ratios, then the specification indicates not a limit on
exploitation, but the exercise of exploitation via the medium of the contractual
agreement. Interpreting UCS in these work arrangements as evidence of nonemployment is a formalistic denial of contract exploitation-an exchange that is
exploitative on the basis of the express terms due to the great imbalance of
power in the market between the worker and a party possessing greater
Recognizing that UCS may be consistent with
productive capital.4 91
employment acknowledges that workers often assent to extensive contractual
instruction due to a lack of relative bargaining power. As discussed in Part V,
the contract may be an arbitrary and misleading institutional referent.
THE- EMPLOYMENT/NON-EMPLOYMENT
IN
CONTRACT AS AN INSTITUTIONAL MARKER

VI. STABILITY

DISTINCTION:

Given the lack of a legal-conceptual resolution to the means/ends query,
how do judges evaluate claims of control over the work relationship? How do
they distinguish contractual negotiation from production? "Employment" is a
"social practice"492 or an institutional creature, and judges seek to distinguish
contracting and producing by constructing and interposing institutional
In doing so, judges participate in the contested processes of remarkers.4
institutionalizing employment.
Judges construct and interpose the written contract and practice of signing it
as an institutional marker that purports to segregate contracting and producing,
akin to a meeting and handshake with a hiring manager in industrial
employment. While related, the role of contract as institutional referent is

491. Minimum wage statutes are an example of the legislature recognizing contract
exploitation in employment.
492. Stone, supra note 24.
493. See NLRB v. Labor Ready, Inc., 253 F.3d 195, 201 (4th Cir. 2001); see also Zatz,
Boundaries, supra note 263, at 866, 925-29 (suggesting judges look to "extra-legal" data points or
"relational markers" to determine employment status); VIVIANA ZELIZER, THE PURCHASE OF
INTIMACY 37-38 (2005) ("When it comes to economic activity-transactions involving production,
distribution, and consumption of valuable goods and services-people mark relevant boundaries by
identifying acceptable matches of relations, transactions, media, and boundaries.").

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol66/iss2/2

78

Tomassetti: The Contracting/Producing Ambiguity and the Collapse of the Means

2014]

CONTRACTING/PRODUCING AMBIGUITY

393

distinct from the legal meaning judges impute to its content in specifying or
failing to specify work directives. For example, parties and decision makers may
invoke the length and intricacy of the contract as an institutional referent of nonemployment when the contract comprises pages of "platitudes and
guidelines."4 94 Appeal to an elaborate contractual articulation of the work
relationship is not necessarily an appeal to UCS or its absence in constructing the
contract as institutional referent, although it may incorporate it. More so than
the location of its content on the spectrum outlined in Part V.A, the corporeality
of the contract or written designation of the work, as well as the temporality and
ritual practice of bargaining, drafting, and signing, define the contract as an
institutional marker.
Below, this Article argues that courts often construct and interpose the
contract as an indicator of non-employment. This Article suggests that this is
misleading in many cases.
A.

Contract as Temporal-CorporealBoundary between Contracting and
Producing

The written contract as a temporal and corporeal marker tends to signify
non-employment by purporting to separate the moments of contractual formation
from moments of performance in employment. Solis v. Velocity Express495
provides an illustration. In Solis, the Secretary of Labor brought an FLSA action
against a shipping company for failing to pay overtime to delivery drivers that it
had converted from employees to independent contractors.496 The court applied
the means/ends standard, trying to "separate the facts that indicate Velocity
Express controlled the manner in which work was to be performed from the facts
that suggest nothing more than a contractual expectation between the parties." 497
The Secretary presented evidence that the "size of specific routes led to long,
twelve-to fourteen-hour workdays and prevented the drivers from taking breaks,
working for other delivery companies, or otherwise arranging their schedules,"
contrary to the written contract, which provided that drivers would have this
discretion.4 98 To determine whether the route assignments were evidence of
Velocity's control over the means of the work, the court constructed and
positioned the signing of the written contract as a temporal-corporeal marker that
protected a sphere of production/contractual performance from the
contamination of contractual negotiation:

494. See Estrada v. FedEx Ground, No. BC 210310, 2004 WL 5631425, at *4 (Cal. Super. Ct.
July 26, 2004).
495. No. CV 09-864-MO, 2010 WL 3259917 (D. Or. Aug. 12, 2010).
496. Id. at *1 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2012)).
497. Id. at *5.
498. Id. at *1, *4.
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Another question of fact is whether the drivers' long work days and
inability to take breaks or work for other companies is a function of
Velocity Express's control over its workers or simply an unprofitable
contractual bargain.... [A] trier of fact could find that route selection
was a meaningful way in which Velocity Express exerted control over
its drivers. The Secretary's critical evidence on this issue is the
testimony of delivery drivers who state that they received their route
499
assignments after they contracted with Velocity Express.
The court made the answer to the means/ends question contingent on
whether the oppressive route was specified in the contract at the outset of the
relationship or assigned after the drivers signed. The court distinguished the
case from Knox on this basis.5 0 0 In Solis, the "critical" difference between a
contractor's "unprofitable contractual bargain" and an employer's control over
production was contractual designation: if the company assigned the driver a
route during contractual negotiation, a consequence of which was that the driver
had to work long hours, the control was not indicative of employment status, but
of an "unprofitable contractual bargain."o Rather than controlling production,
502
If the alleged
the employer was exercising bargaining leverage in negotiation.
employer assigned the delivery route only after signing the contract, with the
same resulting long work hours, the route assignment was evidence of
Driving a hard bargain in
employment-of subordination in production.
production, as opposed to during contractual negotiation, was evidence of
employment. If the same disparate bargaining power would explain both a
contractual and post-contractual agreement by drivers to service the route,
however, the contract signing appears to be an arbitrary institutional marker.
B.

The Role of Contract in DesignatingMarkets andHierarchies

Part III noted that work law and the legal tests for employment embody
some assumptions about "markets and hierarchies," or firm/market distinctions
and the conceptual binaries distinguishing intra- from inter-firm relationships in
the
examples where
provided
Part IV.A
industrial work.so 3
work
contracting/producing ambiguity became salient in disputes involving
arrangements that seemed to lack Fordist markers separating where employee
and employer stood as contractual equals from where they stood in a relationship
of subservience.504 Bodie suggests that Ronald Coase's distinction between
command and trade, or the distinction between agency and market relationships

499.
500.
501.
502.
503.
504.

See id. at *6.
Id.; cf EEOC v. N. Knox Sch. Corp. 154 F.3d 744, 748 (7th Cir. 1998).
See id.
See id.
See supra Part I11.
See supra Part IV.A.
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separate firms from markets, in essence distinguishing employment and
independent contracting.505 He argues that factors in the Restatement tests for
employment status reflect, or at least are amenable to interpretation in
accordance with, Coasian distinctions between firms and markets.50 6
The reasoning in many employment status disputes suggests that one way
judges work to institutionalize employment, or stabilize the employment/nonemployment distinction, is looking for inter- and intra-hierarchy data coordinates
reflecting Coasian theories that try to explain why firms "make or buy," or why
firms exist as a way of organizing economic activity apart from markets, and
why boundaries between firms and markets are located where they are.so0
Firms and judges sometimes construct contractual elaboration of the work as
an indicator of non-employment by invoking distinctions between firms and
markets, or inter-firm and intra-firm relations. They draw on tropes of markets
and hierarchies to map contracting onto inter-firm relations (markets) and
producing onto intra-firm relations (firms). Appeals in employment status
disputes to the written contract's extensive articulation of work reflect the
contract's construction as an institutional prop to facilitate this mapping.
Contractual elaboration suggests that the alleged employer has opted to expend
the time and effort on articulating the ends of the work in the written contract in
lieu of spending it in monitoring and directing the work.os It suggests the firm
is incurring the ex ante transaction costs of contractual negotiation and drafting,
typical of a "buy" decision or inter-firm relationship-independent contracting.
The firm appears to be saving on agency costs like ex post supervision and
disciplinary correction that would be typical of a "make" decision or intra-firm
relationship-employment.
Some companies appear to take deliberate advantage of these "make or buy"
associations while appealing to contractual designation to signal inter-firm

505. See Bodie, supra note 46, at 696. Coase's theory of why a firm might be cheaper than the
market in organizing production reflects the doctrinal differences between employment and
commercial contract that registered and reinforced the employee's subordinate status. He suggested
that the legal mechanism of contract was inadequate when the entrepreneur did not want to work out
significant details of the deal ex ante. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386,
391-92 (1937).
506. See Bodie, supra note 46, at 707 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)
(1958)).
507. See, e.g., Williamson, supra note 144, at 558-59. Several factors in the
Darden/Restatement and economic realities tests are consistent with transaction cost or "make or
buy" analyses. For example, the extent of supervision and a company's right to discipline the
worker distinguish the agency costs of ex post monitoring and enforcement rather than the
transaction costs of ex ante contracting. The factors of whether the alleged independent contractor
services others and "whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or
business," bear on whether there is a monopsony arrangement, and asset specificity and uncertainty,
under a transaction cost analysis. See Bodie, supra note 46, at 703-04.
508. See In re FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d at 977.
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relationships. 50 9 FedEx has contended that its training program, mandatory for
drivers without commercial experience, "isn't training, but a precondition, to
becoming a contractor." 510 Here, worker training, the contractual requirement
that drivers undergo before signing, turns what usually indicates a "make"
decision and control over the manner of the work-training in firm-specific
practices-into a "buy" decision. The contracting/producing ambiguity provides
companies the opportunity to manipulate "make or buy" symbols, and requires
rethinking whether many work arrangements are really "post-industrial." It also
requires recognizing that judges, in imputing legal meaning to these
characterizations, are participating in processes of institutionalization.
C.

Contract as Misleading Institutional Marker: Technology and Service
Work

The written contract may contemplate ongoing direction of the work, albeit
not through in-person, real-time supervision but through logistics technology and
customer monitoring. It may deposit the worker into a highly rationalized and
integrated productive process as another cog in the machine. When judges
interpret the written contract as evidence of independent contracting in these
cases, they interpose the contract as an institutional marker that does not
effectively defend a realm of independent production but simply registers
differences in the labor process between industrial manufacturing and other
work.
In these cases, interpreting UCS as consistent with independent
contracting appears to be high formalism.
Part V.A looked at different levels of contractual specificity in laying out the
work, from simply labeling the work relationship as independent contracting to
describing in substantial detail and scope the tasks the worker is to perform. The
author construed meso formalism as reasoning that neutralizes contractual
provisions reciting the legal incidents of employment so that, while true
statements of the relationship, they no longer have the legal consequence of
subjecting the relationship to work law. This Article argued that attempts to
answer the means/ends question by interpreting meso-level contractual
designations of the work as specification of the "results" was a more obvious,
but unfortunately prevalent, form of contractual formalism: it interposes the
written contract as a flimsy membrane between contractual formation and
performance. This Article also argued that UCS makes it more difficult to see if
contractual negotiation is truly over once the worker begins production. Here,
this Article suggests that attempts to institutionalize UCS, or what appears to be

509. See id; see also supra Part IV. For instance, FedEx designated ex post sanctions as ex
ante contracting: Ex post sanctions in the form of disciplinary meetings were contractually required
business discussions that provided recommendations. In re FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 734
F.Supp.2d 557, 570 (N.D. Ind. 2010). FedEx labeled what functioned like a Human Resources
department as a "Contractor Liaison."
510. In re FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 734 F. Supp. 2d at 563.
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an elaborate contractual articulation of the work relationship, as an institutional
marker of non-employment may also be contractual formalism.
In some work arrangements, the written contract appears to go farther than
describing features of the work process, stating elements of employment under
the agency and economic tests, or stating institutional features of industrial
work-a full-time, five-day workweek. Contractual provisions that purportedly
describe a contractor's work responsibilities approach describing the
organization of the enterprise and an integrated production process, including a
division of labor and bureaucratic hierarchy. Despite elaborating the work
relationship, the contract does not shield the production process from bargaining:
the provisions require intensive and ongoing direction of the worker in the
course of production, even if not in the form of the in-person, real-time
supervision, of industrial work. The provisions state relations in production
among coworkers and between workers and management. It describes an
indivisible fraction of management's coordination of the collective work in terms
of individual responsibilities. The detailed written contract may, in essence,
diagram the enterprise organization and deposit the worker into an integrated and
highly rationalized production process.
The FedEx delivery drivers' work is one such example.5 1 The FedEx labor
process differs from Fordist manufacturing work in that contractual designation
and advanced logistics and communications technology partially replace the
roles that heavy, integrated machinery and real-time, in-person supervision
played in coordinating, directing, and pacing industrial manufacturing work.
Typical features of the "typical" industrial employer's open-ended control over
production included the design of a productive process through time-study
engineering and use of supervisors to monitor and adjust work effort and
speed.512 FedEx uses logistics and communications technology to organize a
complex division of labor and coordinate its drivers' delivery work. 513 It
controls the pacing of work, but primarily through its sophisticated logistics
system and contractual specification rather than through machine speed and the
foreman's harrying. 5 14 FedEx also controls the drivers' work hours and work
loads by calculating the number of packages deliverable in a nine-and-a-half to
eleven-hour day, taking into account driving distances and time per stop.5 15
Supervisors are charged with recording how many steps a driver takes between
the truck and building and whether the driver enters the next coordinates in the
scanner while walking between drop-off point and truck and regularly adjusting

511. See, e.g., In re FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 734 F.Supp.2d at 561 (discussing the
provisions in FedEx's Operating Agreement).
512. Compare In re FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 734 F.Supp.2d at 560-71 (describing
the FedEx Operating Agreement and working processes), with VINEL, supranote 37, at 205.
513. See In re FedEx GroundPackageSys., Inc., 734 F.Supp.2d at 570-71.
514. See id. at 568-571.
515. See id. at 569-70; Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 765 F.3d 981, 985 (9th
Cir. 2014).
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drivers' service areas.5 16 Further, FedEx replaced in part the constant eye of the
foreman with modem communications technology-the ID badges, networked
scanners, and barcode technology-and by conscripting the customer to monitor
and evaluate the drivers' performance through audits and the customer-tracking
database. As in an integrated manufacturing facility, the FedEx operation is a
large machine amalgamating diverse steps of production. However, this
machine is largely invisible because it is built with logistics technology rather
than steel and gears.m
Few would question that upfront or pre-specification of work embedded in
assembly line machinery, and a firm's control over when that machine is turned
on, for how long, its speed, and its operation modes, would demonstrate that the
firm was not really exercising control over the means of the work.5 18 Should it
be of legal consequence whether a supervisor or contract directs a worker
assigned to an assembly line station to, "rotate the widget clockwise [ninety]
degrees as it comes down the conveyer belt and then insert a pin," or whether it
is a widget on a conveyor belt or package on a pallet that a driver must deliver to
a specified place in a specified manner as a geographic/manual manipulation of
his/her assigned station at the logistics machine? Given FedEx's control over the
work process, interpreting the contract as describing the "results" of the work is
high formalism.
Several courts are working to stabilize the employment/non-employment
distinction by constructing and interposing the signing of a written contract as a
temporal-corporeal marker that defends a boundary between contracting and
producing and establishes a territory of independent production. Yet the contract
is misleading as an institutional marker of non-employment when the invisible
authority and discretion of a logistics regime replaces the more visible direction
of integrated machinery and the foreman. It construes differences in the labor
process from industrial work as differences in authority relations in work.
VII. CONCLUSION

Work arrangements in which the alleged employer includes detailed and
comprehensive task directives in a contract at the outset of the relationship pose
a fundamental dilemma under the dominant inquiry in employment status

516. See id at 569.
517. See id. at 570, 573.
518. According to Max Weber, in the capitalist enterprise, the "organization of work was

embedded in rational technology." WEBER, supra note 479, at 1395. "[U]nified control over the
means of production and raw materials create[d] the possibility of subjecting labor to a stringent
discipline and hence of controlling the speed of work and of attaining standardization of effort and
of product quality." Id. at 137. Logistics systems are less visible as the "means of production" and
"raw materials" than the technology that Weber referenced, but just as rational and capable of
domination. See, e.g., Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61, 75 (2d Cir. 2003) (questioning
whether pre-specification of work tasks in fabric patterns was evidence of control over the means of
the work).
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disputes-whether the alleged employer controls only the "ends" of the work or
also the "details" of the work. This Article showed that the apparent collapse of
the process/product 'distinction in these cases is grounded in the contradictory
nature of the employment contract. 519
Neither misapprehension of non-industrial work when considered through
the lens of static legal categories nor unwieldy legal tests for employment status
adequately explain the persistent legal disagreement as to what constitutes an
employment relationship. Rather, the employment contract itself destabilizes the
legal employment/non-employment distinction. The tension between servitude
and equality is constitutive of the legal employment relationship and confounds
the means/ends query-a fundamental and nearly ubiquitous question in
employment status disputes-even within "standard" industrial work
relationships.
It makes ambiguous the distinction between contractual
negotiation and production, as well as between the property rights of the
entrepreneur and contractual rights of the employer to direct the work.
In employment, relations of equality coincide with relations of servitude,
and judges navigate the means/ends query by constructing markers-tenporal,
bureaucratic, technological, and other-to partition contracting and producing.
While these markers are arbitrary as a legal matter-they are symbols rather than
signs bearing some necessary or natural resemblance to legal concepts-they
also work to make employment legible as a legal and social practice. As
industrial forms of work disintegrate or mutate, judges in employment status
disputes participate in the contested process of re-institutionalizing employment.
Interpretations of different contractual designations of the work in employment
status disputes suggests a different role for "contract" than that of either a legal
phenomenon or persuasive normative idiom: contract may be doing "work" as an
institutional marker in employment status disputes.
Tweaking the tests for employment status will not calm the legal turbulence
over the identity of the employment relationship. Proposals for reforming work
law must not lose sight of the contradiction between servitude and equality in the
employment contract.
This contradiction makes the means/ends question
irresolvable and leaves the intelligibility of employment as a meaningful social
relationship dependent on forces of institutionalization. Political contests over
re-institutionalization-waged in the courts but also beyond-will determine the
post-industrial employment relationship.

519. For a discussion of the process/product distinction in legal contexts outside of
employment law, see Douglas Kysar, Preferencesfor Processes: The Process/ProductDistinction
and the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REv. 525 (2004). Kysar interrogates the
process/product distinction for creating and patrolling a distinction between the interests of
consumers as market actors and their interests as citizens under trade law, constitutional law on
commercial speech, and environmental, health, and safety regulations.
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